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CHINESE COMMUNIST ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION
19^9-1965
A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 
CHAPTER I
The People's Republic of China (PRC) came into exist­
ence on October 1, 19*+9. This new nation-state, which is 
generally referred to by popular news media as Communist 
China, was the result of years of civil war between Mao Tse- 
Tung and his communist followers and Chiang Kai-shek and his 
nationalists. Chiang's forces were driven to the island of 
Formosa (Taiwan) where they still remain as a sort of vestigal 
Chinese government. In fact, of course, mainland China has 
been firmly in the hands of the communists for more than fif­
teen years. The unhappy situation of two Chinese governments 
has meant that some countries have recognized the Mao Tse- 
tung group as the legitimate rulers of China while others 
persist in supporting Chiang Kai-shek.
The Soviet Union is one of the powers which recognized 
the communist claim to the official government of China, that 
is, the People's Republic. Moreover, for a long time the
2Chinese conmrunists hailed the Soviet Union as tutor, example, 
and benefactor. Under these circumstances it appeared that 
the two largest countries in the world— both communist— had 
effected a unity of friendship and purpose which might not 
auger well for the Western Democracies. For years a steady 
stream of mutually commendatory statements flowed between 
Moscow and Peking. Then a few notes of minor irritation be­
gan to arise. These notes piled higher, one on top of 
another, until Western commentators started speaking cau­
tiously of a Sino-Soviet split. By 1963, it was no longer 
necessary to be cautious, since both the Russians and the 
Chinese were openly acknowledging the breach and were trying 
to put the blame for it on each other.
The general history of growing hostility between Com­
munist China and the Soviet Union from 19^9 through 1965 can 
be structured in traditional research fashion. There is a 
good deal of literature on the subject, although not as 
much as one might like. Few American writers got inside of 
China during these years because of the opposition of the 
United States State Department. Perhaps they would not have 
been welcomed by the Chinese anyway. On the other hand, a 
good many European authors have gone there and reported 
their experiences. Several hundreds of Chinese have left 
their homeland, and they have told their own stories. Then 
too, Chinese radio broadcasts have been monitored by the
3West, and the Republic's newspapers, news magazines, and 
some official party documents are generally available to 
anyone who wants them. By making careful use of both of 
these primary and secondary sources of information, it was 
possible to construct a historical narrative reflecting 
Chinese Communist attitudes toward the Soviet Union from 
19^9 through 196?.
Fortunately, it was also possible to utilize one of 
the newer methods of research, content analysis, in deter­
mining the intensity of Chinese attitude during a part of 
this period. This is not to say that the traditional ap­
proach was inadequate or that content analysis is necessar­
ily better. Rather, by combining the old and the new meth­
odologies, additional insights and corroboration were gained.
Content analysis was originally developed by psychol­
ogists to aid them in their research. Now it has been 
adopted, in various forms, by many branches of social sci­
ence, including political science. The form used here was 
the Q-Sort which produced a quantitative measurement of 
hostility between the two countries as seen from the Chinese 
point of view.
The historical narrative reveals that over the years, 
several PRC leaders made statements concerning their atti­
tude toward the Soviet Union. Sometimes these statements 
were friendly, sometimes they were in the form of a mild
If
rebuke, and sometimes they were outright hostile or even 
vicious.
Usually, the statements were part of a general speech 
made upon the occasion of some party anniversary or perhaps 
at a plenary session of a party congress. These speeches 
were often printed in either Chinese or Russian newspapers, 
broadcast over Peking radio, or passed out to foreign dele­
gates attending one of the congresses. In any event, most 
of the speeches are available to Western scholars in one form 
or another. In fact, one of the best sources for the docu­
ments is the United States Consulate General in Hong Kong 
which has, for years, collected the more important ones and 
published them, in English, under the general title of Cur­
rent Background. With a few exceptions, it was selected 
passages from these documents that were subjected to the Q- 
Sort process.
SCOPE OF THE STUDY
A simple but practical way of studying Chinese Com­
munists' attitudes toward the Soviet Union was to divide the 
period 19^9-196? into two parts. The first part covers rough­
ly the first eight years, and the second part, the remaining 
seven. The reason for the division was not because the 
earlier period was friendly and the latter hostile; such 
was not necessarily the case. But rather it was because of 
the amount and type of information recorded.
5In general, much of what could he said about the 
years from 19^9 to 1957 or 1958 rested on research performed 
by the Western observers. Neither the PRC nor the USSR pub­
lished many of their official documents that might have an 
important bearing on their true attitude toward each other. 
The result is that a good deal of inference must be drawn 
from what was said and done, by officials both inside and 
outside of these two countries. Aay conclusions reached, 
therefore, are speculative at best, even when based, in some 
cases, on fairly substantial historical evidence. Of course, 
as one approaches 1956, the amount of material picks up 
dramatically so that a somewhat, better picture can be made.
On the other hand, from 1959 on, the volume of pub­
lished documents increases, until by 1963, it reached stag­
gering proportions indeed. This allowed for a far greater 
use of primary materials which presumably made the conclu­
sions more reliable.
At the same time, dividing the study in half provided 
a practical advantage in the employment of the Q-Sort exer­
cise. Since it was necessary to build the exercise around 
official statements only, and since there were good reasons 
for not trying to cover too great a time span, the Q-Sort 
could be limited very nicely to just the second half of the 
period covered. Moreover, by a singular stroke of luck, it 
was these last seven years or so that produced most of the 
"fireworks" between the PRC and the USSR.
6In short then, while the historical method of research 
was applied to the entire fifteen years, only the last seven 
years were subjected to content analysis methodology. No 
attempt was made to overly-formali%e the division, so as 
not to detract from the whole.
OBJECTIVES
The formation and subsequent demise of an alliance 
between the two largest and most populous communist countries 
in the world is certainly a phenomenon of great interest to 
students of international relations. Also, when these two 
events take place within a relatively short period of time, 
a fascinating array of subjects present themselves for study. 
The fact that both the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic 
of China operate, most of the time, behind a veil of secrecy 
only heightens the curiosity. Under the circumstances, the 
first objective of the study was to review Sino-Soviet rela­
tions from 1949 through 196? in order to gain some insights 
into Chinese Communists' attitudes toward their Northern 
neighbors during that period.
A second objective was to establish the efficacy of a 
behavioral device in performing social science research.
For a long time, social scientists were pretty well limited 
to research in areas that landed themselves to the traditional, 
historical approach of investigation* It was necessary to
7survey the available literature, to dig into archives, to 
review memoirs, and so on, in order to develop the desired 
information. In this way, a tremendous amount of extremely 
valuable research was advanced and the method will doubtlessly 
continue to do yoeman service in the future. However, in 
recent years, a number of behavioral research techniques 
have appeared upon the scene. They have the advantage of 
allowing the social scientist to subject his information to 
various numerical interpretations, which are more objective, 
and therefore more subject to tests of validity, than is 
usually the case with the traditional approach. Happily, 
it is also possible, to put the two methods together, as was 
done in this study. As mentioned earlier, the device tested 
was the Q-Sort form of content analysis. The conclusions 
developed from the Q-Sort and the historical approach were 
mutually re-enforcing.
CHAPTER II
There Is general agreement among current historians 
that relations between the Peoples Republic of China and the 
Soviet Union during the first seven or eight years of the 
PRC's existence were reasonably friendly. Most of them sug­
gest that this attitude changed to one of hostility sometime 
between 1956 and 1959. The following quotation from Edward 
Crankshaw's book, The New Cold War: Moscow Pekin, is
representative:
It is impossible to say with certainty the precise date 
at which the Chinese decided that they had to challenge 
Khrushchev. Later on we shall see, when we come to 
consider the climacteric year, I960, that Khrushchev 
gave 1959 as the beginning of the conflict, accusing 
China of then beginning to violate the Moscow Declara­
tion of November 1957, a policy document sighed by all 
the bloc parties after their meeting to celebrate the 
fortieth anniversary of the Russian revolution. But 
the Chinese themselves gave 1956 as the critical year, 
the year of the 20th Party Congress at which Khrushchev 
made his secret speech denouncing Stalin.1
Since the "split" date is in some dispute then, it 
might be convenient to consider the friendly period as last­
ing through 1957. This is roughly the point at which the
^Edward Crankshaw, ggg Cold War: Moscow v. Pekin
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1963), p. 23.
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9"Great Leap Forward" was Inaugerated by the Chinese and it 
effected a decided Influence on Slno-Sovlet relations.
The new Chinese Republic was established on October 1, 
19^9» and within a matter of hours It was recognized by the 
Soviet Union. While the beginning of diplomatic relations 
between the two Communist states was routine, there was 
nothing routine about the visit of Mao Tse-tung to Moscow 
later In the year. In the first place, Mao was In a highly 
unusual position. He was the leader of the most populous 
communist country In the world; yet he had never been to 
Russia— or anywhere outside Chlna--dld not speak Russian, and 
had largely Ignored Russian advice for more than twenty years. 
In the second place, Stalin had given aid and comfort through­
out the Chinese civil war period to Chiang Kai-shek's nation­
alists which must have cost many communist lives. Finally, 
both Mao and Stalin had learned from cruel experience how to 
be tough, dispassionate bargainers. It Is not likely, there­
fore, that the Kremlin leader could view his visitor as just 
another relatively unimportant satellite head.
After Mao demonstrated his mastery of China beyond further 
doubt. Stalin hailed the Communist victory In China as 
the strongest blow dealt world Imperialism since the Octo­
ber revolution . . . .  Subsequently and until the day of 
his death, Stalin gave minimum cause for Chinese suspicion, 
refrained from territorial aggrandizement and unmasked 
Intervention In Internal affairs, and allowed Peking a 
degree of expression and action which he had previously 
denied to Tito.2
^Charles A. Buss, The Far East (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1955), P« 5^7.
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All of this would seem to indicate that the two men 
met in an atmosphere of mutually recognized equality. While 
this was partially true, it was not long before an unspoken 
but nevertheless clear limit was placed on Mao's position.
In the first blush of victory over the Kuomintang, the
Chinese liked to speak of their way as a model for backward
and colonial countries everywhere:
Echoing and developing the thesis expressed by Liu Shao- 
chi in a famous interview with Anna Louise Strong in 19^, 
they claimed in their propaganda that Mao was an independ­
ent prophet and theorist and that his writings embodied 
a new and independent ideology: the path marked out by
them for other undeveloped countries was referred to as 
"Mao's Road."3
The Russians, however, easily found a way to put an end
to these pretensions:
When in February 1950 a Chinese delegate travelled to 
Moscow to negotiate a new trade and communications agree­
ment, the negotiations dragged on until mid-June, ten 
days before the outbreak of the Korean War. After that 
much less was heard^about Mao Tse-tung as a prophet and 
an Asian Karl Marx.
In short, Mao was high up the ladder of world communist hier­
archy, but Stalin was at the top.
Mao Tse-tung remained in Moscow for some nine weeks.
The more or less secret discussions with Stalin no doubt 
ranged over a wide variety of topics. A few authors have
3crankshaw, p. 21.
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suggested that the two men may have spent some of the time 
planning the Iforean War, but absolute documentation for this 
is lacking.^ On the other hand, a number of treaty arrange­
ments and economic agreements were made which are now a mat­
ter of public record. They signed on February 1^, 1950, a 
Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid. A main 
feature of that treaty was that if either contracting party 
was attacked by Japan or any state collaborating with Japan 
(meaning the United States), the other would immediately come 
to her aid with military and other assistance. The two 
powers agreed to work for an early peace treaty with Japan, 
to consult each other over international affairs of mutual 
concern, and to establish close economic and cultural ties.
In some respects the Russians were actually quite 
generous to the Chinese in these negotiations. They agreed 
to give up their claims to the Chinese-Changchun Railroad, 
Port Arthur, and Dairen without compensation by the end of 
1952 or upon the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan.
'One of the more interesting accounts along this line 
is by Harold C. Hinton of the George Washington University 
Institute for Defense Analyses. In his book, Communist China 
in World Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966),
pp. 205-1 1, Professor Hinton argues that Mao pushed for the 
war on behalf of the North Koreans. The North Ikreans wanted 
to strike early before South Korea received important support 
from General IfecArthur who presumably called for a re-armed 
Japan in a speech he made January 1, 1950. Stalin is pic­
tured as being hesitant about the whole thing.
12
The transfer of all property was accomplished by 1952 except 
for Port Arthur. Probably, because of the Korean War, the 
Chinese requested that joint control and use of the naval 
base there continue for some time.
The USSR also extended a credit to China in the value 
of 3 00,000 ,000 US dollars at one per cent interest. This was 
to be paid out at the rate of $6 0,0 00 ,000 a year for five 
years. The Chinese had 4 ^ repay the loan in ten annual in­
stallments beginning December 31» 195^. In all probability, 
this was a good deal less money than the PRC had hoped for, 
and it could not begin to compare with the sort of funds that 
the US was laying out to her allies under the Marshall Plan.
A few weeks later, on March 27, 1950, additional a- 
greements were made for joint-stock companies to exploit oil 
and other mineral deposits in the Sinkiang area, also to operate 
airlines between China and various cities in Siberia.^
In summary, it would appear that the Chinese Communists 
and the Soviet Union certainly started out on the right note 
during these early months. The age-old Chinese cries of "for­
eign devils" and "unequal treaties" could hardly have been 
applied to the Russians at this stage of the game even if the 
loans were a bit parsimonious.
good account of these agreements can be found in 
most modern history texts on China or Russia. The Buss book, 
pp. 5^8-5^9 ) quoted earlier is one such example.
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The period from October 19^9 to March 1953» when Stalin 
died, was, in general, a reasonably calm period in Sino-Soviet 
relations. As has already been noted, a number of treaty and 
trade agreements were completed that should have gone a long 
way toward eliminating or reducing any outstanding trouble 
areas between the two powers. Then too, most of this period 
coincides with the Korean War in which both countries played 
major roles. It is quite possible that the Chinese may have 
resented the use of their "volunteer" manpower as cannon- 
fodder while the Russians only supplied material aid, but it 
could be argued that this gave the PRC a chance to displace 
some of the Soviet influence over the North Koreans. Further­
more, there is evidence to suggest that the Chinese received 
substantial additional credits from the USSR during these 
years, no doubt to help ease the severe economic strain of 
the war. The most important point to be made here is that 
the war probably kept the Chinese too busy to engage in any 
mischief with their Northern ally.
Another reason for the relatively stable years of 19^9 
to 1953 would be Stalin himself. As long as he was alive, 
his mantle of leadership over the communist world was almost 
indisputable. "Stalin had had the prestige of almost three
^Harry Schwartz, Tsars. Mandarins. and Commissars 
(New York: Lippincott Company, 196M-), p. 150.
I h
decades of Soviet leadership as Lenin's successor. He had led 
the Soviet Union to victory In World War II and had spread
o
Communist rule In Europe and Asia.” There Is general agree­
ment that the Chinese acceded to Stalin's position and may 
even have been somewhat moved by his death. "No other non- 
Chinese figure In modern times has, through his death, occa­
sioned the overwhelming, unspontaneous Chinese attention 
which Stalin called forth. There was an official mourning 
meeting In Peking, with over half a million people present, 
and a required flve-mlnute period of silence throughout the 
country. Peking automatically produced a special essay, 
signed by Mao Tse-tung and dedicated to Stalin, entitled The
9
Greatest Friendship." Buss puts It quite simply by saying, 
"As long as Stalin lived, he was Russia to the Chinese Com­
munists."^® All of this Is not to say that the Chinese viewed 
Stalin as some sort of Socialist Pope who was Infallible and 
unassailable. Rather, It does suggest a pragmatic awareness 
that Stalin had been around a long time and that he was firmly 
In control of one of the two most powerful countries In the 
world.
^Schwartz, p. 151.
9
^Howard L. Boorman, Alexander Eckstein, Philip E. 
Mosely, Benjamin Schwartz, Moscow-Peklng Axis; Strengths and 
Strains (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957)> pp. 13-1^.
^®Claude A. Buss, Asia In the Modern World : A History
at China. Japan. South p d  Southeast Asia (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1964-), p. 658.
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It should also he apparent that these early years in 
the history of the PRC are years in which both the Russians 
and the Chinese were busy straightening up their own houses.
The USSR was still recovering from World War II in which it 
had suffered enormous losses. There was the problem of con­
solidating control over the Eastern European satellite coun­
tries, including the trouble with Tito in Yugoslavia. Finally, 
the Russians were anxious to come up to the United States in 
nuclear weaponry (or surpass it) since the cold war was in 
full force. Therefore, Moscow’s attention was on the West, 
Europe and America, and she treated the new Chinese Republic 
as a secondary interest.
For their part, the Communist Chinese were beset with 
a multitude of problems besides the Korean venture. One of 
the most important of these was that of establishing effective 
governmental control over 6^0,000 ,000 or more people spread 
out over 3,700,000 square m i l e s . A d d  to this the fact that 
both transportation and communications were extremely limited, 
villages, cities, and countryside were war-torn, and inflation 
was horrendous. Furthermore, the Chinese felt that it was 
necessary to move quickly into both Sinkiang provence and 
Tibet, presumably to forestall any Russian interests in those
^^hese are rounded-off estimated figures taken from 
Statistical Yearbook. 1965 (New York: United Nations, 1966)
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areas. Then there was the belligerent attitude of the United 
States with its atomic bombs plus a petulant Chiang Kai-shek 
sitting at the end of a short leash on the island of Formosa. 
It would no doubt be an understatement to suggest that Mao 
Tse-tung had his hands full.
In short then, both countries were well enough occupied 
at home as to leave little time or inclination to seriously 
bother each other. To be sure, there were strains in the 
alliance, but there was also an obvious effort to keep them 
within bounds. If these were fairly good years, however, the 
next two or three were even better. In fact, one author has
called the period between 1953 and 1956 the "Post-Stalin
12Honeymoon" in describing relations between the USSR and PRC.
The Communist Chinese were immediate beneficiaries of 
Stalin's death. Practically all of the communist rulers at­
tended the funeral except Mao; he was represented by Chou En- 
Lai, who happened to be in Moscow on other business at the 
t i m e . T h e  Russians went out of their way to thrust forward 
the Chinese as their principal ally. In the funeral proces­
sion, Chou walked in the front rank with Malenkov, Beria, and
^^David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev: A Short His-
torv of the Slno-Soviet Conflict (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1963), p. 17.
^^There does not seem to be any official explanation 
for Mao's absence. A cautious guess has been made that the 
weather may have not been favorable for flying. Besides,
Mao, it is generally believed, does not like to fly, and the 
trip by train would have taken too long.
17
Khrushchev. When the funeral orations were given from the 
balcony of Lenin's tomb, Chou stood with the members of the 
Soviet Presidium. No other non-Russian leader was accorded
IIl
these two honors. Moreover, on March 10, a picture appeared
in Pravda. the official Russian Communist Party newspaper,
showing Stalin in the middle with Malenkov on one side and
Mao Tse-tung on the other. The picture was a forgery, a
composite! What was its purpose? A quick guess would be
that Malenkov wanted to associate himself with Stalin but
that would be only partly true.
The point was rather to link Malenkov with Mao Tse-tung, 
to identify Mao and the Chinese Communists with the suc­
cession to Stalin-Mao-Malenkov picture, even if there 
had not been other evidence that the Chinese Communists 
had been promoted almost overnight to joint leadership 
of the Communist camp.15
About two weeks later the Russians gave further indica­
tion of their desire to elevate the Chinese Communists by re­
placing their ambassador to Peking. They sent V. V. Kuznetsov, 
who at the same time was also named a Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs.
He was the first Russian chief of mission assigned to 
Peking since 19^9 who had not previously been accredited 
to the National Government of China, either in Chungking 
or later in Nanking. One might speculate about the re­
actions of the Chinese Communists to the fact that Stalin,
^^Ibyd, p. 1 8.
18
during his lifetime, had sent as diplomatic representa­
tives to Peking men who had earlier been accredited to 
the very government in China against which the Chinese 
Communists had fought so long and so hard. It was clear 
in any case, that Moscow's assignment of a Deputy Foreign 
Minister to Peking definitely raised the status of the 
Soviet embassy there.
The Chinese may also have gained from Stalin's death
in that, four days after the funeral, Chou En-Lai suddenly
announced certain concessions that made an end of the Korean
War a possibility. This may have happened even if Stalin had
lived, but "The Communist bloc . . . appears to have been
more genuinely desirous of an armistice after Stalin's death
17than it had been earlier."
There were two important events in 195^ which high­
lighted the "honeymoon" period. One was the Geneva Conference 
and the other, a visit to Peking by a very important Soviet 
delegation.
The war in Indo-China between the French and the Viet 
Minh forces of Ho Chi-minh had dragged on for a number of 
years. It is likely that Ho wanted to continue the struggle, 
confident that he could win it all, especially after his spec­
tacular victory over the French stronghold of Dienbienphu. 
However, it is even more likely that both Moscow and Peking 
were tired of the strain on international relations and were
l^Boorman, (gt. al., p. 1 5. 
l?Ibid.. p. 16.
19
l8also wary of possible United States interference. In any
event, a conference was called in Geneva to end the matter
and the Communist Chinese took part. This was their first
good opportunity to be seen on the world stage, and they took
full advantage of it.
Their delegation to Geneva was headed by Chou En-lai,
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and considerably 
outnumbered every other delegation. The Chinese took 
over one of the largest hotels in the city and engaged 
a fleet of cars to carry them around. Chou En-lai in­
stalled himself, like the other great power delegations, 
in a villa and proceeded to receive and be received by 
British and French statesmen. There was no mistaking 
the concern of the Chinese to demonstrate that they knew 
as well as any government how to behave as a major 
power.19
More importantly, "Chou En-lai went far in establishing Peking's
point that the settlement of Asian problems would inevitably
20involve Western negotiations with Communist China."
Perhaps of greater significance to the Chinese was the
Soviet delegation that arrived in Peking in October of 195^.
It appears certain that Moscow was ready and willing to please
the Chinese in the subsequent negotiations by the caliber of
men sent to bargain. They were no less than party Presidium
members Nikita Khrushchev, Nikolai Bulganin, and Anastas Miko-
yan. This was the most powerful Russian delegation to visit
21
China since the founding of the PRC.
^®Schwartz, p. 1?2, 
^^Floyd, p. 2 1.
^^Boorman, gt. âi., p. 20. 
21schwartz, p. 153.
20
A number of agreements were concluded which practical­
ly removed all traces of the Russian presence in China. One 
of them called for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from 
Port Arthur with their installations going to the Chinese. 
Another turned over to the Chinese all Soviet shares in the 
joint companies that had been exploiting mineral and oil de­
posits in Sinkiang, the joint aviation company, and the ship 
building and repair company in Dairen. Of course, the Chi­
nese had to pay for these shares, but at least they would 
have sole ownership. Plans were also announced for a rail­
road linking the Soviet Union and China across Sinkiang, giv­
ing the Chinese better access to this area and that of Soviet 
Central Asia than they had ever had before. Finally, the 
Russians extended to their ally an additional credit of
$130,000,000, plus a promise to aid in the development of
22more than a hundred new industrial enterprises. A separate 
Sino-Soviet-Mongolian agreement concluded during this same 
period provided for another railroad link between the USSR 
and the PRC only through Outer M o n g o l i a . I n  effect, this 
line gave the Chinese a chance later on to penetrate that 
Russian Satellite in an attempt to bring it more closely into 
the Chinese sphere of influence.
^^Ibid.. pp. 153-^.
23Boorman, et. al., p. 24.
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It must surely seem strange that In a mere matter of 
days the Russians were so willing to give up the hard-won 
gains in China of Tsars and Commissars alike. The official 
explanation, as indicated by Comrade Khrushchev upon depart­
ing Peking, is of little help. "These agreements are based 
on the principles of deep respect for each other, fraternal
pL
concern, and mutual assistance." In his book. Tsars. Man­
darins. and Commissars. Harry Schwartz offers a reflection 
that is much less altruistic. He thinks that the ever- 
practical Russians realized that it was only a matter of 
time before China would be strong enough to demand these con­
cessions anyway, so the Kremlin rulers simply played Santa
2*5Claus for whatever credit it would bring them. Schwartz
bases his conclusion in part on Khrushchev's own words:
Khrushchev went to great lengths to flatter China in the 
major speech he delivered in Peking. Communist China, he 
declared, "has emerged as a great power on the internat­
ional arena." In words whose emptiness he was to demon­
strate only a few years later, he asserted that "without 
the participation of the Chinese Peoples Republic it is 
now impossible to decide international relations and 
peaceful solution of disputed problems."
The Communist Chinese were to make gains on another 
front as a partial result of Stalin's death, namely the
^^Floyd, p. 220.
^^Schwartz, p. 15M-.
^^Ibid.. p. 153.
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extension of their influence into Southeast Asia. While the 
Russians were busy solving their problems of succession, the 
Chinese were free to engage in diplomatic games. In June of 
195^, Chou En-lai stopped in New Delhi for talks with Jawaharlal 
Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister. They discussed the principles 
which were to govern Sino-Indian relations and agreed to con­
sult each other plus other Asian governments on Asian prob­
lems, a suggestion of "Asia for the Asians." Of special 
interest was a reported statement of Chou's to the effect 
that "outside forces" would no longer be allowed to decide 
the fate of Asia.^? By "outside forces" did he also mean to 
include the Soviet UnionI
Nehru paid an official visit to China in October of 
the same year. There were further protestations of friend­
ship with accompanying trade agreements. It seems clear at
this point that the Indians accepted their big communist neigh-
28bor as a positive friend.
The PRC's biggest effort to assume leadership in Asia 
came at the Conference of Asian and African states held in 
Bandung (Indonesia) in April of 1955» The Chinese did not 
call the meeting but they were clearly the inspiration behind 
it.
^^Floyd, pp. 22-3.
^®Ibid., p. 2 3.
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Also in 1955» the Russians withdrew their troops from Austria 
and sent their leaders to a "summit conference" with the 
Western Powers at Geneva.
In all of these activities by the two powers, it can 
be seen then that there was a fairly genuine effort by both 
to reduce world tension as well as tensions between them­
selves. Perhaps the only area of significant disagreement 
was the continuing controversy over the island of Taiwan.
The Chinese Communists, for obvious reasons, wanted the 
island turned over to them and advanced the issue from time 
to time by threatening to take it by force. The United 
States added to the PRC’s problem in 1955 by signing a mutual 
security agreement with the Chiang Kai-shek government, there­
by establishing in principle a "two-Chinas" p o l i c y . T h e  
Russians could usually be counted on to back Peking’s claim 
to Taiwan, but at the Geneva Conference Khrushchev "made no 
belligerent moves or statements with respect to the Taiwan 
Strait Crisis . . . This attitude probably disappointed
the Chinese Communists, and Hinton goes so far as to say,
"The spectre of some sort of deal between the Soviet Union
35gchwartz, p. 15*t.
3^Harold E. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 128.
37lbid., p. 127.
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and the West that would tend to reduce the reliability of 
Soviet protection of and support for the CPR must have sug­
gested itself in Peking."38
If the Chinese Communists were unhappy about Taiwan,
they most likely could view the rest of the period between
Stalin's death and the 20th Party Congress of the Soviet Union
with a good deal of equanimity. They had received substantial
material aid from the Russians; they were accorded a higher
position in the socialist camp than the eastern European
powers; and they had carved out their own area of influence
in Southeast Asia. For all of this, PRC could thank either
directly or indirectly their northern ally:
In short, at the beginning of 1956 it was reasonable 
to regard the Moscow-Peking axis as a powerful factor 
in world politics, which was likely to grow stronger 
rather than to break up. Both Russians and Chinese 
seemed to have every reason for maintaining a close 
alliance and none at all for quarrelling.3”
There were a number of dramatic events occuring in 
1956 which are generally regarded as having a profound impact 
on Sino-Soviet relations. The more important of these were 
the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Union and the 
trouble in Poland and Hungary. In the introduction to his
38%bid. (Note, PRC has been used in this study to 
indicate the Peoples Republic of China; however, some authors, 
like Hinton, prefer CPR, meaning the Chinese Peoples Republic.)
39pioyd, p. 31.
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excellent study, The Slno-Sovlet Conflict : 1956-1961. Donald
S. Zagoria sets the scene.
I have chosen the 20th Congress as my starting point 
in the story of Sino-Soviet conflict for a number of 
reasons. First, the Congress defined Soviet policy 
on precisely the three issues of strategy on which the 
Sino-Soviet differences have subsequently centered: 
the way to build "socialism" and communism in states 
already ruled by Communist parties, the nature of the 
relationship among Communist parties, and the way to 
pursue the struggle against the West. Second, the 
Chinese Communists themselves, in heated private ex­
changes with the Russians, allegedly trace their dif­
ferences with Krushchev to the 20th Congress. Finally, 
and not least important, it was after the Congress—  
and the impact on the Communist world of Khrushchev's 
secret speech about Stalin— that China first began to 
intervene in East European Communist affairs and to 
speak and act as a separate source of doctrine and 
strategy for the Communist world.40
It can be said, with a good deal of assurance, that 
the best remembered event of the 20th Party Congress was 
Khrushchev's speech denouncing Stalin. This was actually the 
second of two major speeches he made before the delegates, 
and it was stated at a secret session. The gist of his re­
marks were soon "leaked" to the world press occasioning a 
good deal of surprise or even amazement. While there does 
not appear to be any solid evidence as to whether Khrushchev 
consulted the leaders of any other communist country before 
denouncing Stalin, the consensus is that he did not. In
^®Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict : 1956-
1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 71.
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the case of the Chinese Communists, Schwartz bluntly asserts
"It Is clear that Khrushchev had not consulted Peking before
M-1launching this attack." As proof, Schwartz offers the
fact that "The Chinese delegate to the Congress^ spoke highly
U-Pof Stalin In his speech to hie Soviet comrades." Moreover, 
Schwartz Is of the opinion that the Chinese would not have 
approved entirely of Khrushchev's remarks since their own 
man, Mao, might have been Interested In building a "person­
ality cult" of his own.^^ Hugh Seton-Watson tends to agree 
with Schwartz's basic premise. "As we have seen, Mao had 
little love for Stalin, but Khrushchev's Impetuous launching 
of 'de-Stallnlsatlon' was hardly to his taste." Finally, 
both men are supported by the German political scientist, 
Klaus Mehnert, In his well documented book Peking and Moscow, 
where he states, "Mao let It be known, Stalin's errors were 
secondary as compared to his achievements. Criticism of 
Stalin within certain limits— that was all right; but It was 
'extremely wrong' to deny the Importance of leaders."
^^Schwartz, p. 157. 
2^.
3^-’Ibid*
kk
Hugh Seton-Watson, "The Great Schism: On Slno-
Sovlet Conflicts," Tension Areas in World Affairs, ed. Arthur 
Turner and Leonard Freedman (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth 
Publishing Co., 196M-), p. 258.
^^KLaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow (New York: Mentor,
1964), p. 359.
29
Based on these comments, one can probably assume that the
Chinese did not know of Khruschev's Intentions and that they
were not overly enthusiastic about them when openly informed.
Khrushchev's secret speech was interesting, to say the
least, "but something else happened at that Congress, even
more important in the long run than the attack on Stalin,
k6
though quite overshadowed by this at the time." The refer­
ence, of course, is to Khruschev's first speech in which he 
discussed the questions of the inevitability of war and the 
different forms of transition to socialism.
In his comments, Khrushchev openly suggested that 
modern conditions, especially the atomic bomb, called for 
some re-thinking of classical Marxist-Leninist doctrine.
Taking his text from Marx, Lenin had fully stated his belief 
in the inevitability of war so long as capitalism existed any­
where on the face of the earth. Economic pressures and mate­
rial greed would drive capitalist societies to fight each 
other for markets. Moreover, this war was good for communism- 
the more broken eggs, the better the omelette. Similarly, 
the same concept holds true for internal revolutions, the 
more violent the better. Wars and revolutions would have to 
continue until the capitalists had destroyed themselves; 
then communism could rise from the ashes. Thus, it can be
^^Crankshaw, pp. 23-2^.
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seen that wars are inevitable and the transition to socialism
k7is through the destruction of capitalism.
Khrushchev's views amounted to a major revision of 
doctrine. He put "peaceful co-existence" at the center of 
Soviet foreign policy. "He denied that he expected a Com­
munist world victory to come about 'through armed interfer­
ence by the socialist countries in the internal affairs of
U-fithe capitalist country.'" Instead he felt that communism 
would win because its overwhelming advantages over the capi­
talist system would become apparent to the working classes 
of all countries. Meanwhile, the strength of the socialist 
countries was now great enough to prevent any enemies' ad­
venturist plans.^9 In other words, war was no longer in­
evitable.
In like manner, he changed the rules for transition 
to socialism. "Times having changed, and the peace-loving 
masses, inspired and sustained by the Soviet Union, having 
grown so strong, it was more than conceivable that in 'certain 
countries’ Communism would be achieved not through violent
\.n
See Crankshaw. pp. 2^ — 25, for a brief but good 
account of the ideological argument raised by Khrushchev's 
speech.
hQSchwartz, p. 1?6. 
^9ibid.. p. 157.
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revolution but by natural evolution through, perhaps,
parliamentary means.
As startling as these ideas might seem in retrospect,
the general belief is that the Chinese communists tended to
take them in stride, at least, for a while. "On the whole,
the Chinese appeared to approve the downgrading of Stalin
51and to be firmly behind Khrushchev's new line." Crankshaw 
is of the opinion that "there was no question in 1956 of the 
Chinese accusing Khrushchev of betraying Marxist-Leninism, 
of betraying the revolution. It is to be doubted whether 
they know what Khrushchev was doing any more than he knew 
h i m s e l f . Y e a r s  later, the Chinese were to hark back to 
the Twentieth Party Congress and to speak out against 
"Khrushchev revisionism" but for the moment they remained 
remarkably silent.
The self-imposed silence lasted until April 5, 1956. 
Then an article appeared in the Peking People * s Daily en­
titled "The Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the 
Proletariat." It was a carefully constrained article, but 
nevertheless it made it clear that Stalin had been both good 
and bad. In fact, his good side was emphasized more than
^®Crankshaw, p. 27.
^^Ployd, p. 37. 
^^Crankshaw, p. 53»
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his had. What is more important is that the article sug­
gested that Stalin might not have made mistakes if there 
had been more broadly based leadership, i.e. if the Chinese 
had been consulted. Additionally, they hinted that since 
Russian leadership was now in a bit of disarray, and since 
Chinese leadership was firmly consolidated, it might be well 
in the future for the "Socialist Camp" to look to Peking for 
direction rather than M o s c o w . T h i s  last point, of course, 
was made in the most subtle way possible, and it is likely 
that they didn't really expect to get a chance to take an 
active leadership role for some time. However, before 
another three months had passed, they found themselves doing 
just that, and in Europe, of all places!
De-Stalinization apparently had a far greater impact 
on the European communist countries and parties than 
Khrushchev had intended or expected.^ Coming as it did 
after nearly three years of general relaxation of Stalin's 
iron discipline, both at home and throughout the Socialist 
camp, it seemed to whet the appetites of some of the Eastern 
European parties for more independence. Moscow's authority 
was undermined, including Khrushchev's own authority and
%8ee R. G. Boyd's Communist China's Foreign Policv 
(New York, Praeger, 1962), pp. 71-72, for a fuller inter­
pretation of the Peonle*s Dallv article.
^Crankshaw, p. 53»
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de-Stallnization was certainly a direct cause of the revolts
first in Poland and then in Hungary,
When the Polish revolt flared up and Gomulka, released 
from prison, took over the new government, Moscow's 
first reaction was to restore the status quo by force.
, . . Khrushchev himself, accompanied by Molotov and 
Malenkov (with whom he was at that time locked in con­
flict) descended on Warsaw and read the riot act. But 
the Poles stood firm. . . . Soon Chou En-lai himself 
flew to Moscow, then to Warsaw, to act as a moderating 
influence, to explain to the Russians the true inward­
ness of the Polish revolt, and to explain to Gomulka 
why he had Chinese support and just how far it would 
go. We do not know, but it is more than probable, that 
Khrushchev personally was deeply relieved. He saw his 
policy of reform on the edge of ruin, and he was under 
extreme pressure from the Stalinists, headed by Molotov, 
to revert to the old-fashioned terror. China saved 
him."50
Khrushchev's relief was not to last for long however. 
A few days after the settlement of the Polish question, the 
Hungarians staged an even more dramatic revolt. Indeed, it 
appeared that not only did they want to get rid of their 
communist leader, but that they wanted to get out of the 
Socialist camp altogether.
Moscow hesitated. For a short time it looked as if 
the Russians would stand aside; then, in convincing fashion, 
elements of the Red army moved in to crush the Hungarians.
^^Crankshaw, p. 53•
5*Ibid.
3^
The part played by the Chinese Communists in the Hun­
garian crisis is in some doubt. Alexandre Metaxas, in his 
book, Moscow or Peking?, states flatly, "in its straits Mos­
cow made the mistake of asking Mao Tse-tung to intervene in 
the Hungarian c o n f l i c t . H e  has support for his assertion
in that the Chinese announced in 1963 that they had had to
58
force Khrushchev’s hand against the Hungarians in 1956.
It needs to be remembered though, that this claim was only 
made after the Sino-Soviet conflict was an open reality. 
Metaxas can also point to the fact that the Chinese were 
among the first, if not the first, countries to openly praise 
the Soviet action in its public press.
A more restrained assessment of Peking's role has
been written by Irwin Isenberg.
In 1956 unrest in Poland and a revolution in Hungary 
enabled the Chinese to play a role on the Eastern Euro­
pean scene. Their influence was probably only periph­
eral. One may doubt that, as the Chinese now maintain, 
their advice was the decisive element in Moscow's 
decision to accept Wladyslaw Gomulka in Poland and crush 
Imre Nagy in Hungary; but certainly the influence they 
wielded gave them a taste for more.°®
^^Alexandre Metaxas, Moscow or Peking? (London: Chat-
to and Windus, 1961), 1. 77.
58,'Schwartz, p. 159. 
60,
^^Boyd, pp. 72-7 3,
'Irwin Isenberg, ed.. The Russian-Chinese Rift: Its
Impact on World Affairs (New York: H. W. Wilson Company,
1966), p. 27.
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Whichever position one cares to take in this matter, 
there is general agreement that the Chinese did have a say 
in the Polish and Hungarian problems. This Chinese intrusion 
into Eastern Europe is even more interesting when it is noted 
that their position vis-a-vis Poland was a liberal one, while 
in Hungary it was strictly hard-line, Hugh Seton-Watson of­
fers an explanation for this apparent contradiction.
In September, 1956, a Polish delegation to the Ninth 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, led by Edward 
Ochab, found such encouragement for the Polish party's 
independent attitude (including its opposition to the 
Soviet view of the Poznan rising of July). . . . The 
"liberal" elements in the Polish party were convinced 
that China was on their side. In reality, the Chinese 
were interested not in "liberalism" but in equality 
between parties, that is, in reducing the predominance 
of the Soviet party. This became clear when they came 
out strongly in defense of the Soviet action in Hun­
gary. In an emergency all Communists must stand 
together.61
Another interesting sidelight of the Hungarian event 
is Tito's comments and the reaction to them by Russia, China, 
and Albania.
In a speech made at Pula on November 11, 1956, the 
Yugoslav leader had faintly praised the Soviet crushing of 
Hungary as being a better answer than a full-scale war. At 
the same time, however, he blandly maintained that the Soviets 
had bungled the whole thing by not taking his advice in the 
first place.
^^Turner and Freedman, ed., p. 258. 
^^Floyd, p. m .
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William E. Griffith has made a carefully documented
study of the comments, ellicited by Tito's speech, in Moscow,
Peking, and Tirana. His main purpose is to illustrate the
growing estrangement between Albania and the USSR plus the
parallel development of alliance between Albania and the
PRC. He has prepared a table showing all of the important
issues that occured from 1955 to 1959 with the positions
taken by the three countries. According to the table, it
can be seen that from the Pula speech onward, Albania and
China took virtually the same positions on every i s s u e . ^3
In his commentary, Mr. Griffith reports:
Detailed comparison of the Soviet and Chinese positions 
on the ideological and foreign-policy issues during the 
early stages of the Sino-Soviet dispute with the Albanian 
position on these same issues indicates . . . that Sino 
Albanian convergence and joint opposition to Soviet 
positions (above all, naturally, on the Yugoslav issue) 
increased rapidly after the Hungarian Revolution. . . . "
Griffith found that the Soviet response to Tito's re­
marks were somewhat sharper than the Chinese and that the Al­
banians were the most critical of all.^^ Floyd has nothing 
to say about Albania but reports the same conclusion vis-a-vis 
Russia and China. The Chinese press, according to Floyd,
^^William E. Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet 
Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1963), pp. 30-32.
^^Ibld., pp. 29-3 4.
G ^ i b i d . .  p .  3 0 .
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"pointed to real differences of opinion with the Yugoslavs, 
these comments were noticeably milder than those made by 
the Russians." It would appear that Griffith, with support 
from Floyd, is contradicting himself. If the USSR and the 
Albanians were the most critical of Tito, then they should 
have furthered their friendship, but instead, Tirana and 
Peking draw steadily closer together. There is a relatively 
simple explanation.
The Albanian leader, Hoxha, apparently lived in the 
fear that his country would fall under the complete domina­
tion of the Yugoslavs if Tito were ever given a free hand to 
operate in the Balkans by Moscow.Therefore, Hoxha could 
breathe easier every time Yugoslav-Soviet relations took a 
turn for the worse. However, by the early summer of the fol­
lowing year, 1957, Khrushchev was once again wooing Belgrade,
68
whereas Chinese regard for Tito remained cool or even hostile. 
Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that 
the Albanians were forced more and more to turn to the PRC 
for support against first the Yugoslavs, and then the Russians.
The point of this brief departure into Albanian and 
Yugoslavian foreign affairs is to establish the two straw-men
GGpioyd, p. 42.
^^Griffith, Albania, p. 27.
^®Ployd, pp. M-5-M-6.
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which were later used by the Soviets and the Chinese in 
denouncing each other. For a while, until the split became 
public, both of these great powers felt that they had to mask 
the barbs flying between them. For instance, the Russians 
would blast the "Albanian dogmatists," (meaning the Chinese) and 
the Chinese would snarl about the "Tito revisionists," (meaning 
the Russians), It would be a few years before these "subtle" 
euphemisms were employed but the lines were evidently being 
drawn in late 1956.
In reviewing the year of the Twentieth Party Congress, 
it has been shown that there were a number of ups and downs 
in Sino-Soviet relations. The Chinese backed the Poles, ex­
pressed cautious disagreement over de-Stalinization, and may 
have forced Khrushchev’s hand in Hungary. It is extremely 
probable that the Russians were annoyed or even embarrassed 
by these actions, but if they were, their internal succession 
troubles kept them surprisingly pliable. Perhaps the most 
significant factor to remember about this period is that when 
the need arose for the Chinese Communists to find ideological 
backing for their position, they could always return to the 
Twentieth Party Congress. Otherwise, the Sino-Soviet alliance 
entered 1957 still intact.
From many standpoints, most of 1957 might conceivably 
be considered the last really "good" period in relations be­
tween the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China.
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For one thing, there were few actual contacts of any magni­
tude between the two powers which could stir up friction.
The one notable exception was the celebration in Moscow, in 
November, of the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet Revolu­
tion where the Chinese again suggested a hard-line approach. 
This event will be dealt with a little later. Of greater 
moment is the fact that "the attention of the leaders of 
both countries was taken up by internal political conflicts 
which were resolved only in the summer and autumn.
Khrushchev had to face the so-called "anti-party" group 
while the "hundred flowers" campaign apparently nudged Mao 
to the Left.
These elements of Russian affairs which had been pro­
moted by Khrushchev had met with mixed results, as already 
indicated. For a while, his happy and partially successful 
junketeering to relax tensions seemed to stamp him with a 
golden touch, even if a bit tarnished by accounts of his 
prodigious drinking feats. However, all of the time that 
Khrushchev was riding high, a group within the Russian party
70Presidium was watching for an opportunity to get rid of him.' 
The denunciation of Stalin, followed closely by the uprising
^9ibid., p.
70Metaxas, p. 76.
M-0
in Poland and Hungary, gave them their chance. In June of
1957» this anti-party group led by Molotov, Malenkov, Kagan-
ovitch and Shepilov, tried to remove Khrushchev from power.
He received support from Mikoyan and the army in the form of
Marshall Z h u k o v . W i t h  their help he convinced a meeting
of the Central Committee of the party to retain him in com-
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mand and to oust his enemies. This manuver left Khrushchev 
in effective personal control of the Soviet Union, a control 
which became virtually complete with the elimination of 
Zhukov in November of the same year .^ 3 By an odd coincidence, 
this period, from June to November, during which Khrushchev 
struggled for power was almost exactly the same length of 
time that Mao Tse-tung had to face internal tensions in his 
country.
"The period between June and November 1957 was one of 
the most fateful and obscure periods in recent Chinese Com­
munist history. Sometime within those six months, Chinese 
Communist domestic and external policy underwent a radical 
transformation from Right to Left."?^ It can be argued that
^^Ibid.. p. 77. It is interesting to note that Bul­
ganin is generally not included in the anti-party group (nor 
as a supporter of Khrushchev) although*later, he was quietly 
forced to stand aside.
^^Floyd, p. M-5.
73Metaxas, p. 76.
^^Zagoria,‘ p. 66.
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the reason for this shift lies in the "Hundred Flowers" cam­
paign and the decision to launch the "Great Leap Forward."
The "Hundred Flowers" campaign is hidden in a bit of 
mystery so that a certain amount of guesswork is necessary 
in explaining its purpose.Briefly, it appears that by 
early 1957, Mao must have felt his regime sufficiently con­
solidated as to allow open criticism by Chinese intellectuals, 
that is to let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred ideas 
contend. It has been suggested that the Chinese leader 
believed that the Communist Party was a genuinely popular 
party and that he could operate as a sort of benevolent 
dictator avoiding the mistakes of S t a l i n . I f  this was the 
case, then the results of the "blooming and contending" 
period must have been a traumatic experience. The intellec­
tuals responded to the invitation with an unnerving storm of 
criticism that apparently touched off wholesale defections 
of farmers from cooperatives and trade union people from 
their work.?? After a scant six weeks, the campaign was 
brought to an abrupt halt.
?^For a thorough analysis of this campaign, plus 
relevant Chinese documents, see Roderick MacFarquhar, The 
Hundred Flowers Campaign and thé Chinese Intellectuals 
(New York: Praeger, I960).
?^Zagoria, p. 6 7.
??Ibid.
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As shocking as the reaction to the "Hundred Flowers" 
program appears to have been, it is doubtful that it was 
sufficient in itself to jerk Mao to the Left. A much more 
serious challenge faced the Chinese in the summer of 1957 in 
the form of the downturn in its domestic economy.
Between 1953-57» the PRC had labored within the frame­
work of their first five-year plan. Their accomplishments 
had been impressive. "For example, the annual output of 
many of China's basic heavy industries doubled or tripled. 
Total industrial production, it was claimed, rose by nearly 
120 per cent. And China's gross national product increased 
at an average annual rate of perhaps 7 or 8 per cent. In 
terms of the Chinese Communists' own priority goals— partic­
ularly the goal of industrial progress— the first Plan was 
clearly an over-all success."^®
By the end of the Plan, however, there were definite 
signs that things were beginning to slow down. Soviet aid 
was being channeled more and more into Eastern Europe, China's 
collectives were not producing the expected amount of food, 
pork and cloth rations were cut and coal miners were called 
upon to work harder in order to keep the factories running.
f&Doak A. Barnett, Gommunlat China in Perspective
(New York: Praeger, 196&), p. 5^.
^3
Finally, the press began to speak cautiously of national
calamities.
It is at this point in the deepening economic crisis
that a split in the party leadership evidently occured.
The Right Wing is generally believed to have urged caution,
to follow a sound slow approach to economic development.
The Left Wing, on the other hand, advocated a drastic break-
80neck pace, a "Great Leap Forward." It seemingly felt that 
all difficulties could be overcome if only the masses could 
be modilized and imbued with great ideological fervor. China 
would pull herself up by her own bootstraps, without increase 
in Soviet aid. "If . . . the Soviet model on which China’s 
first Five Year Plan had been based had proved inadequate 
for China's distinctive problems, then the Soviet model must 
be scrapped and replaced by one which maximized the one re-
On
source that China had in abundance— labor power." ^
The fight between the Left and the Right probably
lasted from June, when the Right Wing dominated, to late
02September, when the Left Wing gained the ascendancy. Mac­
Farquhar has identified the leaders of the Right as Chou
7^Roderick MacFarquhar, "Communist China's Intra- 
Party Dispute," Pacific Affairs. December 1958, pp. 323-325.
®®Zagoria, p. 68.
^^MacFarquhar, pp. 325-327.
GZlbid.
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En-lal and Ch'en Yi. The Left was led by Liu Shao-ch'i and 
Teng Hsiao-p'ing.®^ Mao's role is not clear but since the 
Left won it is reasonable to assume that he was at least 
willing to be pulled in that direction at that moment. The 
upshot of this dispute was that a decision was made to try 
radical economic policies in an effort to move China ahead 
industrially. The plans were laid for the "Great Leap For­
ward" and the communes even though they were not put into 
action until the next year. This meant that the Chinese 
Communists were about to wade out into ideological waters of 
their own which proved to be a major issue in the Sino-Soviet 
split. In the meantime, it also meant that Mao would go to 
Moscow for the November celebrations as a hard-line leftist.
Before turning to the Moscow Conference, it is neces­
sary to add a few comments about some other interesting 
occurances that colored the thinking of both Mao and Khrush­
chov in 1957.
In August, the Russians announced to a somewhat skep­
tical world that the USaR had successfully tested an inter-
84continental multi-stage ballistic rocket. Since not very
GSlbid.
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Schwartz, p. 162,
^5
much was known about multi-stage rockets at that time, the 
news was only partially disturbing to Western observers. 
However, when the Russians put up the world's first "sputnik" 
on October M-, the West was quick to see the military potential 
of such a missile and the Americans, in particular, were cast 
into a deep g l o o m . W h i l e  Khrushchev, and the Soviet Union, 
was jubilant, he nonetheless went out of his way to emphasize 
only the deterrent value of his new weapon. On the other 
hand, "the Chinese, who had nothing whatsoever to do with 
the affair, went off their heads with joy; a Communist 
country, the Soviet Union, had utterly outstripped the im­
perialists in the development of weaponry; now was the time
to exert the power of the Socialist camp and put unremitting
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pressure on the West in the interests of world revolution." 
This difference in interpretation of the use for the new 
missile was carried over into the November discussions as 
will be shown later.
Another interesting event took place that fall. "On 
October 1?, 1957, the two nations reached an agreement . . . 
which required the Soviet Union to give China a sample of an 
atomic bomb and technical data concerning the manufacture. 
This historic agreement, by which the Soviet Union pledged
®^Crankshaw, p. 70.
Q^Ibid.. pp. 70-71.
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its help to make China a nuclear power and even to give the 
Chinese an atomic bomb, was concluded in the deepest secrecy. 
In light of the fact that the Russians had known how to make 
atomic bombs for over seven years without sharing that infor­
mation with their Chinese ally, there is room for speculation 
as to why they did so at this time. The general feeling is 
that Khrushchev was still a little nervous over his narrow 
defeat of the anti-party group and wanted to buy China's
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support both for his policies at home and in Eastern Europe. 
Moreover, the timing may have been designed to ensure Mao's 
cooperation at the Moscow Conference.®^ If those were his 
motives, then they certainly succeeded, at least for the 
short run. What is more interesting, the wily leader of the 
Kremlin never did pay off on his promise. In 1963, when the 
Sino-Soviet split was out in the open, the Chinese Utterly 
protested Khrushchev's treachery in reneging on his promise 
of atomic aid. They claimed that he repudiated the agreement 
in 1959.9°
®7schwartz, p. 162.
8®Ibid.. pp. 162-163.
®^illiam E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cam­
bridge, Mass.: the MIT Press, 1964), p. 17.
90pekine Review. VI, 33 (August 16, 1963), p. 14.
^7
One more minor episode which was carried out prior to 
the Russians anniversary celebration was the establishment 
in the USSR of a Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society. Its 
purpose was to popularize pro-Chinese feelings among the 
Russian people. A counterpart organization had been active 
in China for years so that the absence of one in the Soviet 
Union was somewhat awkward. The society was founded in 
October and may also have been designed to help produce 
Mao's cooperation at the next month's meeting,
The fortieth anniversary of the Russian revolution 
was celebrated in Moscow early in November. It included a 
full scale conference with some sixty-four Communist parties 
represented.Every important red leader was there except 
for Tito of Yugoslavia who declined to participate at the 
last moment because of a "sudden" attack of lumbago. More 
likely, he was afraid that he might be called upon to sign 
some sort of joint declaration which could possibly affect 
his independent stance. This would indeed have been the case 
had he attended.
It goes without saying that Khrushchev was most eager 
to embrace the celebrations and the conference. Having
9^Schwartz, p. I6 3. 
^^Floyd, p. ^8 . 
Ibid.. p. 50.
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suffered through a year and a half of near catastrophy in 
trying to maintain or augment his position of leadership, 
he would now be able to stand center stage as the acknowl­
edged ruler of the mighty Soviet Union, "From the Russian 
point of view, it was an excellent opportunity to restore 
Moscow’s prestige in the international Communist movement. .
• . The fortieth anniversary of the Revolution was a good 
occasion to impress on Communism's proconsuls and foreign 
agents Russia's seniority and experience in the business of 
revolution and to remind them, by means of lavish entertain­
ment, elaborate military parades and impressive sputnik- 
launchings, that Russia was still the centre of Communism's 
material power and sustenance.
By the same token, the Chinese welcomed the conference 
as a chance to do a little drum beating on their own. The 
mere fact that Mao Tse-tung saw fit to attend the affair in 
person is a solid indication that the Chinese also wanted a 
part of the stage. Mao almost never leaves his homeland, 
and seldom makes a public speech, yet he was willing to go 
to Moscow where he made himself visible to the whole Communist 
world for the first time. The belief is that he did so be­
cause he wanted to force the Soviets to the Left on the ques­
tions of internal Socialist Camp policies and global strategy.
^^Ployd, p. 48.
95zagoria, p. 73.
^9
The Moscow meeting produced two declarations, one a 
general statement on peace which everyone signed and the 
other one which became known as the "Moscow Declaration" or 
the "Declaration of 1957." This second declaration applied 
only to the countries that were under actual communist control 
and was signed by all of them except Yugoslavia. Tito had 
guessed right; it would have compromised him. In general, 
it contained two significant positions, one on foreign 
policy and one on internal matters. Both the Chinese and 
the Russians tried to shape these to suit themselves.
Mao set the tone of his thinking on foreign policy in 
a speech which has by now become famous. "I consider that 
the present world situation has reached a new turning point. 
There are now two winds in the world: the east wind and the
west wind. There is a spying in China: 'If the east wind
does not prevail over the west wind, then the west wind will 
prevail over the east wind.' I think the characteristic of 
the current situation is that the east wind prevails over 
the west wind; that is, the strength of socialism exceeds 
the strength of imperialism.
While this comment may not sound too bellicose, it is 
clear that Mao was thinking about the new Russian missile,
^^Mao Tse-Tung, November 18, 1957, speech in Moscow, 
quoted in "Mao Tse-tung on Imperialists and Reactionaries," 
Current Background, no. 53^, November 12, 1958.
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plus the atomic capability his country would soon have, and 
meant for the Socialist countries to use this new found pre­
ponderance to squeeze the capitalists.
Despite Mao's speech, the final statement on foreign 
policy came out strongly in favor of supporting the broad 
outline of peaceful co-existence which Khrushchev had laid 
down in 1956.^^ As a result of Mao's address and the Declara­
tion statement, both leaders could claim, later on, that the 
other was guilty of misinterpretation. Since the Chinese 
had signed the paper, however, it would appear that the 
Russians had the better of the argument, for whatever it was 
worth.
If Khrushchev got his way on foreign policy, there is 
good reason for believing that he was outmanuvered by the 
Chinese on internal policy. The problem here was to decide 
the greater evil; dogmatism or revisionism.
For some time the Russians had been denouncing dog­
matism. This was part of Khrushchev's plan to relax tensions, 
Furthermore, dogmatism was obnoxious to the Yugoslavs and the 
only way to bring Tito back into the fold was to deny such a 
relentless philosophy. Interestingly, the Chinese were just 
as opposed to dogmatism, which had resulted in the Hungarian
^^Floyd, pp. 52-53.
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revolt and the possible shattering of the Socialist Camp.
In other words, the Chinese had found revisionism useful in 
gaining more independence for themselves, but they were op­
posed to it if it meant any weakening of the Socialist Camp 
which might in turn mean a slow-down in aid and support to 
the PRC.98
Given these circumstances, it is obvious that the 
statement on dogmatism and revisionism was going to take 
much work to satisfy anybody. What emerged was a series of 
statements that left the whole matter wide open to individual 
interpretation. For instance: In one of the paragraphs it
was made clear that "the main danger at present is revision­
ism, or, in other words, right-wing opportunism, which as a 
manifestation of bourgeois ideology paralyses the revolution­
ary energy of the working class and demands the preservation 
or restoration of capitalism."99 No doubt, this is the way 
the Chinese wanted the resolution to read and probably had a 
big hand in its phrasing. But the Russians also were playing 
a role here and they must have insisted on adding the next 
comment: "However, dogmatism and sectarianism can also be
the main danger at different phases of development in one
9®zagoria, pp. I8I-1 82.
99Declaration of Twelve Communist and Workers' Parties, 
Moscow, November 22, 1957, text in Current Digest of the 
Soviet Press, vol. 9, January 1, 1958, pp. 3-12.
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party or another. It is for each Communist party to decide 
what danger threatens it more at the time.”^ ^^ In a final 
note the Chinese came right back with, "Modern revisionism 
seeks to smear the great teachings of Marxism-Leninism, . . . 
Maybe the Russians and the Chinese knew where the main danger 
lay, in dogmatism or revisionism, but the other parties must 
have left the meeting in some confusion1 At any rate, this 
ambiguity made it possible for both powers, in the years 
ahead, to accuse the other of deviating from the Declaration.
Mao Tse-tung created a mild surprise while at the Mos­
cow celebrations by his strong endorsement of the USSR as the 
center of power for the Communist world. On November 6, he 
declared "we regard it as the sacred international obligation
of all Socialist countries to strengthen the solidarity of
102
the Socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union." A 
few days later, he went even further by saying, "Our Socialist 
camp should have a leader, and this is the Soviet Union."^^3 
These comments were surprising in that during much of 
1956 the Chinese had been anxious to carve out a stance that 
was independent of Moscow. Certainly the Poles were led to
lOOlbld.
lOllbid.
102Mao Tse-tung, November 6, 1957» speech, quoted in 
NONA, November 6, 1957»
^®3wao Tse-tung, November 17, 1957, speech, quoted 
in NONA, November l8, 1957.
%believe that this was the case. Now, a year had hardly gone 
by and Mao was championing the Russians as leaders of the 
Socialist Camp. It is possible that the PRC's ruler took 
this position in order to pay back Khrushchev for his promise 
of nuclear assistance and other emoluments; however, deeper 
inspection suggests another reason. As had already been 
noted, Mao wanted equality, especially for himself, but he 
also needed a unified camp if China was to realize her goals. 
He must have recognized that in 1957 at least, the USSR could 
guarantee such unity and China could not. Besides, the Mos­
cow Declaration proved that he could influence Soviet policy 
to some extent anyway.
Thus ended the conference and the year. As far as 
anyone could see, the USSR and the PRC parted as the best of 
friends, each thinking he had understood the other's words.
It would only be a matter of months before both were to learn 
how much they had misjudged the actual situation.
Before leaving the 19^9-57 era, it might be of some 
value to briefly examine Sino-Soviet relations along a few 
other lines. Such things as cultural exchanges, reaction to 
Soviet advisors, trade, and Chinese guesswork vis-a-vis 
potential Soviet leaders might shed some additional in­
sights on the over-all picture.
Reliable figures on cultural exchange events, number 
of participants and attendance are fairly difficult to come
5^
by, particularly for the time period under consideration. 
However, Klaus Mehnert, a German political scientist who 
has lived in both the USSR and the PRC for extended periods 
and who speaks both languages has made a brief study of these 
exchanges which is useful. He has taken his figures from 
Russian and Chinese sources which in many cases are only 
official estimates and therefore need to be viewed with some 
reserve.
Mehnert found that between 19^9 and 1959 some 295 
million copies of Russian books were translated into Chinese 
and sold in that country. At the same time, 2 k million 
Chinese books, translated into Russian, were placed on sale 
in the USSR. There were 840 films exchanged and they were 
seen by 2.*+ billion viewers. Most of the films were Russian, 
while most of the audience was Chinese, Additionally, 112 
Soviet stage and concert ensembles, comprising 2,301 members, 
were sent to China and 13^ Chinese ensembles, with 2,33^ 
members, went to Russia. Then too, there were Russian radio 
broadcasts that were transmitted in Chinese over Chinese 
stations, and vice versa, the Russian language was introduced 
into thousands of Chinese schools (Chinese was introduced in­
to a few Russian schools) and there were exchanges of trade
1 oh-fairs, students, etc.
1 oh-All of the figures in this paragraph were taken 
from Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, trans., Leila Venne- 
witz (New York: Mentor Books, 196h-), pp. 33^-335*
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Mehnert is convinced that during the early years of 
the Sino-Soviet alliance, the Chinese government was genuinely 
eager to have its people become fully acquainted with their 
great ally.^05 Moreover, the drive to educate the Chinese 
on Russian life apparently increased steadily until it reached 
a peak in 1957.^^^ While visiting China in that year, Mehnert 
detected an attitude of growing resentment against all the 
pro-Soviet sentiment that the Chinese had to take. Too much 
had been made of a good thing. "It was clear that Soviet 
propaganda had over-reached itself and achieved the opposite 
objective: the feeling we all know after having too much of
one particular dish."^®^ For example, there were almost daily 
newspaper stories of visiting Russian experts giving some of 
their food to Chinese children, of a Soviet soldier rescuing 
a little Chinese girl, of Russian women doctors saving the
1 rtQ
lives of Chinese mothers and babies and so on.
The well known China expert, A. Doak Barnett, tells a 
somewhat similar story in his book Communist China : The
Early Years. He describes a Chinese propaganda film called 
Woman Locomotive Driver in which several Chinese girls are 
trying to learn to be drivers. They are aided in their
^Mehnert, p. 335. 
^°^Ibl&., p. 336. 
lOTlbid.. p. 338. 
lOGibid.. p. 336.
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endeavors by a Russian advisor named Sedov. The heroine of 
the story is little Sun who nearly fails the class in coal- 
shoveling. Later on, she does fail the examination on the 
workings of a locomotive but is given a second chance. With 
the help of Sedov and the others, she passes the make-up test 
and becomes a driver. For this, she thanks Sedov and wants 
to give him a present, but he refuses saying that he is 
merely a representative of the Soviet Union and its aid to 
the Chinese people.
Given these illustrations, the reader will find it 
easy to agree with Mehnert that after so long the traditional 
pride of the Chinese must have been sorely tried. Still, it 
must be admitted that the two countries did carry on an 
enormous amount of cultural exchange and that a large number 
of Soviet experts did contribute greatly to China's develop­
ment. For the most part, it would probably be correct to 
assume that these contacts helped relations rather than hurt 
them.
The pattern of trade relations between the Soviet 
Union and the Peoples' Republic of China during the years 
1950-1957 also reflect to some extent the total relational 
situation.
109A. Doak Barnett, Communiât China : The Early Years
(New York: Praeger, 196^), pp. 82-8 3.
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TABLE 1
SOVIET-CHINESE TRADE*
(IN MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS)
Year
Soviet exports 
to China
Soviet Imports 
from China
1950 3 8 8 .2 5 1 8 8 .2 5
1951 4 7 6 .2 5 3 3 2 .0 0
1952 5 5 4 .2 5 413.75
1953 697.50 4 7 4 .7 5
1954 7 5 9 .2 5 578 .25
1955 74 2 .5 0 643.50
1956 733.00
5 4 4 .0 0
764.25
1957 73 8 .2 5
♦Source: "Zu den chinesisch-sowjetischen Wirtschafts-
beziehungen," Per Ostblock und die Entvlcklungslander (Han­
over: Verlag furLiteratur und Zeithgeschehen GmbH) no. 7,
April 1962, p. M-7, quoted in William E. Griffith, The Sino- 
Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 19641, p. 232.
It can be seen from the table that Soviet exports in­
creased steadily through 1954. They leveled off somewhat in 
1955 and 1956 and then suffered a serious dip in 1957* Soviet 
imports increased through 1956 with a slight reduction in 1957* 
Looking ahead a bit, Chapter III will present a table showing 
that both exports and imports moved upward again in 1958 and 
reached dramatic proportions in 1959* This would seem to 
indicate that Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate in 
1955, but a further examination is needed. The reductions 
in Soviet trade with China during 1955-56 are matched by
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increases of Russian aid elsewhere, particularly the middle- 
East and I n d i a . T h e  large loss in 1957 has already "been 
mentioned earlier in this chapter as a casualty of the revolts 
in Poland and Hungary. The Russians found it necessary to 
pour more aid into those countries in order to stabilize that 
area. The leveling off of Soviet imports from China in 1957 
is probably due to the slowdown of Chinese production in that 
year. In other words, it can be argued that had the Russians 
not been forced to send aid to these other countries, their 
trade figures with the PRC should have continued upward.
The Chinese, no doubt, disapproved of this shift in resources
from their door, especially to India, but there really was
111not anything that they could do about it On balance
then, the trade figures for 1950-1957 are not very useful 
in pinpointing the Sino-Soviet split. Later on, as will be 
seen, in the early 1960's, they are much more revealing.
There is another point of reference for considering 
relations between the two communist powers during these first 
eight years and that is the matter of the Chinese's preference 
of Stalin's successor. Any conclusion drawn here must, of 
course, be highly speculative and should not be over-emphasized,
llOQriffith, Sino-Soviet Rift, pp. 233-2g4.
IllIbid.
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but it might be interesting to look at the available materi­
al*
To begin with, there seems to be some agreement that 
the Chinese did indeed favor Khrushchev. Myron Rush feels 
that this is so because of Khrushchev’s early insistence on 
the development of heavy industry at the expense of consumer 
g o o d s . Z a g o r i a  boldly suggests that "it was the Chinese 
who in all likelihood contributed greatly to Khrushchev's 
triumph over Malenkov in 195^."^^^ The historian Buss thinks 
that the Chinese liked Khrushchev in 195^, but that within a 
year they had changed their minds and from then on steadily 
became disillusioned with him.
To some extent, at least, the Chinese have provided 
the best answer themselves. In November of each year, virtu­
ally all communist parties send congratulatory telegrams to 
the Russian party on the occasion of the anniversary celebra­
tion of the USSR's revolution. These telegrams, following 
diplomatic protocol, are addressed by the communist parties 
to whichever Russian leaders are believed to be in command.
All of these telegrams are published in Pravda. Klaus Mehnert
112I^on Rush, The Rise of Khrushchev (Washington, 
D. C.: 1958), pp. 6-7.
ll^Zagoria, p. 21.
ll^ <3uss, Asia in the Modern World, p. 659.
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has made a study of the Chinese telegrams and has paraphrased
11*5them in the following manner: ^
1953! From Mao to Prime Minister Comrade Malenkov
195^: From Mao and Chou En-lai to President Voroshilov
1955î From Mao, Liu Shao Ch'i. and Chou to President 
Voroshilov, Prime Minister Bulganin and Foreign 
Minister Molotov
1956: From Mao, Lui, and Chou to President Voroshilov,
Prime Minister Bulganin, and Foreign Minister 
Shepilov
1957: No telegram was sent, perhaps because Mao was
in Moscow for the celebrations although all 
other countries sent telegrams even if their 
leaders were in Moscow.
1958: From Mao, Liu, and Chou to Prime Minister and
Party Leader Khrushchev and to President Voro­
shilov
1959: From Mao. Liu, Marshal Chu Teh, and Chou to 
President Voroshilov and Khrushchev (in that 
order)
I960: As in 1959
1961: From the same four to Party Leader and Prime
Minister Khrushchev and President of State 
Brezhnev
1962: As in 1961
It can immediately be noted that the Chinese did not 
consider it proper to include Khrushchev in their greetings 
until 1958 although Mao no doubt was aware that Khrushchev 
was in control of things by the time of the 1957 Moscow 
celebrations. The reason for this may very well be that the
^^^Mehnert, pp. 318-319.
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Chinese were simply following correct protocol by always 
addressing the current President, Prime Minister, and some­
times the Foreign Minister, Since Khrushchev did not have 
a state office for some time, there would be no need to In­
clude his name In the telegrams. However, by digging further, 
Mehnert found that In both 1955 and 1956, most of the East 
European countries did Include Khrushchev, This was even 
true of Outer M o n g o l i a , I t  Is hard to believe that the 
PRC could be less sophisticated In such matters than these 
other countries, particularly Outer Mongollal
Again, trying to determine the Chinese choice of a 
successor to Stalin Is risky business. It Is even possible 
that they did not really prefer anyone. All the telegrams 
actually Indicate Is that the Chinese were committed to cor­
rect diplomatic procedure. On the other hand, one could 
read Into this formalism either a desire to play a waiting 
game or a certain reserve toward Khrushchev, Putting every­
thing together, there appears to be a slight consensus In 
favor of the latter vein,
A summation of Chinese Communist attitudes toward the 
Soviet Union from 19^-9-1957 reveals a pattern of general 
deference on the part of the PRC but with growing attempts 
at Independence as well. The Stalin era, 19^9-1953» was a
^^^Mehnert, pp, 318-319*
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rather rugged austere period with the Chinese struggling to 
establish their control at home while fighting a debilitating 
war in Korea. It is safe to say that they quite willingly 
accepted the USSR as the senior partner in their relation­
ship during this period.
When the old Russian dictator died, there was a cer­
tain amount of confusion in Moscow for a time which trans­
lated into a loosening of reins. The PRC was quick to seize 
this opportunity by moving vigorously into the international 
theater and by elevating itself a bit within the framework 
of the Sino-Soviet Alliance. This period lasted from the 
middle of 1953 through 1955.
In many respects 1956 was a crucial year. At the 
Twentieth Russian Party Congress, Khrushchev issued his 
brutal denunciation of Stalin which apparently encouraged 
the later uprisings in Poland and Hungary. For a time the 
Kremlin's leaders seemed paralyzed and the Chinese boldly 
assumed the imitative. Presumably, their reward was accep­
tance of China's unique path to Socialism as well as a nearly 
co-equal position in the leadership of the Socialist Camp, a 
reward which was shrugged off the following year.
Internal difficulties in both the Soviet Union and 
Communist China combined to make 1957 a transitional year. 
Perhaps without either side realizing it, the leadership of 
the USSR moved to the Right while Peking moved to the Left.
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The result was that both parties could leave the Moscow Con­
ference in November thinking that they had understood each 
other when in reality they were miles apart.
1957 closed with the Communist world in reasonable 
order, Mao, himself had declared to all the parties at Mos­
cow that the Socialist Camp had but one leader and that was 
the Soviet Union. If there was any reason for suspecting an 
imminent break in Sino-Soviet relations at this point in his­
tory, it was well hidden. Writing in early 1957, Benjamin 
Schwartz asserted that "the immediate prospects for the
relations between Moscow and Peking do not necessarily point
117to any 'break.'" Yet a break did come and sooner than 
anyone expected. The very next year, 1958, the Chinese were 
to launch themselves into deep ideological waters revolving 
around the communes and the Great Leap Forward. This was 
the beginning of a fairly steady drive to an open split. In 
retrospect, then, it is possible that after 1957, there was 
no turning back.
117Boorman, ej^ . al., p. lM-0 .
CHAPTER III
The view from Peking, as the year 1958 opened, must
have been a considerably satisfying one. Mao Tse-tung had
returned from the Moscow Conference held during the previous
November with additional stature and prestige for himself
and his country.
His influence on Soviet policy stood higher than ever 
before and it was to persist into the summer of 1958.
At the Conference itself he could take credit for re­
storing the United Communist front. . . . Mao had 
reached the position at which he alone among world 
Communist leaders had been invited by Moscow to cooper­
ate in laying down the law to the lesser Parties: All
Communist Parties were equal, of course, but the Soviet 
Party had always been more equal than the others; now 
the Chinese Party was more equal too.i
This general state of euphoria was further manifested
in a broad policy statement issued by Chou En-lai in Febru-
p
ary. His remarks clearly reflected the Chinese belief in 
the "East wind now prevailing over the West wind." As ex­
plained in Chapter II this feeling stemmed largely from the 
Soviet Union's development of a new ICBM. He suggested that 
the imperialists now had to face an invincible socialist camp
^Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow y. Pekin
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1963), p. 7^ .
^New China News Agency, February 10, 1958. (Hereafter
NCNA)
6^ -
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that was stronger and more united than ever before.^ On the 
other hand, the United States was faced with serious economic 
recessions and political crises. It was also having trouble 
with NATO. In fact the total American effort to dominate 
Its allies, Chou maintained, was meeting with rejection and 
the United States was likely to find Itself Isolated If It
If
did not mend Its ways. Under these circumstances, according 
to the policy statement, the Western (and especially the United 
States') presence In Korea and Vietnam should not be allowed 
to continue. However, Chou's strongest attack came over the 
Issues of Taiwan and the "two Chinas" concept. Once again, 
he called for the liberation of Taiwan but In stronger terms 
than had been used for some time. In particular he rallied 
against the "two Chinas" concept, which was gaining some small 
popularity, as being totally unacceptable.'
This attitude of socialist superiority permeated Chi­
nese actions throughout the next several months. It was re­
flected In their renewed attack on the Yugoslavs In May, In 
their statements at the Warsaw Pact Meeting, their position 
concerning the Middle East Crisis later In the summer, and 
above all, the Taiwan Straits crisis. In every one of these
3NCNA, February 10, 1958•
5,
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Instances the Russians had some say too, and most of the time 
they agreed with the Chinese. Yet a closer inspection will 
show that Peking was always the more bellicose and probably 
actually alarmed their ally in the case of Taiwan.
It will be recalled that the Yugoslavs had refused to 
sign the Moscow declaration. This apparently touched nerve 
endings in both Moscow and Belgrade. The Russians soon 
launched an anti-revisionist campaign, although without 
directly naming Yugoslavia, and Tito sought strong support 
for his views from Gomulka and Kadar who appeared to be lis­
tening. Also, the Yugoslavs issued copies of the draft pro­
gram for their upcoming party congress to all socialist 
countries. While sections of it had been toned down to 
placate the Russians, it was still much too independent to 
suit Kremlin tastes. The result of all of this activity was 
that the Soviet leaders, by the middle of April, felt called 
upon to refuse to attend the Yugoslav congress and to denounce 
its program.* Their total attack took them to the very edge 
of a break with Belgrade, but they seemed to want to leave 
the door open just a crack to a future rapprochement. A 
few days after the Yugoslav Party Congress opened, Soviet 
Presidium member Furtseva said in a speech in Warsaw, "We 
have been and we will be friends with Yugoslavia— always."^
Apor a full account of this period see Robert Bass 
and Elizabeth Marbury (eds.). The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversv. 
1§4#-19S8 (New York: Prospect Books, 1959)» pp. lolf-7.
7pull text in New York Times. April 2?, 1958.
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The Chinese Conumnists must have viewed the Soviet- 
Yugoslav conflict with a good deal of pleasure, but they 
held their fire until after the Belgrade Congress had con­
cluded. On May fifth, they jumped In with both feet. An 
editorial appeared In Jen-mln .1 Ih-nao of that date which 
lashed out at Tito and his group as the worst kind of revl-
o
slonlsts. Among other things. It was suggested that the 
Yugoslav program was actually dictated by the Americans and 
that Tito was out to undermine the whole Bloc with his brand 
of revisionism. The Chinese denunciation was much more severe 
than anything the Russians had said up until then, and It was 
fairly Implicit that Peking was forcing the Russians to say 
more. The Soviet Union did Indeed respond by calling a 
plenum meeting of the Central Committee to discuss the Yugo­
slav crisis, by publishing an editorial In Pravda which was 
strongly anti-Belgrade, and by postponing credit agreements 
with that country.^ At the last minute, however, the Russians 
would temper their remarks just enough to make It clear that 
they were still not ready to make a clean break.
®«lfodern Revisionism Must Be Condemned," Peking Re- 
2i§w, IX (May 13, 1958).
^Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury (eds.). The Sovlet- 
Yugoslav Controversy. 19^8-1958 (New York: Prospect Books,
1959) pp. 189-190.PP
10
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The Chinese felt no such compunction* Early in June
an article appeared in Hung sht'i, (Red Flag). a new Chinese
Journal) written by Ch'en Po-ta, in which Tito was accused
of having been bought by the American Imperialists.^^ Near
the end of the same month the Chinese openly called Tito a
traitor and began to refer derisively to the "Tito clique"
12
as wanting to disintegrate the Bloc. June ended with both 
the Chinese and the Yugoslavs withdrawing their respective 
ambassadors. From this time to the present the PRC has never 
relented in its uncompromising attitude toward Belgrade.
From this brief recitation of Yugoslav-Russian and 
Yugoslav-Chinese relations during the early part of 1958, it 
is reasonably clear that the Chinese were experiencing a new 
mood of exuberance and belligerency. In their minds the time 
was ripe for pushing hard against the decaying capitalist 
countries. But first, the Socialist camp had to have ab­
solute unity; therefore Tito had to make up his mind— he had 
to get in or get out. When Tito made it plain that he pre­
ferred sitting on the fence, Peking was perfectly willing to 
dump him.^^ For their part the Russians were certainly 
harsh enough in their criticisms of the Yugoslavs, but as
^^Peking Review, XVI (June 17, 1958), p. 9.
l^Peonles' Daily. June 26, 1958.
^^Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict : 1956-
1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. l8l-
1827
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matters rapidly reached a head, Khrushchev quietly withdrew 
from the field and began to recommend that Tito simply be 
ignored.
The interesting point here is why the Chinese pushed 
the Russians so persistently in the direction of an open 
break with Tito. The answer to this question, as Professor 
Zagoria sees it, is that they needed complete Bloc unity to 
achieve Chinese goals in the Far East. More specifically 
they needed the support of the Soviet Union with its missiles 
and nuclear weapons. Therefore, Peking could not tolerate 
the slightest easing in East-West tensions. "Although Camp 
David was still more than a year away, the signs of a Soviet 
move in this direction were already perceptible. By prevent­
ing a Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement, the Chinese probably 
believed that they could make more difficult a Moscow- 
Washington rapprochement. In other words the Chinese 
attack on Yugoslavia was actually an attack on the Soviet 
Union! Peking was telling Moscow not to go soft, not to 
become revisionist, not to play ball with the American im­
perialists, and the "Tito Clique" was simply a handy euphinism. 
The slowly widening breach between the two countries had 
received another push.
^^Zagoria, p. 18>+.
^^Ibid.. p. 185.
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At a meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries held in 
Moscow in May of 1958 the Chinese Communists advanced virtu­
ally the same arguments that they used during the Yugoslav 
incident— namely that the East wind now prevailed over the 
West wind. According to his speech which was published in 
SCMP (Survey of the China Mainland Press) Ch'en Yun, the 
principal Chinese "observer" at the conference, the United 
States was approaching an economic crisis, the Western allies 
were falling into disarray, and the United States was really 
only a "paper t i g e r . T h i s  was practically the same speech 
that Mao had made at the Moscow Conference the year before, 
and like Mao, Ch'en called for stern pressure against the 
West. When Khrushchev presented his address, it also was a 
repeat of remarks that he had made in November. He spoke of 
the vast devastation that would result from a nuclear war 
and suggested the need for a summit meeting to settle interna­
tional tensions. Interestingly, he also held out the promise 
to the West of vast markets in the USSR, the Middle East, and 
C h i n a i Here again, it is evident that the Chinese were 
eager to follow a strong left wing policy while the Russians 
had moved to the middle of the road.
^^No. 1787, June 9, 1958, pp. ^9-51.
^7"por Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism," 
(collection of speeches by Khrushchev), (New York: E. P.
Dutton and Co., Inc.) I960, pp. 39^-^33*
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The first really good chance for the Socialist camp 
to flex its muscles came with the Middle East crisis in July 
of 1958. For a time, this situation threatened to bring 
Russian troops into direct confrontation with British and 
American troops. The whole world anxiously watched and waited, 
and the Chinese Communists, in particular, followed each Soviet 
move.
The crisis was the result of a coup in Iraq which over­
threw a pro-Western government. When the rebellion showed 
signs of spreading, the British sent troops to Jordan, and 
the United States sent men to Lebanon. For a time, no one 
was certain as to what these troops were to do. If they simply 
stabllzed things in those two countries, then the problem was 
not too serious, but if they also tried to move into Iraq, 
then they were sure to run up against Russian forces. Fur­
thermore, the problem was complicated by the fact that the 
Iraqi rebellion fitted, to some extent, the pattern of a 
"national liberation" movement which communist countries 
were supposed to aid. Therefore, should American forces 
move into Iraq, could the Soviet Union dare to stand aside?
To avoid this dilemma, Khrushchev was determined to use 
every conceivable political pressure to prevent the 
Western powers from carrying out their supposed inten­
tions while at the same time evading a military commit­
ment of his own. Although he hurried to recognize the 
new Iraqi government and promised Nasser support in the 
unlikely event of a Western attack on the Ü.Â.R., he 
sent no "volunteer" fighters and instead issued his
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appeal for an emergency smpit meeting with Indian 
participation on 19 July.io
His proposal failed, but both sides did agree to submit the
problem to the Ü. N. Security Council and gradually the
Middle-East crisis calmed down.
It Is easy to see that the Kremlin response was a 
carefully measured one. While attempting to appear "tough" 
on the one hand, they left open the possibility of a grace­
ful way out for everyone on the other. The evidence Is that 
this did not suit the Chinese at all.
To the leaders of the People's Republic of China, the 
Middle-East crisis presented a perfect excuse for asserting 
the Socialist Camp's superiority. There could be only one 
response: military action must be met with military action.
If the West were not stopped now. It would only be encouraged 
to move on to new adventures. Besides, the U. N. was probably 
Incapable of removing the West from Lebanon and Jordan. Most 
of these sentiments were expressed In an editorial published 
In Peonies Dally on July 20. "If the U.S.— British aggressors 
refuse to withdraw from Lebanon and Jordan, and Insist on ex­
panding their aggression, then the only course left to the
l8
Richard Lowenthal, "Shifts and Rifts In the Russo- 
Chlnese Alliance," Problems of Communism, January, February 
1959, p. 19.
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people of the world is to hit the aggressors on the head! . . .
19The only language they understand is that of force."
Significantly, the Chinese refused to endorse Khrush­
chev's call for a summit meeting until July 22. From then 
on, they tended to follow the Kremlin line once again, prob­
ably because the crisis was diminishing gradually anyway.^0 
This episode displayed another instance in which the PRC was 
ready to go farther than the Soviet Union and actively urged 
their ally to follow them.
Possibly the most dramatic divergence of opinion in 
foreign affairs between the USSR and the PRC occurred over 
the Taiwan Straits crisis. Unfortunately, scholars who 
have written about the affair are in some disagreement on 
many of its aspects, which makes any conclusions subject to 
some dispute. For instance, there does not seem to be any 
consensus as to whether the Russians knew ahead of time just 
what the Chinese were about to do. Alexandre Metaxas states
flatly that they did not. "Without warning Moscow, Peking
21gave orders for an intensive bombardment of Quemoy." Barnett 
takes note of the fact that Khrushchev visited Peking at the 
beginning of August and wonders if the Chinese might not have 
asked for Moscow's backing of its proposal at that time.
19jen-Min Jih-nao. July 20, 1958.
Zagoria, p. 199.
Alexandre Metaxas, Moscow or Peking? (London: Chat-
to and Windus, 1961), p. 85.
7^
However, he makes no conclusion, saying simply: "Whether or
not a specific agreement on this subject was concluded between 
Mao and Khrushchev, within three weeks after their meeting,
the Chinese Communists did, in fact, open up an intense bom-
22bardment of Quemoy. . . ." These same two authors are in 
disagreement over the probable outcome of the crisis as far 
as relations between the two countries is concerned. Metaxas 
thinks that it left them further apart than ever and caused 
considerable bitterness.On the other hand, Barnett main­
tains that, "in this crisis the Russians gave Peking stronger 
political and diplomatic backing than ever before. They fully 
endorsed all of the Chinese Communists' claims, and at the 
height of the crisis Khrushchev stated that 'an attack on the 
People's Republic of China . . .  is an attack on the Soviet 
Union.
One of the most detailed and well written accounts of 
the entire crisis period can be found in Donald Zagoria's 
book. The Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1956-1961. He offers several
reasons for the venture which can be boiled down to mean 
mainly that Mao wanted to give East-West tensions another 
vigorous push and apparently felt that the off-shore islands
pp
A. Doak Barnett, ComTimnlst China and Asia: Chal­
lenge to American Policy (New York: Harper and Brother,
1 9 W ,  p."367^
^^Metaxas, pp. 89-90.
Barnett, Communiât China and Asia, p. 368.
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in Taiwan Straits were a relatively safe target. In this,
Mao was mistaken. The Americans and the Nationalist Chi­
nese found ways of defending the islands which obviated 
Peking's plans. The attack lasted from August 23 to Septem­
ber 6, when the PRC agreed to negotiate. Of great interest 
is Zagoria's observation that Soviet diplomatic support dur­
ing this period was loud but not overly belligerent. After 
September 6, when the crisis was all but over, Soviet dip­
lomatic support increased markedly, including the threat to 
use atomic weapons if the Americans also did so. If Zagoria's 
assessment is correct, and he offers fairly solid supporting
evidence, one could only conclude that the Russian response
25was cautious and even cynical.
As was stated at the beginning of the discussion of
the Taiwan Straits crises, the whole matter is still in some
dispute. On balance, however. Professor Zagoria probably
made the best over-all evaluation.
All that can be safely concluded is that Mao Tse-tung, 
having undertaken a venture on the basis of a calcula­
tion of the balance of power which was not shared by 
Khrushchev, was forced to make a public and humiliating 
withdrawal. Judging by the secret documents exchanged 
between the two parties in I960, there seems good reason 
to believe that the Russians did fear that the Chinese 
might drag them into a war and that Peking resented in­
sufficient Soviet support. It seems likely that tha, 
Strait venture left much ill feeling on both sides.
^^Zagoria, pp. 206-16.
Z^Ibld.. p. 217.
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The Taiwan Straits crisis was the last major point of 
contention between the USSR and the PRC in the foreign policy 
field to occur in 1958. As serious as some of the differ­
ences had been over the various foreign policy issues during 
the year, it is not likely that they had the profound impact 
which was to result from a purely domestic decision of the 
Chinese. The reference, of course, is to the introduction 
of the "people's communes."
Some mention was made in the last chapter as to the 
general reasons for advancing the commune idea. Briefly 
again, the feeling among many top Chinese party leaders was 
that the economy (especially industry) was beginning to flag, 
not nearly enough aid was being received from Russia, and, 
perhaps, the entire revolutionary spirit needed to be re­
vitalized in a "Great Leap Forward."
These sentiments, voiced mostly by the Left-wing, were 
formalized into the commune program. The 500,000,000 Chinese 
peasants living in the countryside would be herded onto com­
munes where they would all share equally and each give freely 
of his labor.Living conditions were to be highly regi­
mented, and there was hope that each commune would be mostly 
self-sufficient— hence the rather notorious "backyard furnaces."
2?David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 63.
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And, "In so far as the scheme made economic sense at all, it 
could be seen as an attempt to deal with the pressing prob­
lems of food shortage and lagging industrial plans by ex­
ploiting the one resource of which China had no shortage:
pQ
unskilled manpower."
The resolution of the Chinese Communist Party which 
established the leap forward came on August 29, and almost 
immediately extravagant claims for the success of the leap 
were put forward. The press spoke glowingly of the food 
problem being basically solved in 1958 and completely solved 
in 1959. Mao himself announced that grain production would 
double in 1958 and double again in 19591^^ On October 1, 
the Peonies' Daily editorialized that "a happy prosperous 
life of abundant food and clothing is no longer a remote 
ideal and can be realized within two or three years.
As fantastic as all of this must have sounded to the
Russians, there is no overwhelming evidence that the reports
particularly bothered the leaders of the Kremlin. In fact,
Soviet articles approved of the mass use of labor power 
for the construction of irrigation and other facilities 
in the countryside, seeing in this another peculiarly 
Chinese response to capital shortage. . . . Thus, Soviet 
journals seemed to approve of the new Chinese economic
ZBibid.
29zagoria, pp. 89-90.
^^The Peonies' Daily. October 1, 1958.
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policies which ultimately led to the communes— ^despite 
the fact that these policies varied considerably from 
past and present Soviet economic practice.31
It should be noted, however, that this was before the Russians
fully understood what was going on.
Quite early in the commune program, the Chinese began 
to advance some far-reaching political conclusions which had 
major significance to Sino-Soviet relations. For one thing, 
Peking started saying that their commune program would put 
them within early reach of Marx's promised land. "Less than 
ten years after taking over a backward country largely deva­
stated by war they were claiming to be within sight of Com­
munism. This was a goal which the Russians, for all their 
industrial achievements over the previous forty years, had
32
only just dared to name, and even then in the vaguest terms."
It is easy to imagine what Moscow must have thought of this 
impertinence, once it became obvious.
A corollary assumption, which would no doubt occur to 
the Soviets, would be the possible gains in foreign influence 
of the Chinese experiment. If the PRC could leap so quickly 
to Communism, might not other backward nations see the Chi­
nese way as a better road to socialism than the Russian? 
William E. Griffith has stated it this way: "The communes
also represented a Chinese claim to ideological primary as
S^Zagoria, p. 91.
^^Floyd, p. 64.
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the creators of a rapid and effective road to communism, 
particularly for the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America."33
In addition to these potentially troublesome issues, 
Peking returned to the theme that Mao had thought all of 
this up and was therefore something of a prophet. In fact, 
it was asserted that he was clearly on a par, as a theortician, 
with Marx and Lenin. This was probably the beginning of the 
gradually developing concept that Mao was much more important 
than Khrushchev. As David Floyd put it, the Chinese "were 
led by Mao Tse-tung who was a 'prophet' and an original Marx­
ist thinker. Who else could compete with him? Khrushchev 
was by comparison a petty party official, with no 'works' to 
his name."3^ C. P. Fitzgerald has suggested that "when Mao 
became not only a prophet for Asia, but the senior and sole 
surviving 'contributor to the treasury of Marxist thought,' 
the relationship between Asian and European Communism was 
very greatly changed."3^ With occasional periods of relaxa­
tion, the persistent building of a "cult of Mao" has continued 
right up to the present.
33william E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 196^), p. l8.
3*^loyd, p. 6M-.
39c. P. Fitzgerald, The Birth of Communist China 
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 196M-), p. 261,
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There Is some speculation as to just when the Russians
became aware of what the commune program was all about. A
few observers think that Mao may have discussed the subject
with Khrushchev, around the first of August, when the Soviet
leader was visiting Peking, but it was probably not a major
agenda item. Mehnert's statement is typical:
We do not know whether Peking gave the Kremlin advance 
information on the people's communes. If during the 
visit to Peking in July and August 1958 Chrushchev was 
told by Mao what was going on, certainly nothing was 
said publicly about it. If Mao concealed from his guest 
the mass movement which was then already under way, or 
even its scope (and there are many indications that this 
is what happened), this must have been an additional 
reason for Moscow's anger.3«
Of course, the commune resolution was made public, and, 
as already indicated, the Chinese press spoke almost daily 
about the wonderful expectations of such a plan. All of this 
was available to the Russians, so they obviously knew about 
the communes. The point is, they did not fully understand 
then.
Professor Zagoria has made the plausible deduction 
that the Soviet Union was adequately aware of Chinese diffi­
culties in agriculture and industrial production, and there­
fore hailed The People's Communes as a realistic effort to 
overcome these problems. Moreover, it is probable that the 
Russians initially believed the communes to be some sort of
3^Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, trans. by Leila 
Vennewitz (New York: Mentor Books, 196^), p. 261,
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higher-type cooperative, incorporating both agricultural and 
industrial enterprise.He tentatively concluded that "if 
the Chinese had chosen to call the 'communes' by some other 
name, if they had made no ideological claims for them, and 
if they had not pushed the 'egalitarian' aspect of the experi­
ment as far as they did, the communes would not have caused 
the considerable friction in Sino-Soviet relations that they 
did."^® In short then, it would appear that the Kremlin was 
not aware of the threat to its leadership position until after 
the communes had been in operation for the better part of 
three months.
Even when the Russians finally saw the full significance 
of the People's Communes, they reacted in a carefully restrained 
manner, at least for the balance of 1958. Some of their criti­
cism, quite naturally, was rather pointed, as, for example,
T. A. Stepanyan's articles in Vonrosv Filesofi (Problems of 
Philosophy) of October 16, 1958. In it, he alleged that the 
Soviet Union and its East European allies would reach perfect 
communism first, and only later would the Asian Communist 
countries follow.Also, in December, Mr. Khrushchev is
S^Zagoria, pp. 112-15.
38j
39,
) k<_____________________________ _______________________
1958, p. 3 4, as quoted in Harry Schwartz, Tsars, Mbndarins. 
and Commissars (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1964), p. I96.
38ibid.. p. 115.
T^. A. Stepanyan. "Oktyabrskaya revolyuttsiya i stan- 
ovlenie ommunisticheskoi formatsii," Vonrosv Filosofi. 10,
82
supposed to have told (then) Senator Hubert Humphrey, who 
was in Moscow at the time, that communes were "reactionary" 
and "old fashioned,Presumably, Khrushchev felt certain 
that the remark would get back to the Chinese and wanted it 
that way. (Later, Khrushchev generally denied having made 
the comment.)
The basic response, however, was almost total silence. 
The word commune was practically eliminated from all Russian 
news items concerning China, and even the scholarly Journals 
were extremely sparing in using the word. Soviet leaders in 
particular abstained from any reference to the communes in
ifl
their official speeches from the middle of October on.
Soviet Ambassador Yudin made two public speeches in Peking 
on the occasion of the October Revolution anniversary. In 
both cases he completely ignored the communes while stressing 
the official Russian line on the transition to c o m m u n i s m . *+2 
Interestingly, it is at about this same time that the Chinese 
themselves began to retreat somewhat from their positions.
It has been suggested that Yudin may have received instruc- 
tions from Moscow to tell the Chinese to back off.
^Schwartz, p. 169.
^^Zagoria, p. 111.
^^NCNA, November 6 and 7, 1958.
^^Zagoria, pp. 111-12.
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An example of a subtle and perhaps amusing reproach 
that the Kremlin used against the PRC came in October. It 
involved the CPSU's October Revolution anniversary slogans 
as they appeared each year from time to time in Pravda. 
Generally, all of the Satellite countries received the same 
slogan except China, which was treated separately. Following 
is a brief table showing the various slogans:
TABLE 2
SOVIET SLOGANS ON SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION*
Year China Satellites
October 1955 successfully struggling 
for . . . construction 
of the foundations of 
socialism
struggling for . . 
. the construction 
of socialism
May 1956 successfully realizing 
a socialist transform­
ation
struggling for . . 
. the construction 
of socialism
October 1956 successfully building 
socialism
struggling for . . 
. the construction 
of socialism
May 1957 builder of socialism building socialism
October 1957 builder of socialism building socialism
May 1958 builder of socialism building socialism
October 1958 building socialism building socialism
*Source: All statements abbreviated from the full
slogans as they appeared in various issues of Pravda. as 
quoted in Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict : 19S6-
1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19^2), p. 112.
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A brief look at the table immediately reveals that 
the PRC was always treated a little better than the satel­
lites and from May of 1957 was accorded the high station of 
"builder of socialism." It is hard to imagine that the 
Soviet Union would have applied a much stronger accolade to 
itself. Then in October of 1958, the USSR not only down­
graded China to a status of only "building socialism" but 
put the Chinese on the same level as, presumably, Bulgaria. 
There does not seem to be any evidence that Peking took any 
special note of their demotion, but it is clear, given the 
sometimes strange world of communist jargon, that they had 
been given a distinct slap on the wrist.
For the most part then, the Russian reaction to the 
communes during the latter part of 1958 was usually subtle, 
academic, or simply silence. They would make much more severe 
and even sinister attacks in 1959 as will be shown. Oddly 
enough, by then, the need for reaction was probably already 
greatly reduced.
The "great leap forward" and coramunization program 
started out auspiciously enough, and spectacular gains were 
apparently made in many areas. Most of these, however, were 
short-term gains, and very quickly, enormous shortcomings in 
over-all planning began to appear. Soon, confusion, frustra­
tion, and resentment set in. A. Doak Barnett has aptly 
described the situation:
85
For a brief period after the start of the "great leap," 
Communist China did experience an outburst of organized 
human activity that probably has few parallels in history, 
at any time or in any place. But clearly the Chinese 
Communists attempted to do too much too fast, and they 
made some very serious mistakes. Economic planning and 
administration, in effect broke down. Many of the new 
economic experiments were failures; notable among these 
were the much-publicized "backyard steel furnaces" and 
other hastily promoted rural industries. After being 
worked to the point of exhaustion, and organized to the 
point where they were deprived of almost all individual 
incentives, the Chinese people began to react in jb)ae 
only way that they could— by dragging their feet.^
By December 10, 1958, party rulers vaguely, but none­
theless officially, hinted that things were not going well.
On that date a resolution was passed by the Central Committee 
which strongly implied that the communes, as an organizational 
unit, would most likely have to be dropped. Of course, the 
resolution spoke in terms of high praise for the communes, 
but at the same time, words such as "impetuous," "premature," 
"hastily," or "Utopian" were applied to their implementation. 
Moreover, the peasant was told that he should be allowed to 
keep his clothing, bedding, small livestock and poultry, his 
bank savings, and his right to work on his own for extra in­
come if it did not interfere with his assigned t a s k s . T h u s  
a retreat from the "great leap forward" was begun only a few
^A. Doak Barnett, Communist China in Perspective 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 19&2), p. 55%
^^See Chinese Communism: Selected Documents. Dan N.
Jacobs and Bans H. Baerwald, eds. (New York: Harper and
Row, 1963), pp. 111-132, for full text.
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months after the program was started. On the surface, the 
Chinese continued to support the communes In their speeches 
and news released for the next couple of years, but with 
less and less frequency. After late I960, It was obvious 
that even vocal support was being quietly dropped.
In late January 1959» Khrushchev struck his first, 
more or less open, official blow at the communes. The Rus­
sians were holding their twenty-first party congress "which 
may well have been summoned specifically for the purpose of 
putting the Chinese In their place.Khrushchev did not 
mention the PRC by name, but his target was unmistakable. 
"Society, he said, cannot leap from capitalism to communism. 
Furthermore, he let It be known that It was Improbable that 
one country would achieve full communism ahead of all others. 
"The socialist countries will enter the higher phase of com-
L.O
munlst society more or less simultaneously.
Perhaps Khrushchev's most direct attack on the communes 
came In July, during a speech that was made In Poland. There, 
he ridiculed the Idea that communes were necessary to build 
communism, and declared that people who thought so obviously 
"did not properly understand what communism Is and how It Is 
b u i l t . T h i s  was virtually the last comment made by a top
^Floyd, p. 6M-.
^^Full text In Pravda. January 28, 1959.
'Ibid.
49Pravda. July 21, 1959.
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Kremlin official, or, indeed, any Russian, on the communes, 
so that as far as they were concerned, the matter was at an 
end.
Although the Chinese apparently took no real note of 
Khrushchev's remarks in Poland, they continued to support 
their experiment, but in a more constrained manner. Partly, 
this was because the leap forward was not working but also 
because Peking's attention was now required to meet more 
dramatic problems. The dispute over the "great leap forward" 
and the "people's communes" was short but bitter. It is en­
tirely possible that it was the single most important event 
in the deepening Sino-Soviet split.
One of the problems the PRC had to face, which was by 
no means new but which had been exacerbated by the leap for­
ward, was the need for more aid. Their frantic pace of in­
dustrialization had created an enormous shortage of all sorts 
of goods that presumably could come only from the Soviet 
Union. An interesting but undocumented speculation on the 
USSR's being the only major source of supply has been ad­
vanced by Alexandre Metaxas in his book Moscow or Peking?
He suggests that early in 1959
Khrushchev heard talk of certain negotiations which were 
taking place, in utter secrecy, between Peking and Formosa 
that is, in fact, between Mao Tze-tung Zsiç7 and Chiang 
Kai-shek, under the auspices of htaie. Sun Yat-sen, widow 
of the great statesman and sister of Mme. Chiang Kai-shek.
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A reconciliation between the two Chinas, though diffi­
cult to envisage, might lead directly to a.reconcilia- 
tion between China and the United States.
If true, then it would be conceivable that Mao might seek aid 
from the United States rather than the Soviet Union. To fore­
stall this eventuality, Metaxas believes that Khrushchev pre­
cipitated a crisis over Berlin only to withdraw later in ex­
change for the promise of a summit conference. The Eisenhower 
administration could hardly talk peace with the Kremlin while 
at the same time it tried to wean the Chinese out of the Soviet 
orbit. Thus, China was isolated from the West and could only 
make the best deal possible with the Russians.
Whether or not Metaxas is right, the record does show 
that Peking concluded a new trade agreement with Moscow during 
the early part of 1959. Typically, however, the Chinese got 
far less than they wanted and had to pay a hard price for 
that. Soviet trade to China increased by 50$ over 1958, but 
Peking was forced to pay cash. In fact, the Chinese actually 
sent more to the USSR than it received, achieving a trade sur- 
plus which helped to pay off some of its back debts.'
A related aspect of the Chinese need for industrial 
goods was their desire to become a nuclear power. As indicated
^^Metaxas, pp. 92-93 
^llbid.. p. 93. 
^^Schwartz, p. 171.
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in Chapter II, the Russians had promised Peking assistance 
in this area and had agreed to supply them with an actual 
sample bomb. But in June 1959, Khrushchev suddenly canceled 
the entire arrangement. All of this was done in the utmost 
secrecy, so that Western observers did not learn of the agree­
ment or its subsequent cancelation until several years later. 
For that matter, not all of the details are clear even now. 
Under the circumstances, it is necessary to speculate on the 
motives behind Moscow's action. Griffith believes that Khrush­
chev probably meant to drive the PRC back into line, "In 
June, presumably both as penalty for the past and as threat 
for the future, he formally abrogated the Soviet commitment 
to give China aid in its atomic weapons.
Jumping ahead to 1963, when the Sino-Soviet dispute
was out in the open, the Chinese themselves reported:
As far back as June 20, 1959, when there was not yet the 
slightest sign of a treaty on stopping nuclear tests, the 
Soviet Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on 
new technology for national defense concluded between 
China and the Soviet Union on October 15, 1957, and 
refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb 
and technical data concerning its manufacture. This was 
done as a presentation gift at the time the Soviet 
leader went to the %ited States for talks with Eisen­
hower in September. 54
^^illiam E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cam­
bridge: The MIT Press, 196^ -), p. lo.
^Peking Review VI (August 16, I9 6 3), 7-15.
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While the Chinese are not quite saying that Khrushchev told 
Eisenhower the full story, their use of the term "presenta­
tion gift" strongly suggests that this was the case. Enough 
so, Schwartz has theorized that the "gift" accounted for the 
"sudden sprouting of the 'Spirit of Camp David' in September 
1959 and the subsequent extraordinary, if short-lived, Soviet- 
American cordiality. . . Since the Chinese statement
was made well after the fact and in a mood of deep resentment, 
it should probably be treated with a bit of skepticism. On 
the other hand, it is fairly certain that Peking did not 
receive any further nuclear aid from the USSR after June 1959.
Another problem the PRC had to face during this same 
year was one of internal politics. The "great leap forward" 
had not been a unanimous decision and, as failures mounted, 
its detractors began to challenge openly the Left wing of the 
party
In April, 1959, coinciding with the period of economic 
rethinking after the setbacks of the previous year, 
certain changes were made in the Peking Government.
Mao Tse-tung resigned his position as 'Chairman' or 
President in favour of Liu-Shao-chi, an expert in Com­
munist theory rather than a practical statesman. Mao, 
who like Stalin had held the key posts of both govern­
ment and party, continued as chief of the latter, so 
that in effect he retained supreme power.?"
55schwartz, p. 172.
5*J. V. Davidson-Hous ton, Russia and China ; From the 
Bins to Mao Tse-tung (London: Robert Hale Limited, I960),
p. l6o7
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Whether Mao was forced to resign his position or 
whether he simply thought It expedient to disassociate him­
self from the Left, Is still open to some question. At any 
rate, his action seemed to signal much more determined at­
tacks on the Left wing, which finally came to a head In late 
summer.
The group opposed to the "great leap forward" and 
therefore, the Left wing, was headed by Marshal P'eng Teh- 
hual. Minister of Defense, a member of the Politburo and a 
man of considerable Influence within the party. He was 
joined by such men as Chang Wen-tlen, a Vice-Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, and General Huang Ko-cheng, Chief of Staff 
of the Army, as well as several lesser lights who collectively 
became known as the "anti-party" group.
Marshal P'eng submitted a resolution at the Lushan 
meeting of the eighth plenum of the Central Committee of the 
Chinese Party, He apparently criticized the lack of thought 
that had gone Into the planning for the new economic policies 
and ridiculed the exaggerated claims that were being made for 
them. Not all of the facts are known, but It Is believed 
that at one point during the two week session, Mao's leader­
ship Itself was called Into question, and he had to throw
5?For a full account of this episode see David A. 
Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-hual," The China 
Quarterly. VIII (October-December, 1961), 63-7 6.
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all of his personal prestige on the line in order to win the 
battle.
It appeared likely that the Soviet Union played a role 
in this drama in the sense that both Khrushchev and Marshal 
P’eng were in Tirana, Albania, at the same time in May. Not 
everyone is agreed on this, but Edward Crankshaw asserts that 
the two men met there and that P'eng let Khrushchev see his 
resolution. "In Tirana he took the opportunity of showing 
this memorandum to Khrushchev, before presenting it to his 
colleagues at home." The assumption is that Khrushchev 
gave the Marshal encouragement but in strict confidence, of 
course, "It is still not clear whether the Chinese colleagues 
knew of P’eng’s 'treachery' before his arrest, or whether it 
did not come out until he was under d u r e s s . T h e  important 
thing is that P'eng lost the game and his position, and the 
Chinese had one more reason for their growing enmity toward 
the Soviet Union.
Foreign affairs created some awkward moments between 
the two red powers during 1959 even though the resultant 
friction was soft-pedaled at the time. Two of these moments 
revolved around the Sino-Indian dispute and Khrushchev's 
visit to America.
^^Crankshaw, p. 8 3. 
^^Ibid.. p. 8M-.
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Early in the year, the Tibetans had revolted against 
their Chinese overlords and were rather brutally defeated.
Many of the Tibetans, including the Dalai Lana, fled to India, 
where they were granted political a s y l u m . T h e  Nehru govern­
ment remained neutral in this dispute, but its pro-Tibet 
sympathy was obvious, and popular expressions of support for 
the Tibetans were permitted in the newspapers. This angered 
the Chinese, and there were several border incidents involv­
ing Chinese and Indian troops over the next few months.
Finally, in September, Peking laid official claim to parts 
of India— east of Bhutan, and also in the states of Jammu 
and in Kashmir.
Throughout this period of Sino-Indian contention, the
Russians had refused to take sides:
The Russians' unwillingness to commit themselves in this 
issue or to identify themselves with Chinese criticisms 
of the Indian government followed naturally from the 
pains they had taken to restore friendly relations with 
India in the post-Stalin period. They had no intention 
of undoing the results of years of diplomatic and eco­
nomic effort for the sake of China's southward expansion. 
Indian neutrality was a delicate f l o w e r .
Moscow's position was outlined in a statement issued by 
Tass, official Soviet news agency on September ninth. The fol­
lowing excerpts are especially notable:
^®Claude A. Buss, Asia in the Modern World (New York: 
Macmillan, 196M-), p. 700.
*^R. G, Boyd, Communist China * s Foreign Policy (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. To.
^^Floyd, p. 72.
9^
One cannot fail to express regret at the fact that the 
incident on the Sino-Indian frontier took place. The 
Soviet Union is in friendly relations both with the 
Chinese People's Republic and the Republic of India.
The Chinese and Soviet people as linked by indestructible 
bonds of fraternal friendship, based on the great prin­
ciples of socialist internationalism. Friendly collabor­
ation between the USSR and India is developing success­
fully in accordance with the ideas of peaceful coexistence.
In Soviet ruling circles the assurance is being expressed 
that the government of the Chinese People's Republic and 
the Republic of India will not permit this incident to 
give comfort to those forces who do not want an improve­
ment of the international situation but its worsening, 
and who are trying not to admit the planned slackening 
of international tension in relation between states. In 
the same circles the assurance is being expressed that 
both governments will adjust the misunderstanding that 
has arisen, taking account of their mutual interests in 
the spirit of the traditional friendship between the 
peoples of China and India.
It is clear that while the Russians were at great pains 
to establish their neutrality in this situation, they nonethe­
less wanted an end to the hostilities which could only come 
with Chinese willingness. In effect, the statement put a 
certain amount of pressure on Peking which apparently was not 
appreciated although not much was said at the time.^^ Four
years later, the Chinese referred back to the Tass statement 
in an effort to prove that it was the Russians who first 
openly exposed the Sino-Soviet rift to the whole world.
^^Tass, September 9» 1959.
^^Floyd, p. 73.
^^"Whence the Differences?" Peonies Daily. February 27,
1963.
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The Indian question died down in another month or two, but 
it was to pop up again with even greater intensity in the 
early nineteen sixties.
Khrushchev's visit to America around the middle of 
September evoked only lukewarm enthusiasm from the PRC for 
a proposed summit meeting the following year, but the Chi­
nese were not at all convinced that imperialism would be any 
less dangerous just because its leaders agreed to talk. This 
was part of Peking's continuing desire to push a militant 
policy against the West,
Shortly after the Russian leader returned to Moscow, 
he left for the Chinese capital to take part in the tenth 
anniversary of the People's Republic. While Khrushchev was 
wined and dined in a befitting manner, it was evident to 
observers that relations between the two countries had 
definitely cooled. Even the Soviet press was surprisingly 
candid. On September 31, Pravda reported that the talks had 
been "cordial" and on October 1, the talks were termed "frank," 
and on October 2, they stated only that talks had taken place. 
To experienced Kremlinologists this was a sure sign that the 
meetings had steadily deteriorated. Moreover, it is now 
generally believed that Khrushchev took this opportunity to 
schold the Chinese for their aggressive policy towards the
^^Pravda. September 31, October 1 and 2.
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offshore Islands, India, and the West in general. The
People * s Daily said as much in 1963:
After the Camp David talks, the heads of certain com­
rades were turned and they became more and more intem­
perate in their public attacks on the foreign and 
domestic policies of the Chinese Communist Party.
They publicly abused the Chinese Communist Party as 
attempting 'to test by force the stability of the 
capitalist system' and as 'craving for war like a 
cock for a fight.' They also attacked the Chinese 
Communist Party for its general line of socialist con­
struction, its big leap forward and its people's com­
munes, and they spread the slander that the Chinese 
Party was carrying out an 'adventurist' policy in 
its direction of the state."?
Of course, this comment was written some three and 
one-half years after the fact and probably reflected greater 
bitterness than was actually felt in 1957. Nevertheless, 
the Chinese were not overly pleased with their Russian guest, 
and, perhaps significantly, this was the last time that Mao 
Tse-tung and Khrushchev saw each other.
Based on all of the events discussed above, it would 
appear safe to believe that by the beginning of I960, the 
existence of a widening rift in Sino-Soviet relations was 
known to most, if not all, of the important communist leaders 
throughout the world. Most of the lesser communist officials 
were probably only half aware of any difficulties, and Western 
observers could hardly have had more than the slightest of 
suspicions. However, by the end of I960, the whole communist
^?"Whence the Differences?"
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world was agog at the bitter exchanges that took place 
between the Russians and the Chinese at closed party con­
ferences, and even the West could see unmistakable, if in­
credible, evidence of a serious split. Perhaps the watch­
word of this year would be competition: competition between
the two powers on the international scene, within the com­
munist bloc and over ideological leadership.
On the international level, this competition took 
several different forms. Early in the year, Khrushchev made 
a quick trip through India, Indonesia, Burma, and Afghanistan, 
passing out economic aid to all takers. Right on his heels 
came Chou En-lai and later Chen Yi, spreading good will and 
the offer of enlarged trade agreements. These trips were not 
necessarily unusual, but such close shadowing of the Russian 
leader could have been interpreted as Chinese anxiety.
In îfeiy, Chou En-lai visited Outer Mongolia and extended 
a fair sized loan to that country. 1 couple of months later, 
Vyacheslev Molotov, an old Khrushchev critic, was withdrawn 
from the Soviet embassy in Ulan Bator, which, perhaps, was 
significant. The Russians gave a loan of $35 million to the 
new state of Guinea in Africa; the Chinese gave Guinea $25 
million. Castro in Cuba received an undisclosed amount of 
economic and military aid from Moscow; the Chinese loaned
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him $21 million. In short, everywhere the Russians went, 
with money, friendship, and trade, the Chinese soon followed 
with the same commodities. It is possible that all this in­
dicated was close cooperation between Russia and China in 
their foreign aid programs. However, given the hard pressed 
Chinese economy, which could have used the money at home, it 
is more likely that Peking was determined to seek influence 
in the same places as Moscow. Probably such competition was 
not welcomed by the Russians, since much of the money the 
Chinese were throwing around had almost certainly come from 
the USSRI
The breakup of the Paris summit conference provided 
another spark of dissention. Khrushchev, as previously stated, 
wanted this conference very much, to prove that his ideas on 
disarmament and peaceful coexistence could work, whereas the 
Chinese were skeptical. When the conference collapsed be­
cause of the crash of an American TJ-2 "spy" plane in Russian 
territory, the Chinese must have rejoiced. Peking had said 
all along that the Western imperialistic nations were not to 
be trusted, particularly the United States. "No sooner had 
Khrushchev packed his bags in Paris than the Chinese launched
68All of the above figures and events were taken from 
Floyd, p. 8l. It should be noted that many authorities doubt 
the reliability of both Russian and Chinese aid figures.
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a campaign, even more intensive than before, against Soviet 
strategic v i e w s . it is hard to imagine that the Russian 
leader appreciated the Chinese equivalent of "I told you so."
Later in the year, Khrushchev announced his intention 
to lead the Soviet delegation to the fifteenth session of 
the United Nations General Assembly. Several interesting 
vignettes resulted from this decision that point up the split. 
For example, the Russians had long maintained that the PRC 
should be included as a member of the UN. Yet Khrushchev,
"in his main speech to the Assembly it was noted that he dis­
missed the question of Chinese representation in a very few 
words. It was left to the Albanian delegate to make the most 
impassioned plea for the Chinese Communists."^® Also, he was 
observed in the corridors carrying on friendly discussions 
with Tito while pointedly ignoring the Albanians.Finally, 
the Soviet press, understandably, praised Comrade Khrushchev’s 
work at the United Nations, but the Chinese press complained 
that the United States had once again "pushed around" the 
Socialist Camp, headed by the Soviet U n i o n .
^^Zagoria, pp. 316-17.
^®Floyd, p. 8M-. 
f l l b i d ., p .  8 5 .
^^See Pravda. October 27, I960 and People’s Daily, 
October 19, I960.
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One of the best open Instances of Sino-Soviet con­
flict that occurred during the year that the West could see, 
was the precipitous withdrawal of Soviet advisors from the 
PRC. Elsewhere in this study it was stated that thousands 
of Russian scientists, engineers, and technicians of one 
àort or other had been sent to China to aid that country's 
struggling scientific and industrial complex. Now, suddenly, 
around the middle of July, the Kremlin issued orders telling
n-i
all of these people to return home.' Worse yet, they either 
destroyed or took with them practically all of their notes, 
plans, or blueprints which, of course, caused the Chinese no 
end of grief. (This fact, however, was not generally known 
until years later.) Travelers coming out of China during 
this episode reported the Russian departure, but the West 
could only guess at the numbers leaving. Moreover, while 
Western observers could now clearly see that something serious 
was going on between the USSR and China, they could not have 
seen the monumental fury with which Peking viewed the event, 
since officially the Chinese press remained silent. Even 
more importantly, the reason for the withdrawals remained a 
secret from the outside world for some time to come.
An interesting inside account of the advisor recall 
has been written by Mikhail A. Klochko, a Russian scientist
^Thousands of Soviet military advisors were also in 
China but they apparently were not recalled at this time.
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working in China when the orders came. He reports that on 
August fifth, he was brought into the office of two of his 
Chinese colleagues and given a copy of the official Soviet 
note to the Chinese government pursuant to the advisors re­
call. Professor Klochko was returned to Russia and, a year 
later, was sent to Canada as part of a scientific delegation. 
He managed to elude his supervisors long enough to ask for 
and receive political asylum. He has reconstructed the 
salient points of the Soviet note as follows:
1. The Chinese had not followed the technical advice 
of the Soviet specialists: They preferred to do 
things their own way, which was often exactly the 
opposite of what the Russians had advised them to 
do.
2. The Chinese were often scornful of the Soviet 
prescriptions: They crossed out passages, tore 
them up, and threw away the instructions given 
them.
3. The Chinese had created intolerable conditions 
and a painful psychological climate around the 
Soviet specialists: They spied on them, eaves­
dropped, searched their belongings, opened their 
mail, etc.
k-. There had been instances of Soviet specialists 
being molested and even attacked. This proved 
that the specialists had not been adequately 
protected by the Chinese authorities.
5. All these things had happened despite the great 
assistance the Soviet government had given China. 
Therefore, the Soviet government had dedided to 
call back all Soviet advisors in China in the 
course of July and August— all engineers.
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technicians, skilled workers, scientists^ and 
other Soviet citizens working in China.™
Oddly enough, Klochko agreed that these allegations 
were more or less true, but he still did not think conditions 
were bad enough to warrant the withdrawal. He guessed that 
there must be some larger explanation, a suspicion that was 
confirmed about a week later when he was summoned to the 
Russian embassy in Peking. Ambassador Chervonenko had evi­
dently received orders from Moscow to call in all Soviet 
specialists who were also communist party members and to 
inform that fully on the real reason behind the withdrawal. 
Since Klochko was a party member, he became privy to an extra­
ordinary confession of the Kremlin's inability to bring the 
Chinese to heel.
Chervonenko proceeded to recite a long list of Chinese 
errors beginning as early as 1957. The "hundred flowers" 
campaign had been a mistake, as were the "peoples communes" 
later. Chinese foreign policy was a disaster. The Chinese 
had alienated the Indians and Indonesia. They unjustly at­
tacked the Yugoslavs while supporting the intractable Alban­
ians. The PRC's attitude toward America was contradictory.
On the one hand, they called the United States a "paper tiger," 
while on the other, they accused the United States of wanting
7Sa.khail A. Klochko, Soviet Scientist in Rgl China, 
trans. Andrew Mac Andrew (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1964), pp. 177-78.
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to launch a nuclear holocaust. Finally, the Ambassador re­
peated the five charges listed above as well as maintaining 
that the Chinese were trying to spread subversive propaganda 
among the Soviet advisors!?^ Because of these errors, Chervo­
nenko concluded, "The Soviet Union was forced to recall its 
technical assistance and to give the Chinese government the 
opportunity to ponder its actions and perhaps to mend its 
ways•
There is one more aspect of the withdrawal of advisors 
from the PRC which has relevance: namely, the timing of the
matter. The order was issued some time in the first or second 
week of July; this put it only a couple of weeks or less after 
the conclusion of the Bucharest Conference. On that occasion 
"the break was finally declared and made public within the 
Communist movement at the fateful Congress of the Rumanian 
party in Bucarest ZsicJ where Khrushchev himself faced the 
Chinese delegates and, with a great release of pent-up feel­
ing, told them what he thought of them— and received as good 
as he gave."77 In other words, it is possible that Khrush­
chev cooled his temper, developed at Bucharest, by ordering
7^KLochko, pp. I83-86,
7^Ibid., p. 187.
77crankshaw, p. 96.
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the withdrawal of Soviet advisors. Obviously, Bucharest is 
an extremely important story, but first it would be profit­
able to lo6k briefly at other meetings that preceded the 
Rumanian conference before pursuing that part of the dispute.
The Warsaw Pact countries met in Moscow in February 
i960. The PRC was not a member of this group, but was allowed 
to send an observer named Kang Sheng. As usual, at the end of 
the session, a "Declaration" was issued which reputedly ex­
pressed unanimous approval.The Declaration was full of 
optimism over East-West relations, and Khrushchev's visit 
with Eisenhower that had "broken the ice of the cold war."
War was ruled out; peaceful coexistence, and especially 
personal encounters between world statesmen, represented the 
best way to assure world peace. Under these circumstances, 
disarmament proposals ought to move ahead.
Kang Sheng was permitted to make a speech to the meet­
ing which was later published in the Chinese p r e s s . H e  ad­
mitted that East-West relations were better, and that Khrush­
chev's visit had been successful, but denied that this was 
due to any change of heart by the West. Indeed, he argued 
that the United States remained the "arch enemy of world
^®Full text of the Declaration of the Member States 
of the Warsaw Treaty, Pravda. February 5» I960.
79pekine Review. VI (February 9, I960), 6-9.
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peace." Relations had Improved only because the Communist 
Camp had become so strong— the East wind was still prevail­
ing over the West wind. This, then, was no time to be talk­
ing about disarmament.
During the course of his address, Kang Sheng made two 
important but somewhat contradictory points. First, he 
wanted it clearly understood that any agreement made with 
the West without Chinese participation— presumably over dis­
armament— would not be considered binding by the PRC. This 
suggests a desire for some independence, so the delegates 
must have been a little surprised when Kang next proceeded 
to a renewed call for unity. The Chinese Communists, he 
declared, "have always taken the safeguarding of the unity
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of the Socialist camp as their sacred international duty." 
Actually, from the Chinese viewpoint, Kang Sheng was not 
being contradictory at all. As stated many times before, 
Peking wanted bloc unity, with Soviet leadership, but only 
so long as this led in the direction that the Chinese wanted 
it to go and only if unity contributed to Chinese growth. 
Whenever these things were not the case, then Peking would 
refuse to be bound. So it is hard to see how the Kremlin 
could agree to such a philosophy.
Peking used the occasion of the ninetieth anniversary 
of Lenin's birth on April 22, I960 to issue a series of
GOpeking Review. VI (February 9, I960), 8.
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of articles and speeches that fully spelled out their 
ideological position as opposed to the “modern revisionists," 
i.e. Khrushchev. The most important of these broadsides was 
printed in Hung Ch'i (Red Flag) and was entitled "Long Live 
Leninism.
It is discouragingly long, painfully tedious, repeti­
tious, and so heavily overlaid with communist jargon and 
rhetoric as to be nearly unintelligible in places. Fortunately, 
most authorities, including Professor Zagoria, believe that 
the whole thing can be boiled down to a few main ideas.
The three principal targets of the Chinese fire were the 
very three basic ideological innovations which Khrush­
chev had personally presented to the 20th Party Congress 
and which provided the doctrinal backdrop for his more 
flexible post-Stalin global strategy. These were 
Khrushchev's new doctrines on peaceful co-existence, on 
the non-inevitability of war, and on the possibility of 
peaceful roads to power in non-Communist countries.
In effect, what the Chinese did was to simply search 
through the rather voluminous writings of Lenin, picking out 
those quotations which best proved Peking's point of view. 
However, this was a game that the Russians could also play.
Less than a week later, Otto V. Kuusinen, a member of 
the party Presidium, answered the Chinese in an anniversary 
speech that he made in }foscow.^^ He too quoted from Lenin,
®^Full text in Foreign Languages Press, Peking, I960.
®^Zagoria, p. 299.
®^Full text in Pravda. April 23, I960.
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only this time, of course, he picked just those that sup­
ported Moscow's position, Kuusinen even quoted Lenin's wife 
Krupskaya, She conveniently recalled having heard her hus­
band say that the time would come when war would be so 
destructive as to make it impossible. Presumably, this 
backed Khrushchev's three new doctrines, and anyone who 
didn't think so was just being dogmatic. Unfortunately, 
the Chinese did not have available an appropriate widow that 
they could throw into the fray.
The total effect on the Kremlin's leaders of "long 
Live Leninism" must have been abrasive, to say the least, 
but the whole affair was quickly submerged by other events. 
Almost on the heels of the exchange came news of the Soviet 
downing a United States U-2 "spy" plane, and the subsequent 
aborting of the Paris summit meeting in May, In the ensuing 
flap, the Hung Ch'i polemic lost much of its sting,
Peking got another chance to needle the Russians when 
the World Federation of Trade Unions met in the Chinese capi­
tal early in June, In many ways, it was one of their better 
chances, since the meeting was in their own backyard where 
they could better impress the delegates, the WFTU tended to 
be Left-wing rather than Right, and the fiasco of the Paris 
summit meeting made the Chinese look like prophets.
Chou En-lai and other PRC speakers took full advantage 
of their position by lambasting the Soviet Union's theories
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at every turn. Chou denounced United States' imperialism 
and mocked Khrushchev's efforts at summitry by declaring:
8ii
"Peace can never be achieved by begging it of imperialism,"
The main Chinese delegate, Liu Chang-sheng, spoke on war and 
disarmament. He agreed with Khrushchev that general world 
war might no longer be inevitable, but all other wars were 
still possible and should not be denied. Disarmament, he 
thought, was also in the realm of possibility, but the Chi­
nese had grave reservations, "It is of course inconceivable 
that imperialism will accept proposals for general and com­
plete disarmament,"®^
Despite these comments and the careful behind the 
scenes wooing of foreign delegates, the Chinese do not ap­
pear to have gained much from the WFTU conference. On the 
other hand, they had again succeeded in annoying the Russians, 
as evidenced by Khrushchev's remarks a couple of weeks later 
at Bucharest,
One of the best accounts of the Rumanian Party Congress
held in June of I960 has been written by Edward Crankshaw in
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his book The New Cold War: Moscow v, Peking, By carefully
analyzing the statements of satelite leaders as well as the
^^Peonle's Daily. June 7, I960,
®5peklng Review, Vol, XXIV, I960,
®^See chapter Ten,
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official publications of the Soviet and Chinese press, Mr, 
Crankshaw has been able to reconstruct the events at Bucha­
rest. Since he wrote his book, the Chinese themselves have 
made available evidence which strongly corroborates Crank­
shaw 's narrative.
The Bucharest Conference started out well enough with 
the first two or three days given over to the usual stereo­
typed speeches from one delegate after another. However, 
the Russians apparently used this time to lay a subtle behind 
the scenes framework from which to attack the PRC. Each dele­
gation was invited to visit with key Russian delegates at 
which time they were quietly told of the growing Sino-Soviet 
split and informed that the Chinese were to blame. At the 
conclusion of each of these sessions, the Russians passed 
out a long "letter" to each participant, detailing the history 
of the struggle and listing the many Chinese errors. It ran 
to over eighty pages and "was stiff in tone, sometimes ex­
tremely blunt, but always closely argued. It came as a deep 
shock to most of the delegates to realize that the two great­
est parties in the Communist movement were very seriously at 
loggerheads on points of basic policy."®^
Once the letter had been circulated, the conference 
took on a different meaning. The Russians called for a
®^Crankshaw, p. 103.
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secret session where the leaders of various delegations got 
up and more or less denounced the Chinese. The Soviets 
softenlng-up process had worked.
Finally, the time came for the Chinese to take the 
floor. Their delegation was headed by Peng Chen, a leading 
member of their party hierarchy and the mayor of Peking.
Peng was visibly shaken by the united attack on his country’s 
policies, but he nevertheless maintained his poise. His com­
ments were restrained, reasonable, and concllltory. Mainly, 
Peng pleaded for more sympathetic understanding of his govern­
ment’s actions while, at the same time, he denied that they 
were In any way wrong. All In all, his carefully measured 
speech had a calming effect on the conference, and things 
might have ended there except that the Chinese now decided 
thattwo could play the "letter” game as easily as one.
Apparently, the Russians had actually written two let­
ters, both attacking the Chinese, but In different language. 
The first one, sent privately and exclusively to the Chinese, 
was accusatory, savage, and downright degrading. The second 
one, the one distributed to all of the delegations at Bucha­
rest, has already been described as sometimes blunt but 
closely-argued. This second letter could be considered 
altogether proper and well within the framework of construc­
tive criticism, but the first letter was clearly Insulting 
and hardly the type of thing that one comrade would write
Ill
of another. In effect, it showed off the Kremlin leaders 
to be nothing but loud-mouthed brutes trying to sledgehammer 
the poor Chinese into the Russian line of thought.
What the Chinese did, following the closed session, 
was to run off copies of this violent letter and distribute 
it to the other delegations. They made no comment of their 
own, but let the letter speak for itself. Of course, this 
revelation now placed Moscow's version of the split in a new 
light. Seemingly, the Russians had been hung on their own 
petard.
It is easy to see that the distribution of these two 
letters produced conditions that could only lead to a show­
down, and one was not long in coming. After another day of 
open public speeches the Congress met for the second closed 
session. Khrushchev himself took the floor and, according 
to Crankshaw's information, the Russian leader's performance 
was extraordinary.
He had in front of him a prepared speech, but, as so 
often on lesser occasions, it was soon clear that he 
was departing from that speech. . . .  He did not observe 
the twenty-minute rule. . . .  He abandoned reasoned 
argument and, indeed, all pretense of judicious analysis 
of differences and embarked on a violent tirade couched 
in purely personal terms which was foreign not only to 
the spirit of Marxist-Leninism but also to the spirit 
of great power diplomacy.Go
^^Crankshaw, p. 107.
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On balance, Khrushchev simply repeated the same list 
of grievances that had previously been indicated in both 
letters, only by stating them publicly in a bitter personal 
attack he displayed the depth of which the split had run.
If there were any remaining doubt about the split, Peng Chen 
removed it in his answer. While keeping his remarks less 
personal and on a higher plane, Peng minced no words in 
demonstrating that it was the Russians who were wrong and 
not the Chinese. In fact, his defense was so eloquent that 
Khrushchev offered no rebuttal and appeared willing to let 
the conference run its course. There were a few more speeches, 
mostly in support of the USSR— only Albania supported the PRC—  
and then the delegates approved the usual joint communique be­
fore adjourning. The last thing they did was to approve a 
conference of all Parties to be held in Moscow the following 
November.
Eighty-one of the world's communist parties participated 
in the Moscow conference and virtually every important commun­
ist leader was there with the notable exception of Mao Tse- 
tung of the PRC and Palmiro Togliatti of Italy. China was 
represented by Liu Shao-Chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, while the 
Italian party sent Luigi Longo. The meeting was held in 
secrecy to the extent that the Soviet press did not even ad­
mit it had been held until several days after it was over.®^
®9pioyd, p. 111.
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However, shortly after returning home, several satelite 
leaders made extensive statements, both publicly and semi- 
privately, which have enabled Western observers to describe 
the event in good detail.9^ as a matter of fact, the unusual­
ly large number of interesting "leaks" suggests that perhaps 
Moscow encouraged some of the leakers to say what they said.^l
A brief analysis of these sources indicates that the 
conference may have been a bit less explosive than one might 
have expected. Both the Russians and the Chinese reiterated 
all of the same old arguements concerning peaceful co-existence 
versus world revolution, etc., that had been gone over before. 
Also, there were endless speeches from all of the other parties 
present which made the whole thing tedious, indeed. According 
to Crankshaw's account of the meeting, the only real fireworks 
came when Enver Hoxha of Albania made a personal attack on 
Khrushchev, much to everyone's astonishment.^^ The most im­
portant result of the Moscow Conference was that the entire 
communist world— not just a few of its leaders— now knew the 
depth of the Sino-Soviet split# They also knew that, except 
for Albania, China stood almost alone.
^^The English text of many of these statements, made 
especially by communist officials from Italy, France, and 
Belgium, may be found in The Sino-Soviet Dispute, documented 
and analysed by G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick 
MacFarquhar (London: China Quarterly, 1962).
^^Floyd, p. 112.
^^Crankshaw, p. 131.
11^
At the conclusion of the meeting, a declaration was 
Issued which, In the words of Professor Zagoria, “represented, 
not a real compromise of Soviet and Chinese views, hut a col­
lation of t h e m . I n  other words, both sides won a little 
and lost a little, but both agreed to paper over their dif­
ferences In an outward show of unity.
For the next ten or eleven months, virtually nothing 
was done directly by either Moscow or Peking to exacerbate 
their continuing conflict. It Is possible that each party 
wanted to live up to the Moscow declaration of I960, but, 
more likely, external pressures were at work.
The Kremlin had to concern Itself during the first 
half of 1961 with problems of agriculture, Khrushchev*s 'brief 
and largely unproductive visit with President Kennedy, and 
the Berlin wall. At the same time, "China was In the midst 
of economic crisis so severe that It was forced to turn to 
Canada and Australia for grain. There were Increasing re­
ports of perilously low food supplies on the mainland. The 
commune system had been all but abandoned. . .
By October, however, the Russians were ready to return 
to the fray. Khrushchev used the occasion of the Twenty- 
second Russian Party Congress to read the Albanians practical­
ly right out of the Socialist Camp. Throughout all of 1961,
93zagorla, p. 367.
9^Ibld.
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prior to the Twenty-second Congress, relations between the 
Soviet Union and tiny Albania had steadily deteriorated.9^ 
Bitter comments were made by both sides, and the Russians 
finally withdrew nearly all of their experts from Albania, 
as well as stopping aid to that country. The PRC promptly 
seized this opportunity of establishing a satellite of its 
own in Eastern Europe by sending aid and Chinese experts to 
Tirana. Thus, when Khrushchev attacked the Albanians at the 
Twenty-second Congress, he was in actuality delivering a 
left-handed slap at the Chinese. Moreover, he made certain 
the Chinese understood his meaning. In his speech, which 
was broadcast over Moscow radio, Khrushchev stated that the 
Russians would never compromise the principles established 
at the Twentieth Party Congress "either to the Albanian leaders 
or to anyone else."^^ Naturally, the "anyone else" could only 
have been China, and Chou En-lai, the PRC's representative to 
the Congress, clearly got the message.
Chou answered the challenge in three ways. First, he 
made a speech to the Congress in which he defended the Al­
banians as best he could, while at the same time chiding 
Khrushchev for making a public attack.
95g@@ William E. Griffith, Albania and the Sino- 
Soviet Rift (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 19^37 for a full
account of the dispute.
S^Moscow Radio Home Service, October 18, 1961,
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We hold that if a dispute or difference unfortunately 
arises between fraternal parties or fraternal countries, 
it should be resolved patiently in the spirit of prole­
tarian internationalism and on the principles of equal­
ity and unanimity through consultation. Any public, 
one-sided censure of any fraternal party does not help 
unity and is not helpful in resolving problems.9/
If this statement were cautious and discreet in its 
criticism of the Soviet leader, Chou's next action was any­
thing but subtle. A day or two after the speech, he made 
the rather traditional trip to Red Square to lay a wreath at 
the foot of Lenin's encased body, which was a perfectly 
acceptable act, but then Chou moved on to also place a 
wreath at Stalin's feet.^® Obviously, this act was designed 
to embarrass and perhaps infuriate Khrushchev and the anti- 
Stalinists. Shortly after this event, the Russians removed 
Stalin's remains from Lenin's tomb and placed them in a simple 
undistinguished grave, thereby making any future wreath-laying 
virtually i m p o s s i b l e . 9 9  it is extremely likely that the two 
events are related.
Peking's representative did one final thing to answer 
Khrushchev's challenge which was simply to pack up and return 
home long before the Congress ended. Moreover, Chou pointedly 
refused to give any reason for his sudden departure so that it 
appeared to everyone as if he were walking o u t I n  a
9^ncnA, October 19, 1961.
98pioyd, p. 147.
99Ibid.
^^^Zagoria, p. 370.
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sense, this gesture may have been more prophetic than it 
seemed at the time. The two powers would be "walking out" 
on each other much more often in the future.
Throughout the remainder of 1961 and for the first 
half of 1962, the Sino-Soviet conflict was considerably muted. 
This was the principal period, already alluded to, in which 
the Russians would occasionally publish editorials criticizing 
the "Albanian dogmatists"— meaning the Chinese— and the Chi­
nese would sometimes publish critical comments about the 
"Yugoslav revisionists"— meaning the Russians. It is now 
generally believed that the main reason for the temporary 
lull was a private plea made by the North Vietnamese Party, 
that both Moscow and Peking stop attacking each other in 
their press and radio and try to settle their disagreements 
through a new world communist conference.Significantly, 
such a conference was never held, although both sides took 
turns calling for one. The standard procedure was for the 
Russians to push for a conference whenever they felt condi­
tions best for them; of course, the Chinese would then refuse. 
Conversely, whenever the Russians were suffering some embar­
rassment, such as the Cuban Crisis, the Chinese would promptly 
agree to a conference only to have the Soviets demure.
lOlHarry Gelman, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict," Communist 
China, ed. Franz Schurman and Orville Schell (New York: Vin­
tage Books, 1967), p. 2 83.
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Near the end of summer, 1962, Peking apparently
decided to heat up the debate once again. In late August
and early September, the Chinese press printed three or four
102violent new attacks on "modern revisionism." Some probable 
reasons for the renewed onslaught are that, by this time, the 
PRC had learned that it was not going to receive much, if any, 
aid from the Soviet Union. Also, Khrushchev was once more 
actively wooing that arch-revisionist— Tito. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly. Prime Minister Nehru of India an­
nounced that his country would shortly receive Soviet built 
MIG fighter planes as well as a MIG production plant itself. 
The first tvro reasons are easy to understand, and the last 
one recalls the Sino-Indian border dispute which had never 
been fully resolved.
There were two events that took place in late October 
that strained Sino-Soviet relations even more. One was the 
Chinese attack on India, and the other involved Soviet mis­
sies in Cuba. Curiously, these two crises began within a 
couple of days of each other.
In October 20, the PRC launched a fairly large-scale 
invasion of India in the areas of Ladakh and the North-East 
Frontier Agency. After scoring some surprisingly easy
lOSoeiman, p. 285.
lOSpioyd, p. 158.
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victories, the Chinese agreed to a cease-fire in November, 
thereby allowing the situation to return more or less to 
normal. The war forced the Soviet Union into a most embar­
rassing position, which was probably one of the goals Peking 
had in mind. Moscow had to decide whether to aid a fraternal 
communist country— China— or to aid a strictly neutral non- 
communist country— India.
Their embarrassment was apparent in the way the Soviet 
press almost ignored the Sino-Indian conflict although 
the world's press was full of it at the time, and from 
the Russian's obvious reluctance to take sides in the 
dispute. . . . For once, the Soviet propagandists . . . 
found themselves tongue-tied and unable to do much more 
than urge a "peaceful" solution to the d i s p u t e .
The Chinese had made an extremely important point, but un­
fortunately for them, before they could exploit it fully, 
the Cuban crisis erupted.
Khrushchev's decision to secretly place Soviet missies 
in Cuba, President Kennedy's firm insistence that they must 
be removed, and the subsequent withdrawal of the missies is 
a story that has been told many times by now.^®^ The impor­
tance of all of this action to this study lies in the effect 
it had on Sino-Soviet relations. In actuality, there were 
two reactions from the Chinese : the first occurred when the
lOM-
Floyd, p. 159.
a detailed summary, see the New York Times, 
November 3, 1962.
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discovery of the missiles was announced, and the second when 
the Russians retreated.
Peking's initial response was to leap immediately to 
Khrushchev's side by firing off editorial broadsides against 
the United St a t e s . P e r h a p s  the Chinese were anxious to 
prove that they were not afraid to back Russia in Cuba even 
though the Russians were reluctant to back the Chinese in 
India. Temporarily it appeared as if an outside crisis had 
pulled the socialist camp together again.
A few days later, however, when it began to look as 
if Moscow were retreating, the PRC started to sing a different 
tune.
The Chinese staged enormous parades to protest American 
actions (and, implicitly. Soviet policy) against Cuba;
They flattered and exhorted Castro to maintain his radi­
cal stance; and behind the thinnest veil of esoteric 
phrases they charged Khrushchev with having staged 
"another îftinich" at the cost of Cuban independence and , 
the international Communist and revolutionary movement. '
Worse yet, they added a new word to the communist lexicon to
X08describe Khrushchev's humiliating defeat— "capitulationism."
In the end, the effect of the Sino-Indian and the Cuban af­
fair was to deepen the rift between the USSR and the PRC.
The real shouting match was now just around the corner. A
lOGpeonle's Daily. October 2k and 25, 1962.
^^^Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 61.
^®®Jen Ku-ping, "The Tito Group's Shameful Role,"
Peking Review V (November 16, 1962), 7.
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series of congresses held by the Communist Parties of Bul­
garia, Hungary, Italy, Czechoslavakia in November and Decem­
ber as well as the East German congress in January, gave 
Moscow and Peking additional forums for continuing their 
polemics. In each case, the speeches were pretty much the 
same with most delegates denouncing the Albanians outright 
and the Chinese by implication. Peking's representative,
Wu Hsiu-chuan, in turn, would criticize the "Tito Clique" 
and "the modern revisionists."^®^ An interesting sidelight 
to these meetings is that at each succeeding congress, Wu 
seemed to have been subjected to a steadily increasing 
amount of adverse audience reaction. Finally, at the East 
German congress, he was greeted with what appeared to be 
well organized booing, whistling and foot-stamping.^^® No 
doubt such conduct added to the bitterness of the dispute.
The Russians found one more chance to annoy Peking 
before 1962 came to a close. Tito, the Yugoslav president, 
visited Moscow in December where he was received with "al­
most unprecedented party as well as state h o n o u r s . W i t h
^®9por a well documented account of the Bulgarian, 
Hungarian, Italian, and Czechoslovakian congresses, see 
Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, chap. 7» The East German 
account appears in chap. 10.
llOpioyd, p. 166.
lllcriffith. The Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 85.
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Tito looking on, Khrushchev made a speech before the Supreme
Soviet, outlining the improved state of relations between the
112USSR and Yugoslavia. At the same time, he leveled a double
blast against the Chinese, For one thing, he answered the
Chinese taunt that the Russians were afraid to fight the
Americans over Cuba by implying that the Chinese were afraid
to take either Hongkong or Macao.
Macao is situated at the mouth of the Chu Chiang river 
on the coast of China. It is a small territory and not 
easily spotted on the map. . . . There is also the 
British colony of Hongkong there; it lies in the delta 
of the Hsi Chiang river, literally below the heart of 
such an important town as Canton. The smell coming from 
these places is by no means sweeter than that released 
by colonialism in Goa. . . . If the government of the 
Chinese People’s Republic tolerates Macao and Hongkong, 
it clearly has good reasons for doing so. Therefore, 
it would be ridiculous to level against it the accusa­
tion that this is a concession to British and Portuguese 
colonialists, that this is appeasement.
These few sentences of finely-honed sarcasm clearly 
established the PRC as capitulationists themselves. Khrush­
chev's second blast was even less subtle.
The contemporary left-wing opportunists and sectarians, 
the most outspoken mouthpieces of whom are the Albanian 
leaders, disguise their struggle against the Leninist 
policy of peace and peaceful coexistence by shrill 
pseudo-revolutionary phrases. As has already been said, 
they have slid down to a Trotskyite position. . . .  If 
one scratches these loud-mouthed leftist dogmatists, 
one can easily discover that behind their brave facade
^^^Pull text in Pravda. December 13, 1962.
113pravda, December 13, 1962.
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lies nothing but fear of imperialism and lack of faith 
in the possibility of beating t W  capitalist system in 
peaceful economic c o m p e t i t i o n . ll^
After a barrage of this sort, it appears obvious that 
the Chinese would have to strike back and strike back hard 
if they hoped to regain the initiative. They had been re­
buffed repeatedly by the European Party Congresses; Khrush­
chev had reviled them in Moscow; and a month later, they would 
be booed in East Berlin. Peking's answer was to open the gates 
and let forth a torrent of words that reiterated the correct­
ness of Chinese views ad nauseam. From the end of December, 
1962, to March, 1963 (and even beyond), Chinese party writers 
were kept busy publishing massive editorials designed to de­
fend every criticism of their views that had ever been leveled 
against them by the Russians or anyone else. Of course, the 
Russians were provoked into answering these editorials with 
some of their own, which seemed to stir the Chinese to even 
greater efforts.
Any attempt to examine all of the statements that 
poured out of either Peking or Moscow would require an 
enormous amount of space without adding greatly to an under­
standing of the developing split. Both sides simply argued 
over and over again the issues that had stood between them 
for the past four or five years. Perhaps the only difference
ll^Tbid.
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in these new papers, from previous ones was that the langu­
age was sometimes much clearer, and the Chinese particularly 
displayed an obsession to refute every charge made against 
them. One example of this would be the "paper-tiger" theme.
Mao Tse-tung was reported to have said at one time 
that imperialists were all "paper-tigers." At a later date, 
Khrushchev had occasion to reply that if imperialists were 
paper-tigers, at least, they had nuclear teeth. Thereafter, 
the paper-tiger theme became a prominent part of the shout­
ing match, with the Chinese generally being at a disadvantage. 
Now, shortly after the beginning of the new round of polemics, 
Peking decided once more to explain the paper-tiger.
No matter what kind of teeth imperialism may have, 
whether guns, tanks, rocket teeth, or any other kind of 
teeth, that modern science and technology may produce, 
its rotten, decadent and paper-tiger nature cannot 
change. In the final analysis, neither nuclear teeth 
nor any other kind of teeth can save imperialism from 
its fate of inevitable extinction.115
Not only did both sides write monumental editorials, 
but they also sent long letters to each other, normally 
being in the form of a letter from the central committee of 
one communist party to the central committee of the other. 
Actually, there was nothing new about this as the two coun­
tries had long exchanged letters. What was new was that 
the Chinese communists, for the first time, published their
115«jhe Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us," 
People * s Daily. December 31, 1962.
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letters in their open press. Moreover, they also published
116
the secret letters that were sent to them by the Russians.
It is highly probable that Peking took this course in the 
hope that Moscow would feel compelled to do the same, since 
the Chinese had long complained that the Soviet Union, and 
presumably the Eastern European satellites, were not printing 
the Chinese arguements. In other words, the peoples of those 
countries were only hearing one side of the story. By try­
ing to force the Russians to present Peking's case, the Chi­
nese could gain a vastly wider audience.
The initial thrust was made in February of 1963, but
it elicited little or no reaction from Moscow. In March,
the Chinese tried again. They issued another of their lengthy
editorials entitled "More on the Differences Between Comrade
Togliatti and Us— Some Important Problems of Leninism in the
Contemporary W o r l d . N e a r  the end of that article appears
the most violent and sensational language employed up to that
point in the split.
The doughty warriors /the Russians/ who claim to possess 
the totality of Marxist-Leninist truth are mortally a- 
fraid of the articles written in reply to their attacks 
by the so-called dogmatists, Mctarians, splitters, 
nationalists and Trotskyists /meaning the Chinese/ whom 
they have so vigorously condemned. They dare not pub­
lish these articles in their own newspapers and journals.
As cowardly as mice, they are scared to death . . . .
^^^Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, ed., pp. 287-288.
l^Tped Flag. November 3 and 4, March M-, 1963.
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Dear friends and comrades who claim to possess the whole 
truthI Since you are quite definite that our articles 
are wrong, why don't you publish all these erroneous 
articles and then refute them point by point so as to 
Inculcate hatred among your people against the "heresies" 
you call dogmatism, sectarianism and antl-Marxlsm-Lenln- 
Ism. . . ? You are divorced from the masses. That Is 
why you fear the truth and carry your fear to such ab­
surd lengths. Friends, comrades! If you are men enough 
step forwardI Let each side In the debate publish all 
the articles In which It is criticised by the other side 
and let the people In our own countries and the whole 
world think over and judge who Is right and who Is wrong. 
This Is what we are doing, and we hope you will follow 
our example. We are not afraid to publish everything 
of yours In full. We publish all the "masterpieces" In 
which you rail at us. Then In reply we either refute 
them point by point or refute their main points. Some­
times we publish your articles without a word In answer, 
leaving the readers to judge for themselves. Isn't that 
fair and reasonable? You, modern revisionist masters, 
do you dare to do the same? If you are men enough, you 
will. But having a guilty conscience and an unjust 
case, being fierce of visage but faint of heart, out­
wardly as tough as bulls but Inwardly as timid as mice, 
you will not dare. We are sure you will not dare.
Isn't that so? Please answer
By the end of March, 1963, It was easy for everyone, 
both East and West, to see that the Slno-Sovlet rift was very 
real and deep. A few more attempts at reconciliation were 
made after that point, but they tended to be rather desul­
tory and were probably aimed at gaining a propaganda advan­
tage more than producing any actual results. In late Janu­
ary and early February of 196^ -, the Chinese began to formally 
recognize "pro-Chlnese factions which had rebelled and seceded 
from the established Communist Parties of such countries as
ll&Red Flag, November 3 and March 4, I963.
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Ceylon, Peru, Belguim and Switzerland as the official Com­
i n g
munist Parties in those countries.” Approximately one
month later, "Peking openly called for the removal of the
120
'greatest revisionist of all time'— Khrushchev." But
even Khrushchev's eventual removal did not placate the Chi­
nese for very long. They published the event in their press, 
waited a while to see what the new leaders of the Kremlin 
would do, then satisfied that things would pretty much re­
main the same, Peking resumed its customary s t a n c e . M o s t  
of the first half of 1965 was relatively quiet, but a full- 
scale exchange of polemics during the second half, testified 
to the fact that "Khrushchev revisionism" was still the main 
target even though Khrushchev himself was gone. At this 
writing, prospects for change in this situation do not ap­
pear bright.
A summary or review of Chinese Communist attitudes 
toward the Soviet Union between 1958 and 1965 shows a sur­
face pattern of many ups and downs. Relations were fairly 
good during much of 1958 only to turn downward for part of 
1959. They improved again for the early part of I960 but
H^Franz Schumann and Orville Schell, ed., p. 289.
^ Irwin Isenberg. ed.. The Russian-Chinese Rift:
Its Imnact on World Affairs (New York: H. W. Wilson Comnanv.
1 ^ 6 7 7 ^ 3 ^ :
^^^Harry Hamm, China: Empire of the 700 Million,
trans. Victor Anderson (Garden City, New York: Double Day
and Company, 1966), pp. 2 h ^ -k 6 ,
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suffered a relapse that summer with the withdrawal of 
Soviet experts. There were brief periods of relaxation 
in 1961 and 1962, but they always were followed by renewed 
outbreaks of charge and counter-charge until, by the middle 
of 1963, the dispute was almost totally out in the open and 
almost totally unsolvable. The last two years of the period, 
196^-1965, saw virtually no real efforts at reconciliation; 
rather, the dispute was allowed to solidify.
Beneath the surface, however, there is a somewhat 
different picture. It seems reasonably clear in retrospect 
that the Chinese were intent on moving their revolution to 
the Left, both economically and diplomatically. They wanted 
to stake their claim to ideological leadership by leaping 
forward to communism, ahead of everyone else, through the 
use of communes. If the experiment had worked, Peking could 
have served as a shining example to the underdeveloped peoples 
of the world, everywhere. On the diplomatic front, the Chi­
nese wanted the Russians to use their supposed nuclear mis­
sile superiority to put capitalism in its place, once and for 
all. Only, the Soviet Union was much more interested in 
peaceful coexistence than world revolution. Severe economic 
crisis at home and Russian caution abroad forced the Chinese 
into retreat, humiliation, and isolation. When viewed in 
this light, the pattern of ups and downs, mentioned above, 
becomes more of a straight line. Once Moscow comprehended—
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sometime in 1959— the Chinese intent, relations deteriorated 
at an accelerated rate. Even the available trade figures 
reflect the straight-line trend.
TABLE 3
SOVIET-CHINESE TRADE*
(IN MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS)
Year
Soviet Exports 
to China
Soviet Imports 
from China
1958 634.0 881.3
1959 95^.0 1100.3
I960 816.3 847.3
1961 367.0 550.9
1962 233.2 515.8
♦Source; Uneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR for corresponding 
years as quoted in Schwartz, p. 248.122
Again, the point being made is that between 1958 and 
1965 the Peoples Republic of China turned to the Left, while 
the Soviet Union turned to the Right. As the angle of diverg­
ence grew greater, so too did the degree of hostility. What 
started out as one Socialist Camp became two or three or 
four. Perhaps both the Chinese and the Russians should have 
heeded President Lincoln's advice that "a house divided 
against itself, cannot stand."
l^^Apparently, the Soviet Union stopped publishing 
trade figures after 1962 or else their exports to China were 
too insignificant to announce.
CHAPTER IV
In the material presented up to this point, an earnest 
attempt has been made to develop a reasonably comprehensive 
picture of the Sino-Soviet split. No doubt it has been noted 
that the burden of the effort has been focused on Chinese 
Communist attitudes toward the Soviet Union. To have fully 
recorded reciprocal Soviet attitudes toward the Chinese 
would have required vastly more space and might well have 
obscured one of the primary objectives of the study.
As might be expected, standard methodology was used 
in building up the historical narrative. A large amount of 
available literature was surveyed, particularly the works 
of acknowledged authorities. Whenever possible, primary 
source materials were used, although it was necessary to 
rely on English translations of Chinese statements.^ Fin­
ally, a certain degree of cautious selectivity was employed 
in trying to pick out the important from the purely trivial.
^Many Chinese newspapers, magazines, party statements, 
etc., have been translated into English by the Chinese them­
selves, or by British or American government translators.
In a few cases, a comparison of translations revealed minor 
discrepancies.
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When properly done, research based on this type of 
traditional methodology is usually both interesting and in­
formative.
It has served social scientists well for decades, if 
not centuries, and will probably continue to do so far into 
the future. By marshalling facts and chronicling events, the 
social scientist can gain valuable insights into the story 
of man's behavior. It has been possible to investigate, to 
record, and to theorize— often with a very high degree of 
accuracy. But, perhaps this is not enough. Perhaps it 
would be extremely valuable if the researcher had available 
some more precise measurement of behavior. Fortunately, a 
number of new techniques are now being applied to social 
science research. One of these is content analysis.
Put very briefly and simply, "content analysis is the
2statistical tabulation of the things that have been said."
The technique was probably first used extensively by psychol­
ogists and has only fairly recently been employed by social 
scientists.3 As a matter of fact, political scientists in 
particular have been rather slow in adopting the technique 
to their discipline, and this may very well be one of the
^Ithiel de Sola Pool, Symbols of Democracy (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 19^2), p. 3.
3See Charles Osgood, et al. The Measurement of Mean­
ing (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957) for one
good example of a psychological study employing content 
analysis.
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first dissertations in that field to incorporate content 
analysis as a major part of the study.
In early content analysis studies, social scientists 
leaned heavily on the practice of statistically determining 
the number of times certain key words or symbols appeared 
in the speeches, writings, etc. of key texts. This was re­
ferred to as "counting-frequencies," and from the statistics, 
the researcher could draw conclusions.
Counting frequencies was the main activity of content 
analyists in the 1930's and 19^0's. Indeed, for many 
people that is how content analysis was defined. 
Berelson's book minus one chapter is almost wholly 
devoted to such frequency counts. Lasswell's content 
analyses were frequentcy counts of symbols; so for the 
most part were the RADIR studies at the Hoover Insti­
tute. The units could vary greatly; there were counts 
of column inches, of key words, of themes, of literary 
forms, of types of characters, etc. But up to ten 
years ago almost all studies had for their basic logic 
a comparison of the frequency of certain types of sym­
bolic expression in different segments of text.^
The RADIR studies, mentioned above, were carried out 
by Ithiel de Sola Pool, with the collaboration of Harold D. 
Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and others. They counted the fre­
quency of certain key symbols appearing in the editorials 
of leading newspapers— "Prestige Papers"— of five countries. 
One of the things they found was that
There is, for example, a remarkable degree of reciprocity 
in the attitudes of states toward each other. This
^Ithiel de Sola Pool, Trends in Content Analysis 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 19^9), pp. 19^-96,
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reciprocity is not necessarily immediate, but in the 
long run if elite editorial opinion in state A is 
hostile to state B, then state B will become hostile to 
state A to almost exactly the same degree. Since this 
process takes time, the attitudes of each state toward 
the other may at no moment be exactly alike, but over 
the years they seem to approach a common reciprocal 
attitude. Somehow in this interdependent world the 
attitudes of the elite in one state come to be known 
and returned by the elite of other states.5
Another interesting study was performed by Harold D, 
Lasswell, Nathan Leites, and associates. They were interested 
in pursuing, among other things, the idea that the language 
of politics, i.e. speeches of certain decision-makers, fol­
lowed style patterns. These style patterns changed under 
the press of events and therefore an analysis of the patterns 
might be indicative of political changes.
In the long run, however, the study of style may make its 
largest contribution in relation to the problem of in­
terpreting significant political trends. Certain changes 
in style may indicate the gradual decline of democratic 
feeling, or reveal the ground swell of gathering crisis. 
Style characteristics may prove to be diagnostic criteria 
for the disclosure of destructive or creative political 
personalities./ For style is not to be dismissed as 
ornamentation.°
These two brief illustrations should suggest in a very 
small way the type of research that can be attempted and has
^Ithiel de Sola Pool, Symbols of Internationalism 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), p. 6 1 . For a 
fuller background to this study see also, Ithiel de Sola 
Pool, The Prestige Papers : A Survey of Their Editorials
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952).
^Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites, and Associates, 
Language of Politics (Cambridge, the MIT Press, 1965), p. 38.
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been completed using content analysis. Of course, content 
analysis has undergone a good deal of sophistication in the 
past few years and will probably receive further improvement 
in the years ahead.
The basic use of content analysis in this study re­
volved around an attempt to measure the attitude of hostility 
(or lack of it) expressed in official Chinese documents toward 
the Soviet Union over a specified period of time. Key state­
ments were selected from the speeches of leading Chinese 
statesmen plus party pronouncements, etc., and then judges 
were asked to scale the statements according to the degree 
of hostility expressed.
An orderly approach to utilizing this type of research 
requires that the range of content under examination be clear­
ly defined. A group of researchers working at the Stanford 
International Conflict and Integration Studies Center has 
suggested eight categories of content or perceptions. Para­
phrased, they are:
1. Perceptions of Policy Conditions: goals, aims,
preferences, choices, means to achieve goals.
2. Perceptions of Resolution of Conflict: means of
resolution, expected results of resolution.
3. Perceptions of Capability: numerical (not quali­
tative) estimates of state capability.
Perceptions of Power : qualitative and relative
estimates of state capability.
5. Perceptions of Friendship: approval, cooperation, 
and support.
13?
6. Perceptions of Hostility: enmity, obstructionism.
7. Perceptions of Satisfaction: success, content­
ment, confidence.
8. Perceptions of Frustration! failure, disappoint­
ment, anxiety about goals.?
The same collection of source material might be used 
to study several or all of the above categories. The same 
statement, for example, might say something about policy, 
about conflict resolution, about capability, power, etc.
Before the degree of hostility contained in the various 
Chinese speeches, documents, etc., can be scaled, it is neces­
sary to break down the source statements into basic unit or 
capsule statements.8 For example, Chou En-lai delivered a 
speech in Moscow in 1959, saying in part: “We share a common
destiny, our interests are identical and the close friendship
Q
of our two peoples can never be broken.”  ^ This source state­
ment would produce the following capsule statements:
1. We (PRC) share a common destiny with the (USSR).
2. Our (PRC) interests are identical (with the USSR).
^Robert C. North, e^ al., Content Analysis : A Hand­
book with Applications fog. t ^  Study ^  International Crisis 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), PP*
o
The concepts and structure of this chapter relies 
heavily on an unpublished Exercise Guide on Content Analysis, 
prepared by Dr. Oliver Benson of the University of Oklahoma 
in 1965* He has generously agreed to its use.
^Current Background. No. 572 (January 28, 1959), p. 7.
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3. Our (PRC) close friendship can never be broken 
(with the USSR).
Put another way, the elements which make up a capsule 
statement are:
1. The Preceiver— Chou En-lai in the above example—  
who is speaking for the Chinese.
2. The actor whose action is perceived— again it 
would be Chou En-lai.
3. The target, or recipient of the action— the USSR.
The descriptive-connective, or the action or 
attitude expressed which relates or connects the 
action— "share a common destiny," "interests are 
identical," "close friendship can never be 
broken." It is this element of the unit state­
ment which is the focus of attention in coding 
the statement as a whole, since it is the only 
element which can vary in intensity on any scale 
set up to describe the category of hostility.
A unit statement must not contain more than one per- 
ceiver, one perceived, one target, or one descriptive-con­
nective, although the perceived and the target may be mis­
sing from some statements. Compound sentences, with two or 
more targets must be broken down into two or more unit state­
ments.
Another factor which must be kept in mind when pre­
paring statements for scaling, is the matter of coding and/ 
or masking. Generally, it is convenient to place each unit 
statement on a separate card which has been coded in such a 
way as to prevent the judges, who do the scaling, from be­
ing influenced in their opinions. This was especially
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important in the exercise used here, since the judges were 
asked to scale the intensity of hostility over a period of 
time. Details of this process are dealt with in a later 
chapter.
It may also be necessary, in some cases, to mask 
parts of the statements which might influence the judges' 
decisions. For instance, if a Chinese statment were to say, 
"in I960, the Russians unjustly withdrew all of their ex­
perts, . . it is obvious that the date would have to be 
masked by perhaps replacing it with an X. Fortunately, in 
this study, the coding of the cards by years eliminated 
nearly all need for masking.
All unit statements will be found to fall into two 
distinct groups— those which express an attitude or evalua­
tion, and those which describe an action. If a statement 
maintains that "The Russians are treacherous," it is con­
sidered an affect statement. On the other hand, "The Rus­
sians have moved military forces across our borders," is an 
action statement. It is not possible to scale a set of 
statements consistently if the set includes statements from 
both types. The first expression of the Russians' being 
treacherous, is rightly a measure of hostility, but the 
second expression of troop movement, better illustrates 
belligerency or aggressiveness. Great care was taken to 
use affect statements only.
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The next step In the process Is to select a scaling 
system. A number of effective systems have been developed, 
but the one presented here Is the Q-Sort. It can be both 
reasonably simple and reasonably reliable If the proper 
procedures are followed. Mainly It requires well-formed 
unit statements and well-quallfled judges. More will be 
said about the Judges a little later.
The Q-Sort was originally devised for clinical psychol­
ogical research, but Is adaptable to content analysis If the 
universe of statements Is not too great. It has the virtue 
of forcing the judges to evaluate the entire group of state­
ments and to rank them by a predetermined rank-order. The 
procedure reduces the Influence of Individual personality 
differences In judges.
Once the unit statements have been developed and 
coded, the judges are asked to assign an Intensity value to 
each statement of from one to nine. The least hostile state­
ment would rate a one, with the most hostile receiving a nine. 
The Q-Sort makes use of fixed proportions as to the exact 
number of statements that may be awarded the same value of 
Intensity. These proportions, given In the table below, are 
based on a universe of seventy-five statements and approxi­
mates the normal distribution or "normal curve."
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TABLE k  
Q-SCRT DISTRIBUTION
Intensity Category 1 2 3 1+ 5 6 7 8 9
Percentage 5 8 12 16 18 16 12 8 5
Number from Universe 
of 75
h 6 9 12 13 12 9 6 h
♦Source: Robert C. North, et al., p. 59» for the
first two lines. The last line was computed.
The reason for this forced distribution is to avoid 
"bunching" of relatively similar statements into a high or 
low category. Since the Sino-Soviet split did not fully 
appear in the open Chinese press until 1963, it is likely 
that many of the statements prior to that time might be a- 
warded a low intensity rating by the judges, with the state­
ments after 1963 being awarded a high intensity value. This 
would lead to bunching at the 1, 2, and 3 categories and the 
7, 8, and 9 categories. Obviously, greater discrimination 
in sorting is desirable in order to make more meaningful 
comparisons. Use of the Q-Sort distribution table forces 
the judges to keep sorting until the proper number of state­
ments have been placed in each value category. In other 
words, the judges are not asked to assign absolute measures
l^ fO
of hostility hut rather to determine the relative position 
of each statement in the entire universe of seventy-five 
statements.
After the judges have completed the task of assign­
ing relative values to each statement, the analysis can 
begin. Because the study involves a comparison across time, 
the cards containing the statements are coded in such a way 
that the Judges are unaware of the date on which the source 
statement was made. Now, by use of the code, the cards can 
be rearranged according to year. For purposes of illustra­
tion, assume that nine representative statements have been 
selected for each year. Further, assume that the judges 
have decided that for 1959» three of these statements best 
fit the 2 category, three best fit the 3 category, and three 
best fit the 5 category. By finding the total sum of inten­
sity values assigned and dividing that number by the number 
of statements (nine), the average intensity of the statements 
made in 1959 can be found. Thus, 3x2 + 3x3 + 3x5 / 9 = 3«S» 
In this fashion the average level of hostility expressed by 
the Chinese, in any given year, toward the Russians can be 
mathematically determined and graphically illustrated.
Before the move to the actual exercise, which forms 
a major part of this study, can be made, it is necessary to 
add a few words of caution. The Q-Sort does possess some 
definite limitations which need to be fully understood in
Ihl
order to establish as high a level of reliability as possible. 
As already indicated, these limitations revolve around the 
selection of source statements, the selection of judges, and 
the size of the universe employed.
In a sense, the selection of source statements is not 
necessarily a true limitation due to the fact that the re­
searcher is only using the words of other people and has no 
discrimination as to what is being said. A problem arises, 
however, when a good many speeches, documents, etc., are 
available, and the researcher must then discriminate as to 
what is most representative of the lot. Fortunately, there 
are some perfectly valid methods for narrowing down the 
choices so that subjective judgments can be held to a mini­
mum. These methods will be introduced later.
Finding judges who are well qualified to assess the 
materials presented to them is, of course, of critical im­
portance. Even this factor, however, may not prove to be 
as difficult as it sounds. Almost any academically trained 
person will normally possess the tools of reasoning that 
are required to discriminate between a hostile and a non- 
hostile statement. Moreover, once three or four such per­
sons have been selected, they can be carefully "coached," 
in what they are to do, in several presessions. Naturally, 
they should not be allowed to practice on the actual state­
ments to be used in the research study. If it becomes
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apparent in the pre-sessions that any of the judges is un­
able to perform his role, then he can be excused, and an­
other person can be brought in. Happily, judges used in 
this study were professional Political Scientists with 
strong backgrounds in the Far East and the Soviet Union.
It is presumed that their special competencies lent more 
reliability to the results than might otherwise have been 
the case.
A final problem connected with the use of the Q-Sort 
is the selection of the universe. Generally, this is simply 
a mechanical, or perhaps it would be better to say mental, 
problem of making pair-wise comparisons between too many 
statements. If too large a number of statements are used, 
it is obvious that the discrimination capacity of the judges 
will break down. One hundred statements seem to be about 
the practical limit of a universe. In order to improve 
reliability, it was decided to stop a little short of that 
practical limit by settling on seventy-five.
Earlier, it was stated that in doing their work, the 
judges were not being asked to assign absolute values to 
the unit statements, but, rather, relative ones. This point 
needs to be emphasized again. The Q-Sort does not result in 
absolutes. In similar fashion, the entire concept of Content 
Analysis is not being presented here as a new, perfect 
methodology of research. It has limitations. Just as does
Ih3
the historical method. What is hoped, is that the blending 
of these two methods in this one study has produced better 
results than might have been achieved by using only one.
CHAPTER V
The application of content analysis, in determining 
hostility across a period of time, can be handled in a 
number of ways. The ideal situation is to bring together 
the optimum period of time and the optimum distribution of 
unit statements across that time period. For instance, 
from the establishment of Communist China in 19^9 to the 
end of this study, 1965, is sixteen years. If an analysis 
of hostility were to be made of that whole period, and as­
suming a universe of seventy-five statements, then only 
four or five unit statements could be taken from each year. 
While such a study could technically be made, with fair 
results, the reliability factor would rest heavily on the 
selection of those four or five statements picked from 
each year. There might well be a real question in the mind 
of the researcher whether a state’s total attitude of hos­
tility can be measured on the basis of such a small per- 
year universe.
A second approach to the problem could be to "squeeze” 
the time period together. This would be accomplished by
1^ 5
taking statements from every other year, or perhaps every 
third year, or every fifth year. The result of such squeez­
ing of course is that the total universe of seventy-five 
statements could be devided over fever years, so that each 
year would have a much larger per-year universe. On the 
other hand, squeezing incorporates the obvious danger that 
any number of the years skipped may have been years of sharp 
and dramatic change in attitude. But, since these years had 
been passed over, the change might not appear in the study.
Neither of the two approaches discussed so far would 
seem to provide the type of discriminating insights desired. 
Fortunately, a third approach can be followed which should 
not materially affect the objectives of the study. The 
analysis can be limited to just the last seven years, that 
is 1959-1965. Limiting the analysis to just seven years is 
admittedly an arbitrary decision, but such a limitation does 
possess strong advantages to commend it. For one thing, the 
mathematical computations will most certainly be far more 
precise and meaningful. The suggested ideal of combining 
an optimum time period with an optimum distribution of unit 
statements will have been realized. Also, the years covered 
are probably more dramatic, in recording the attitude of 
hostility, than any other comparable time span. This asser­
tion is based on the historical narrative which indicated 
that no apparently irreversible steps were taken by the
IhS
Chinese until their movement to the Left in 1958. However, 
the Russians did not fully understand what had happened or 
was happening until the following year, so 1959 would seem 
to be a good point to begin the analysis.
Another potentially bothersome area in applying con­
tent analysis is the proper selection of source statements.
The two major questions encountered in this exercise developed 
over what use, if any, should be made of editorial-type state­
ments, versus official ones, and what use should be made of 
once-secret materials which are now available.
Upon examination, one aspect quickly became obvious: 
the Chinese daily newspapers were invariably much more criti­
cal or even vicious than were the official Chinese spokesmen. 
In other words, Ch'en Yi, the Foreign Minister, might go to 
some sort of anniversary party where he could deliver a 
speech, saying perfectly wonderful things about the Russians. 
Yet, the very next day, an unsigned editorial (or one signed 
by an editor using a psuedonym) might appear in People's 
Daily accusing "certain people" (Russians) of being the worst 
kind of revisionists. To make matters even worse, there were 
several occasions when People * s Daily or ggd Flag would head­
line a lead article "A Government Spokesman said today . . . ” 
without ever identifying who the government spokesman was. 
This was particularly true of articles published in 1963.
Ih?
After a good deal of reflection, the decision was 
made to use only official statements, speeches, etc., rather 
than editorial-type statements. Both consistency and 
authenticity should be better for it.
The decision over use of statements which were at one 
time made in secret, but which are now public, was a good 
deal easier to resolve. Quite simply, they were not used, 
since to do so would have grossly distorted the Q-Sort, 
Western observers did not know in I960 what secret messages 
were sent back and forth between the PRC and the USSR; there­
fore, it would be unrealistic for the Q-Sort judges to have 
this information. Just because it was published in 1963, 
Moreover, one could not be certain that the Chinese might 
not have embellished the truth a bit, once they had the ad­
vantage of hindsight.
Once all of the above decisions had been made, the 
actual selection of source statements could begin. The 
whole process was aided immensely by the apparent penchant 
communists have for making speeches on certain anniversary 
dates. Usually, they would speak on the anniversary of the 
founding of the People's Republic of China, on the anniver­
sary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty of Friendship, 
Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, on the anniversary of the 
Russian revolution, and so on. Then too, they would gener­
ally issue a major policy statement or speech at any one of
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a number of party congresses, whether held in China or else­
where. So in these more or less annual events, important 
source statements were relatively easy to spot.
As often as possible, statements used were those that 
were made by leading Chinese figures such as Chou En-lai,
Ch'en Yi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen, and Lin Piao. In a 
few instances, it was necessary to quote some of the lesser 
lights of the Chinese hierarchy, but it is reasonable to 
assume that their speeches were cleared with the party before 
delivery, in any event. Oddly enough, Mao Tse-tung himself 
rarely makes speeches, and this accounts for his absence from 
the above list. It should also be noted that some statements 
were taken from published, official party pronouncements or 
letters. Some of these may have been written by Liu Shao-chi, 
the party theoretician, and most likely had the approval of 
Mao. Again, these are not unsigned editorials, but official 
documents.
For a number of years, the United States Consulate in 
Hongkong has published a series entitled Current Background.
It includes the English translation of all important Chinese 
statements as gathered from their press, radio broadcasts, 
news agencies, and so on. Nearly all of the source state­
ments used in this study were researched from Current Back­
ground. In a few instances, fuller treatment of important 
policy statements or speeches were located in Peking Review.
1^ 9
a Chinese publication, issued in five different languages 
including English. Actually, excerpts from Peking Review 
appear regularly in Current Background, but sometimes in 
abbreviated form. Reprints from People's Daily, the main 
Chinese newspaper, and Red Flag, the official party paper 
also occur in both series, which means that an enormous 
amount of Chinese communication is readily available in 
English.
During the course of a year, the Chinese quite natu­
rally spoke and wrote tens of thousands of words. There­
fore, trying to isolate roughly eleven short sentences, ex­
pressing their current degree of hostility toward the Soviet 
Union for that year, would seem like an impossible task. 
Several things helped, however, to make the task infinitely 
easier than it sounds. In the first place, surprisingly few 
statements were made in some years, outside of editorials, 
that reflected on the USSR at all. Almost immediately then, 
the overwhelming bulk of statements could be eliminated.
Secondly, many of the reprints that did mention the 
Soviet Union, fell into the category of purely routine 
statements which were repeated in similar fashion almost 
every year, at least until the split came out into the open. 
Below is an example of one such routine speech:
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In celebrating the 10th anniversary of the founding of 
the People*s Republic, the Chinese people would like in 
particular to thank the Soviet Union which helped our 
country build 166 construction projects in the first 
Five-Year Plan, signed with China last year and this 
year new agreements to help us build another 125 pro­
jects and has sent us more than 10,800 experts in the 
economic, cultural and educational fields to work in 
China in the last 10 years.1
Generally statements of this sort were ignored.
Some statements, when arranged in proper order, re­
vealed most interesting if subtle changes in attitudes as 
expressed by the Chinese toward the Russians:
1959 The Chinese people will always deem it their sacred 
international obligation to strengthen the.unity of the 
socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union.
1960 In the past ten years. China and the Soviet Union 
together with the other Socialist countries. . . .3
1961 . . .  We have received assistance from the Soviet 
Union and other socialist countries. . .
1962 . ♦ . the unity of the socialist camp and the 
international communist movement.?
196% Together with all other revolutionary people and 
parties in the world, the Communist Party of China stands 
in the forefront of the fight against imperialism.. . . ”
Ichou En-lai, Current Background. No. 598 (October 6, 
1959), p. 16.
^Ch'en Yi, Current Background. No. 595 (October 3, 
1959), p. 34.
3Mao Tse-tung, Current Background. No. 613 (February 
13, I960), p. 2.
^Liu Shao-chi, Current Background. No. 655 (June 30,
1961), p. 8.
9ch'en Yi, Current Background. No. 705 (November 6,
1962), p. 67.
Gchou Yang, Current Background. No. 726 (December 31,
1963), p. 1.
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Notice that in 1959, the Soviet Union headed the 
Socialist Camp, hut in I960, both China and the Soviet Union 
were leading the pack. One year later, the Soviet Union was 
placed on the same level as the other socialist countries, 
and in 1962, they were not mentioned at all. By 1963, not 
only were both the Soviet Union and the Socialist camp 
dropped from sight, but China now stood firmly in the fore­
front of revolutionary people and parties I
Of course, it is not possible to use full statements 
of this type in the Q-Sort. Nor would the judges be allowed 
to view the dates. Some of these statements could be capsu- 
lized, but others had to be discarded.
Through these processes of elimination, the total 
number of useable speeches, papers, etc., was narrowed down 
to only relatively few for each year. The next problem was 
to select, out of what remained, the final source statements 
from which the unit statements would come.
There were really just two guidelines that needed to 
be followed at this point. The first was very simply the 
fact that five years had to have eleven statements, and two 
years, ten statements, in order to fill the universe of 
seventy-five statements for the Q-Sort. In other words, 
only enough source statements could be used, from any one 
year, to provide the ten or eleven statements wanted. All 
the rest of the material was surplus.
192
since not all of the material could be used, the second 
guideline was to attempt to pick out the most representative 
source statements. Obviously this Involved a certain amount 
of personal judgment, but here again, the Chinese Communists 
themselves were of Immense assistance. Their speeches or 
party pronouncements followed a fairly standard formula.
Sometime during the year, for example, a leading member 
of the party would make a major address, or the party would 
Issue a major paper; from then on, for months, any other 
party member making a speech, generally just repeated what 
had already been said. This was not always true, of course, 
but It happened enough to keep personal judgment to a mini­
mum. As a matter of fact. It was possible In some years to 
take nearly all of the sources from a single speech or party 
pronouncement, since that was the one which set the pattern, 
and all subsequent comments displayed no significant deviations,
Presented below are the source statements which were 
selected from each year. After each source statement, ap­
pear the unit statements, structured In the general manner 
In which they were placed on the Q-Sort cards. These unit 
statements are numbered consecutively from one through 
seventy-five.
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1222.
It is a fundamental policy of our country to strengthen 
our unity with the Soviet Union and with all other 
socialist countries,7
1. It is a fundamental policy of our country to
strengthen our unity with the Soviet Union.
We have united as one and worked in close cooperation 
for the common cause of safe-guarding world peace and 
promoting the progress of mankind.®
2. We have united as one/with the USS]^
3. We /PRÇ7 have worked in close cooperation /with 
the USSR7.
We share a common destiny, our interests are identical 
and the close friendship of our two peoples can never 
he broken.7
h . We /PRÇ7 share a common destiny /with the USSR7*
5. Our /PRC? interests are idential ^ith those of 
the USSR/.
6. Our /Irc7 close friendship ^ith the USSR? «an 
never be broken.
During these ten years we have received fraternal aid 
from /ths7 great Soviet Union.
7. During these N years, we have received fra­
ternal aid from /thg/ great Soviet Union.
^Chou En-lai, Current Background. No. 559 (April 18,
1959), p. 24.
^Chou En-lai, Current Background. No. 572 (January 28,
1959), p. 7.
^®Liu Shao-chi, Current Background. No. 594 (September
28, 1959), p. 8.
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The great Soviet Union is the most faithltil friend of 
the Chinese people ^ s  the PRC sees it/.-^ *^
8. /S.S the PRC sees the great Soviet Union is 
the most faithful friend of the Chinese people.
With the Soviet Union . . . our country has established 
a friendship and unity which is indestructible and is 
growing daily.iz
9. Our country ^PRC7 has established a friendship 
and unity with the Soviet Union . . . which is 
indestructible and is growing daily.
In celebrating the tenth anniversary of the founding 
of the People's Republic, the Chinese people would 
like in particular to thank the Soviet Union which 
helped our country build 166 construction projects 
in the first Five-Year Plan period. . . .13
10. The Chinese people would like in particular to 
thank the Soviet Union for construction help. . . .
This concludes the statements used for the year 1959.
It should be noted that unit statement seven has been masked 
by changing the number ten to the letter N. This is to pre­
vent an astute judge from guessing that the speech was made 
on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the People's 
Republic of China— that is, in 1959. Actually, there probably 
is no real need to include the words "During these N years"
l^Teng Hsias-ping, Current Background. No. 595 (Octo­
ber 2, 1959), p. 2 3.
l^Liu Shao-chi, Current Background. No, 595 (October 
1, 1959), p. 16.
l^Chou En-lai, Current Background. No, 598 (October
6, 1959), p. 16.
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on the sorting card at all, since they do not add materially 
to the information that the judges use in arriving at their 
decisions. The best procedure is to eliminate all superfluous 
words from the sorting cards, and most of the statements pre­
sented here did receive some additional refining. Statements 
two, four, and five are good examples of statements containing 
virtually no superfluous words.
Below are the statements for I960. It is interesting 
to note that a couple of the source statements were made by 
"lesser lights" in the party hierarchy.
1260
The Marxist-Leninists and the modern revisionists, 
starting from fundamentally different stands and 
viewpoints, draw fundamentally different conclusions 
on this situation /revolution/,?-^
11. The Marxist Leninists /PRÇ7 draw different con­
clusions than the modern revisionists /USS^ on 
revolution.
We support the disarmament proposals put forward by 
the Soviet Union. It is of course inconceivable 
that imperialism will accept proposals for general 
and complete disarmament. . . . But there are people 
who believe that such proposals can be realised when 
imperialism still exists and that the "danger of war 
can be eliminated" by relying on such proposals.
This is an unrealistic illusion.1?
l^Lu Ting-yi, "Unite Under Lenin's Revolutionary Ban­
ner 1," in Long Live Leninism (Peking: Foreign Languages
Press, I960), pp. 103-04.
^^Liu Chang-sheng, Current Background. No, 621 (June 
27, I960), p. 62.
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12. We ^PRÇ7 support the disarmament proposals of 
the Soviet Union.
1 3. /ÏÏRC perceives/ that people /ÏÏSSR7 have an un­
realistic illusion about disarmament, imperial­
ism, and war.
Although the greatest possible help from abroad 
should be obtained in socialist construction, the 
Party has consistently held that we should rely on 
our own efforts.16
14. We ^PRÇ7 should rely on gur own efforts in 
socialist construction /not rely on USSR/.
The Sino-Soviet alliance of Friendship,
Albania, and Mutual Assistance/ is invincible in the 
world and is a strong bulwark for safeguarding world 
peace. 17
1 5. The Sino-Soviet alliance is invincible in the 
world /as the PRC sees it/.
16. The Sino-Soviet alliance is a strong bulwark
for safeguarding world peace /as the PRC sees it/.
The Chinese people firmly support the efforts made by 
the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to 
oppose imperialist aggression and safeguard world 
peace. . . . Peace can never be obtained by begging 
it of imperialism.18
1 7. The PRC firmly supports the efforts of USSR to 
oppose imperialist aggression and safeguard 
world peace.
1 8. /The PRC perceives the USSR a§7 begging peace 
of imperialism.
l*Li Fu-ch'un, Peking Review. No. 3^ (August 23, I960),
p. 1 5.
^7ch'en Yi, Current Background. No. 619 (February I3 ,
I960), p. 8.
iBchou En-lai, Current Background. No. 620 (June 9,
1960), p. 10.
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In the struggle to safeguard peace, our two countries 
have effected reciprocal assistance and close coopera­
tion.
19* /The PRC and USSR/ have effected reciprocal 
assistance to safeguard peace.
Any aggression and provocation against the Soviet 
Union is aggression and provocation against the PRC 
and the entire socialist camp.'^ ^
20. ^ h e  PRC perceives/ any aggression and provoca­
tion against the USSR as an attack against us.
That is why our cause has won the support of all 
peoples, and first of all of the peoples of the 
Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.21
21. /The PRC/ has won the support, first of all, of 
the USSR.
A quick review of the I960 statements reveals a rather 
mixed bag of sentiments. On the one hand, the Chinese were 
plainly irked at Khrushchev's drive toward a summit meeting 
and his insistence on peaceful co-existence. Their answer 
was to permit Lu Ting-yi, a rising star in the party hierarchy 
and a member of the politburo, to deliver a speech before the 
Central Committee of the CCP on April 22, in which he clearly 
identified the Russians as modern revisionists. It was general 
practice for leading party members to speak about modern
l^Chu Teh, Current Background. No. 613 (February 1*+,
I960), p. 2h.
^®Teng Hsiao-ping, Current Background. No. 631 (May 
20, I960), p. 8.
^^Chou En-lai, Current Background. No. 638 (Septem­
ber 3 0, I960), p. k .
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revisionists, but they were usually careful to add "headed 
by Yugoslavia" or "such as the Tito Clique." Lu took no 
such pains. Moreover, he referred several times to the fact 
that the modern revisionists were trying to make deals with 
the imperialists; since Khrushchev was the major communist 
trying to make deals with the United States at that time, 
it is plain that Lu meant the Kremlin leader. This speech 
was later published as part of the larger work called Long 
Live Leninism and distributed around the world. Oddly 
enough, Lu's speech seems to have gotten lost in the shuffle 
of events and does not appear to be widely quoted.
Another grating comment was made by Liu Chang-sheng, 
propaganda minister at that time. Khrushchev's long sought 
after summit meeting had just collapsed, and Liu was unkind 
enough to remark that there were "people" who had unrealistic 
illusions about disarmament, imperialism, and the inevitability 
of war.
On the other hand, the Chinese were beginning to realize 
the extent of the economic disaster caused by the Great Leap 
Forward and the communes. Also, they could probably see that 
their position was gaining little support among the other com­
munist countries, which may have somewhat alarmed them. Under 
the circumstances, they could not afford to become too nasty, 
and, indeed, most of their comments were quite friendly.
Even after the Russians withdrew their "experts" from China
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in July and August, the Chinese remained tractable. One 
would have thought that they would cry out in fury, but the 
strongest statement made by Li Fu-ch'un, an economic planner, 
was simply to say that, henceforth, China would have to rely 
more on itself. Obviously, the Chinese still needed the 
Russians.
1261
No matter what happens in the world, the Chinese 
people remain forever the most faithful and most 
reliable comrades-in-arms of the Soviet people. .
. . History dictates that we must develop and con­
solidate the friendship and solidarity of the two 
big countries of China and the Soviet U n i o n . 22
22. The Chinese people will remain forever the most 
faithful and reliable comrades-in-arms of the 
Soviet people. . . no matter what happens in 
the world.
23. History dictates that we /PRC? must develop ffld 
consolidate friendship and solidarity with
Here we wish to pay high tribute to the great Soviet 
people and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. .
2^, We /lrôç7 pay high tribute to the great Soviet 
people.
The achievements of China's socialist construction 
are inseparable from the tremendous assistance of
^^Liao Cheng-chih, Current Background. No. 6^7 (Febru­
ary 1 3» I96I), p. 1 1.
23Liu Shao-chi, Current Background. No. 655 (June 30,
1961), p. 8.
160
the Soviet geople.
assistance.24
We shall never forget your
25. China's achievements, in socialist construction, 
are inseparable from the tremendous assistance 
of the Soviet people.
26. We /PRÇ7 shall never forget your ^SSR7 assistance.
Our country is closely united by unbreakable fraternal 
bonds with the great Soviet Union and the other frater­
nal socialist countries. 25
2 7. Our country is closely united with the great
Soviet Union . . .  by unbreakable bonds.
Our socialist camp, comprising twelve fraternal coun­
tries, is a single entity, from the Korean Democratic 
People's Republic to the German Democratic Republic, 
from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the Albanian 
People's Republic. • • . Any public, one-sided censure 
of any fraternal party does not help unity and is not 
helpful to resolving problems. To lay bare a dispute 
between fraternal parties or fraternal countries 
openly in the face of the enemy cannot be regarded 
as a serious Marxist-Leninist attitude. . . . Pro­
found friendship has long existed between the peoples 
of China and the Soviet Union. . . . This great unity 
and friendship of the people of our two countries
will flow on eternally like the Yangtse and the Volga. 26
28.
2 9.
2^he PRC perceives thg7 socialist camp as a single 
entity . . . including Albania /which has been 
censured by the USSR/.
^ h e  PRC perceives that/ any public, one-sided 
cgnsure /by the USS^ of a fraternal party 
/Albania/ does not help unity.
^^Liu Hsiao, Current Background. No. 66? (September
29, 19 6 1), p. 24.
25p@ng Chon, Current Background. No. 664 (October 1,
1961), p. 6.
^^Chou En-lai, speech before the CPSU's Twenty- 
second Congress, Moscow, October 19; full text released by 
NONA, October 19, 1961.
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30. 2^he PRC üerceives that the censiare action by 
the USSR/ cannot be regarded as a serious 
Marxist-Leninist attitude.
3 1. Profound friendship has long existed between 
the peoples of PRC and USSR Æ s  the PRC sees«7.
3 2. /The PRC perceives that/ the great unity and 
friendship of the people of China and the Soviet 
Union will flow on eternally . . . like the 
Yangtse and the Volga.
There are three important insights to be gleaned from 
the 1961 comments. First, outside of unit statements twenty- 
eight, twenty-nine, and thirty, there is a discernible re­
turn to almost maudlin sentimentality. The Chinese seem to 
be falling all over themselves in saying how friendly and 
united are Russia, China, and the rest of the socialist camp 
when, of course, this was not true. The explanation lies, 
in part, in the Moscow conference, held near the end of I960, 
that was supposed to patch things up, and, in part, in the 
natural calamities that struck China throughout much of 1961. 
The Chinese had such a poor year, economically, that they 
were hardly in a position to offend anyone. ■
Even with all of their bowing and scraping, however, 
Peking still managed to insert a subtle knife-thrust into 
virtually every comment. Notice that most of the expressions 
of friendship and unity are addressed to the Soviet neonlet 
it is not to the Soviet Union, not to the Soviet government, 
but to the Soviet people. This is a fairly common diplomatic
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euphemism for saying that the people are all right, hut the 
government leaders are terrible, i. e. Khrushchev is terrible.
Finally, Chou En-lai's speech to the Twenty-second 
Party Congress was made only a day or two after Khrushchev 
had literally read the Albanians right out of the socialist 
camp. Chou blandly read the Albanians right back in again 
and scolded Khrushchev in the process, for having aired 
dirty communist linen in public. Chou did this in spite of 
the fact that his own speech was promptly distributed by 
the New China News Agency. Yet even here, the Chinese 
Premier considered it prudent to close his remazk.s with 
profound expressions of friendship and unity between his 
people and the Soviet people.
1962
The unity and friendship of the Chinese and Soviet 
people which is based on Marxism-Leninism and prole­
tarian internationalism can be broken by no force, 
will grow with each passing day, and will be ever­
lasting. . . .  We cherish it like the apple of our 
eye.
33. The unity and friendship of the Chinese and 
Soviet people . . .can be broken by no force 
2jis the PRC sees i£/«
3^. The unity and friendship of the Chinese and
Soviet people . . . will grow with each passing
day /as the PRC sees i^/.
35* The unity and friendship of the Chinese an^
Soviet people . . . will be everlasting
the PRC sees ij;/.
2?Lin Peng, Current Background. No. 68M- (February 13,
1962), p. 1 5.
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3 6. We cherish it Ænitr and friendship of
Chinese and Soviet peoplg/ like the apple of 
our eye.
We will continue to hold high the revolutionary 
banner of Marxism-Leninism • and thoroughly 
oppose modern revisionism. • . ^
37. We ZHIC7 will contiime to thoroughly onpose 
modern revisionism Z^SSR's revisionisij^
The imperialists, the reactionaries of various coun­
tries, and the modern revisionists have, in collabora­
tion with one another, continually launched anti- 
Chinese campaigns in an attempt to isolate China and 
compel China to change the just stand it takes in 
international affairs. . . . But their attempt is 
completely futile. It is they themselves, not China, 
that have become more and more isolated. The Chi­
nese people will never submit to any pressure, 
much less bargain away principles.29
3 8. ^ h e  PRC perceives thai7« • • the modern revision­
ists have . . . continually launched anti-Chinese 
campaigns in an attempt to isolate China.
39. ^ h e  PRC perceives thaj7* • * the modern revision­
ists have . . . continually launched anti-Chinese 
campaigns . . ._to compel China to change the
Just stand it / ^ C7 takes in international affairs.
^0. But their Z^SR's7 attempt /to isolate and compel 
China to change its just stand in international 
affairs/ is completely futile.
^1. /^e PRC perceives thaj/ it is they themselves
not China, that have become more and 
more isolated.
M-2. The Chinese people will never submit to any 
pressure.
^®Chen Yi, Current Background. No. 692 (October 1,
1962), p. 7.
^^Chou En-lai, Current Background. No. 692 (Septem­
ber 3 0, 1962), pp. 8-9 .
16»f
•^3* 2^ he Chinese people will nevej/ bargain away 
principles.
The year 1962 is also something of a mixed bag, bat 
the tone is definitely more militant than in 1961. The 
speech by Lin Feng, who at one time was Vice-Chairman of 
the powerfo.1 standing committee of the CCP, was made at a 
diplomatic function in the presence of the Soviet Ambassador, 
Chervonenko. It is representative of the diplomatic speeches, 
congratulatory telegrams, letters of greetings, and so on, 
that were issued. The Chinese people were apparently still 
interested in unity and friendship with the Soviet people.
The only "gimmick" the Chinese added was that this unity and 
friendship had to be based on Marxism-Leninism and prole­
tarian internationalism— but not revisionism.
Chou En-lai's speech, which was made about three weeks 
before the Sino-Indian border war (also the Cuban missile 
crisis), is representative of the new hard line the Chinese 
began to take in late 1962 and which forecast the massive 
polemics of 1963. A rather interesting departure from past 
practice is the inclusion, in the opening sentence, of 
"reactionaries of various countries." Chou does not bother 
to say who the reactionaries are, but it appears likely 
that the Chinese now wanted to distinguish between the Titos 
and the KhrushchevA. Thus, Tito becomes a reactionary and 
the Russians— or Khrushchev— becomes a modern revisionist.
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One can only speculate as to which title was considered the 
more demeaningI
The Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, also delivered
an address at about this time which was allegedly aimed at
Tito* In it, he totally confused the issue as to who was a
reactionary, and who was a revisionist.
The imperialists need the help of reactionaries in vari­
ous countries and the latter are serving imperialism in 
a less dignified way. The modern revisionists represented 
by the Tito clique precisely meet these needs. . . .
The fighting peoples of the world can in no way be lulled 
into inaction. The reaction of various countries and the 
Yugoslav modern revisionists will only further reveal 
their ugly features. . . .
The imperialists, the reactionaries of various countries, 
and the modern revisionists gloated over the difficul­
ties encountered by our country. They have attempted 
by every means to vilify, sabotage, subvert, and invade 
our great motherland. . . . But all their wishful think­
ing has come to naught. The criminal activities of the 
imperialists and their running dogs against the People's 
Republic of China, far from overwhelming the Chinese 
people, have heightened their revolutionary fervour in 
building and defending the motherland.30
According to Chen Yi, Tito and others like him, are: 
reactionaries, modern revisionists represented by the Tito 
clique, Yugoslav modern revisionists and just plain modern 
revisionists— not to mention running dogs. Even though this 
is a most remarkable diatribe, it evidently did not receive
30speeeh at National Day Celebration, Peking, October 
1, 1962, as quoted in David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 32M-.
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vide currency in 1962, and is hardly representative of the 
general statements made during that year.
126a
We welcome your letter. We welcome the desire for 
unity and cohesion. We welcome the normal attitude 
of equality towards fraternal parties shown in it. .
. . We will from now on temporarily suspend public 
replies . . .  to the public attacks which were directed 
by name against the Chinese Communist Party by com­
rades of the CPSÜ. . .
44. We /PRÇ7 welcome your /conciliatory/ 
letter.
45. We /PRg/ welcome /^our/ the desire for unity 
and cohesion.
46. We /PRÇ7 welcome the normal attitude of equality 
towards fraternal parties shown in it /USSR's
lettey/'
4 7. We /râis7 will . . . temporarily suspend public 
rgplies to public a 
/uâ7 by you ^SSR/.
e ttacks . . . directed against
The Chinese Government hopes that the Soviet govern­
ment will not take further rash steps detrimental to 
Sino-Soviet unity and the relations between the two 
states. . . .3 2
48. The Chinese Government hopes that the Soviet 
government will not take further rash steps 
detrimental to Sino-Soviet unity.
4 9. The Chinese Government hopes that the Soviet 
government will not take further rash steps 
detrimental to . . . relations between the two 
states.
^^Excerpts from letter of the Central Committee of 
the CCP in the Central Committee of the CPSU of March 9, 
1963. Full text in Peking Review. VI, No. 12 (March 22,
1963)» pp# 6-8.
32pRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Current Background. 
No. 721 (June 2, 1963), p. 48.
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Apparently the Soviet leaders have already become so 
degenerate that they now depend on telling lies for 
a living.
Their practice is one of moving from adventurism to 
capitulationism.
. . .  We shall continue to criticize you, and we hope 
you will tove the courage to argue the matter out 
with us.33
50. ^The PRC perceives thai7 apparently the Soviet 
leaders have already become so degenerate that 
they now depend on telling lies for a living.
51. PRC perceives tha^ their /BSS^ practice 
is one of moving from adventurism to capitula­
tionism.
52. We shall continue to criticize you
53. We ^PR£7 hope you will M v e  the courage to argue 
the matter out with us
. . .  They resort to various dirty tricks to isolate 
the Chinese People's Republic.34-
54-. ^ h e  PRC perceives that7 they / ^ S ^  resort to 
various dirty tricks to isolate the Chinese 
People's Republic.
In the historical narrative, mention was made that 
1963 was the year when the Chinese opened the floodgates and 
let loose an enormous torrent of words to support their argu­
ments with the Soviet Union. The bulk of these words appeared 
in the form of letters from the Central Committee of the
33chinese Government Spokesman, Current Background,
No. 712 (September 1, 1963), p. 1.
^^Lo Shih-kao (PRC ambassador to Albania), Current 
Background. No. 718 (October 1, 1963), p. 1.
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Comiminlst Party of China to the Central Committee of the Com­
munist Party of the Soviet Union. However, there was also a 
stream of anti-Soviet pronouncements that issued from the 
PRC's foreign ministry or government headquarters in general.
By and large, both the official letters and the for­
eign ministry pronouncements were reasonably temperate, al­
though they did carry a bite. Statements attributed to a
"Chinese Government Spokesman" very often bordered on the
vicious. Unfortunately, the Chinese did not identify any of 
the authors of the letters or statements, but almost certainly, 
the foreign ministery spokesman would have to be Chen Yi.
The March 9 letter was handed to the Soviet Ambassador, 
personally, by Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary of the 
CCP. This does not prove that he wrote it, but it does direct­
ly tie the letter to an official name.
1 2 ^
Grave differences exist between us and the leadership
of the Soviet Communist Party on a series of prin- -
cipled questions concerning Marxist-Leninism. . . .3?
55. Grave differences exist between us ^PR^ and the 
leadership of the CPSU . . .  on a series of prin­
cipled questions concerning Marxist-Leninism.
35Chen Yi, Current Background. No. ?48 (June 20,
196^), p. 23.
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Revisionism remains the principal danger in the 
international communist movement. We must concen­
trate on opposing modern revisionism. • . .3°
56. PRC nerceives tha;£7 revisionism /USSR's 
thinking/ remains the principal danger in the 
international communist movement.
57. We /PRC7 must concentrate on opposing modern 
revisionism /USSR's thinking/.
Khrushchev is the chief representative of modern 
revisionism. He has betrayed Leninism, betrayed 
proletarian internationalism, betrayed the path of 
the October Revolution, and betrayed the interests 
of the Soviet people. . . .
We are convinced that the difficulties that have
temporarily appeared between China and the Soviet 
Union and between the two parties are, after all,
only a historical episode and can be gradually
resolved. . . .
The fraternal and militant friendship between the 
Chinese and Soviet peoples is eternal. No one and 
no force can destroy this friendship. . . .37
58. /The PRC perceives that/ Khrushchev is the 
chief representative of modern revisionism.
59. i^he PRC perceives tha^/ he /Khrushcheg/ has 
betrayed Leninism.
60. ^ h e  PRC perceives that/ he /Khrushchej/ has 
betrayed proletarian internationalism.
61. ^ h e  PRC perceives thai/ he /Ôirushchev/ has
betrayed the path of the October Revolution.
62. /fhe PRC perceives thatj/ he /Khrushchej/ has
betrayed the interests of the Soviet people.
36peng Chen, Current Background. No. 77^ (October 1, 
196M-), p. 8.
^^Excerpts from Statement of Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China, distributed by NCNA, November 6, 
196M-.
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63. We ^PRÇ7 are convinced that the difficulties 
that have temporarily appeared between China 
and the Soviet Union . . . are a historical 
episode and can be resolved.
6U-. The fraternal and militant friendship between 
the Chinese and Soviet peoples is eternal /as 
the PRC sees ijj/.
65» /?he PRC perceives that7 no (me and no force 
can destroy this friendship /between the PRC 
and USSR/.
The Chinese appear to have cut back drastically on 
the amount of anti-Soviet polemics published in 196M-, over 
the previous year. Probably they felt that the issues had 
been brought out into the open, for the whole world to see, 
enough times so as to make any further comment redundant—  
not that that probability had bothered them in the past.
Also, the Russians were no longer answering every charge 
made against themselves, which no doubt made Chinese rejoinder 
somewhat more difficult. The most important reason for the 
cut-back, however, must have been China's view of both the 
foreign and domestic scene.
In the foreign scene, the PRC had by 1964 become 
nearly totally isolated and found herself in the position 
of having to look for friends. The Vietnam situation had 
heated-up considerably with the Bay of Tonkin incident, so 
that American planes would be flying close to China's borders. 
The most dramatic event, of course, to Peking's eyes, was the 
ouster of Khrushchev as the leader of the Kremlin.
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Understandably, the Chinese would want to relax the shouting- 
match a bit until they could ascertain the path of the new 
Russian leaders*
At home, the PRC may have experienced a gradual im­
provement in their prolonged economic crisis. They were still 
buying large amounts of wheat from the West, especially Canada, 
but there were far fewer reports of natural calamities coming 
out of China during this period. More importantly, 196h is 
the year the Chinese exploded their first atomic bomb. Un- 
questioningly, this single event added immeasurably to their 
sense of pride and security. Under all of these circumstances, 
Peking may have decided that the dispute with the Soviet Union 
could be reduced in rancor and violence, at least for the time 
being.
Quite clearly, the most interesting revelation to come 
out of the 196^ - statements, is that the Chinese, for the first 
time, admitted that When they said "modern revisionist," they 
meant Khrushchev. In a way, the admission is somewhat anti- 
climatic, since they waited until after Khrushchev had been 
removed from power before naming him. In fact, it can be 
argued that there was little point in naming him at all, once 
he was no longer in a position to revise anything. A possible 
conclusion is that Peking wanted to put the new Kremlin leaders 
on notice that Khrushchev was the only one held to blame for 
the split, in case Moscow wanted to attempt a rapprochement.
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The I96M- statements, In general, seem to relect a partial 
willingness by the Chinese to moderate the dispute.
There may be some concern over the open use of Khrush­
chev's name in the statements, since this would tend to tip- 
off the judges as to the approximate year in which they were 
made. Unfortunately, any attempt to mask his name would 
seriously weaken the impact of the statements. However, 
unless the judges were extremely knowledgable, it is not 
likely that they would know whether these comments were made 
in 1963» 1964, or 1965» In fact, it is possible that the 
judges could be even further off than that.
Some concern might also be expressed over the general 
cadence of a few of the comments made not only in 1964 but 
in one or two other years. For example, statements fifty- 
nine through sixty-two all begin "Khrushchev has betrayed." 
Here again the judges might be alerted to the fact that all 
such statements belong to the same year; however, by shuffling 
the cards, the judges will probably not recognize any pattern 
of similarity until after they have already made most of their 
decisions.
In the final analysis, it should be noted that it is 
not the intent of the Q-Sort to fool the judges into making 
wrong decisions. On the contrary, it would be entirely 
acceptable if astute judges stumble onto clues that lead 
them to make the right decisions.
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1265
More than six months have elapsed since the new 
leaders of CPSU came to power. . . .  We had hoped 
that they would correct their mistakes and return 
to the path of Marxism-Leninism, or at least prove 
a little better than Khrushchev. But all their 
actions have turned out contrary to our hopes. • . . 
They are still stubbornly clinging to the line of 
Sovlet-U.S. cooperation for the domination of the 
world. . . . They are still stubbornly clinging to 
the divisive line.
From a host of facts we cannot but draw the conclu­
sion that Khrushchev's successors are still carrying 
out Khrushchev revisionism, the only difference be­
ing that In their tactics they are more crafty than 
Khrushchev.
Precisely because the Khrushchev revisionists are 
putting on more subtle camouflage and are more decep­
tive, It Is all the more Incumbent on the Marxlst- 
Lenlnlsts to expose the essence behind their false 
appearance and the.deeds of betrayal concealed by 
their fine words.3°
66. We /PRO? had hoped that they /certain Russian 
leader&Z would correct their mistakes.
67. /We— PRC— had hoped that they7 /certain Russian 
leader§7 ^ uld return to the path of Marxism- 
Leninism 2?RC's patb/.
68. /We— PRC— had hoped that they— certain Russian 
leaders, would/ least prove a little better 
than /another Russian leader/.
69. . . . all their /certain Russian leaders/ actions 
turned out contrary to our /PRChopes.
70. /PRC perceives that7 they /certain Russian 
leaders/ are still stubbornly clinging to the
3®Peng Chen, Current Background. No. 763 (May 28, 
1965), pp. 9-10.
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line of Sovlet-U.S. cooperation for the domina­
tion of the world.
71. ^RC perceives that/ they /certain Russian 
leaders/ are still stubbornly clinging to the 
divisive line.
7 2. We /pRç7 draw the conclusion that 2*s successors 
are still carrying out %'s revisionism.
73* We /pro/ conclude that . . . they /certain Rus­
sian leaders/ are more crafty than X, another 
Russian leader . . .  in their tactics.
7 4. X, It is incumbent on the Marxist-Leninists
/PRC/ to expose the essence behind their /certain 
Russian leaders/ false appearances.
75* ._. . it is incumbent on the Marxist-Leninists
/PRC/ to eggpose the deeds of betrayal concealed
by their /certain Russian leaders^/ fine words.
The above statements were taken from a major speech 
made by Peng Chen, Mayor of Peking and important party mem­
ber, in May. Early in September, Lin Piao, who is thought
by some to be Mao's successor, made a speech which is remark­
ably similar to Peng's. Approximately four weeks later, Chou 
En-lai delivered a major address which is also like the first 
two, only a bit more veiled. It is reasonable to assume, 
therefore, that Peng announced the new party-line to be fol­
lowed in the Sino-Soviet dispute, after the Chinese had 
assessed the results of Khrushchev's removal.
They had waited more than six months in the hope that 
Moscow would see things as Peking did, but it apparently had 
all been in vain. Now the Chinese were ready to renew the
v?5
flow of polemics. The themes are still the same, except 
that ’’Khrushchev revisionism" has completely replaced "modern 
revisionism," and the Chinese are again willing to put their 
names to their statements, rather than hiding behind the party. 
It will be noted, that a good deal of masking was now 
necessary, in capsulizing these statements, so as to obscure 
the fact that they were spoken after Khrushchev had been dis­
missed from office. However, most of the masking can be 
removed before placing the statements on the Q-Sort cards, 
since the judges will be made abundantly aware that in every 
case, it is the Chinese speaking to the Russians, Thus, 
statement number sixty-six, for example, can be written 
simply: "We had hoped that they would correct their mis­
takes," Only statements sixty-eight, seventy-two, and seven­
ty-three need to retain the masking technique.
In a review of the seventy-five statements presented 
above, it should be pointed out again that they are the pro­
duct of an exhaustive sifting of published Chinese speeches, 
radio broadcast reprints, party statements, and so on. While 
a framework of reference was adopted which narrowed down the 
field considerably, it was, nevertheless, necessary to examine 
literally thousands of irrelevant speeches on agriculture, 
foreign policy statements, congratulatory telegrams, etc., 
in order to make certain that the mass of material available 
was thoroughly mined. The goal was to uncover ten or eleven
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statements that would be representative of all official 
statements made in any given year. Hopefully, that goal 
was met. Perhaps it would also be wise to caution against 
any pre-guessing of the judges' work. The format used 
above whereby the statements are numbered in order and ac­
cording to years makes it relatively easy to follow the ups 
and downs of Chinese hostility toward the Soviet Union,
There may be a temptation to assume that the Judges will have 
little difficulty in assigning values to any statement. It 
should be remembered, however, that after being placed on 
the Q-Sort cards, the statements are extensively shuffled 
so that their year-order is completely confused. Moreover, 
all of the statements are subjected to additional refining, 
as indicated before, so that the judges will constantly have 
to bear in mind the import of the descriptive-connective 
factor. Finally, the forced-array nature of the Q-Sort will 
commit the judges to full use of their discriminatory powers.
CHAPTER VI
Three Judges were used in the Q-Sort. All had academic 
training, and the areas in which they were trained varied con­
siderably. Judge A, possessed perhaps the best-suited back­
ground with a strong concentration on the Far East and minor 
competency on the Soviet Union. Judge B would presumably be 
the second-best prepared, because he had an excellent command 
of Russian affairs but no direct competency on the Far East. 
Judge G's political science training was limited almost ex­
clusively to the American government and would, therefore, 
normally be considered the least well-qualified of the three. 
While this is a purely subjective evaluation, it will be 
seen, later on, that the three judges did perform at about 
the level suggested for them with, however, some interesting 
variations.
Physical preparations for the Q-Sort and instructions 
to the judges were kept fairly simple. The statements, hav­
ing been refined to an absolute minimum amount of words, were 
typed on the blank side of cards measuring roughly three by 
four inches. Around three edges of the side of the cards, 
there appeared a series of evenly spaced holes. On the
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reverse side of the card, these holes were numbered in order. 
By punching out the leading edge of a hole, it was possible 
to code the card according to the year desired. Thus, ten 
cards had their number nine hold punched out, and these cards 
were used for the ten 1959 statements. The same process was 
followed for all the other years. Nine boxes, each large 
enough to easily accommodate fifteen to twenty statement 
cards, or more, were placed in a row and prominently numbered 
one through nine. A smaller, unobtrusive number was also 
placed on each box indicating the number of statements that 
should finally be awarded to that box. The cards were thor­
oughly shuffled and placed in one stack in front of the 
boxes. Finally, the judging was done in a quiet comfortable 
room with the judges being allowed to smoke, drink coffee, 
etc., so that they would feel no pressure to hurry their 
decisions.
Each judge was informed, briefly, of the general na­
ture of the entire study, as well as the background of content 
analysis. Next, they were introduced to the mechanics of the 
Q-Sort. They were asked to run through a few sample cards to 
make absolutely certain that they understood the Chinese were 
doing the talking, and the Russians were the ones being talked 
about. Of some interest is the fact that, after the Q-Sort 
was completed, both Judges B and C announced that they had 
experienced some difficulty in maintaining their role of
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impartiality. They both felt that some statements, which 
might appear rather bland on the surface, could have been 
intended as most insulting by the Chinese. The question was 
whether the judges should try to see these statements through 
their own eyes or through the eyes of the Chinese. Apparently, 
both judges decided, during the sorting, to answer this ques­
tion in their own way, which may account in part for the dif­
ferent conclusions they reached. Judge A never expressed 
any concern over the matter.
The judges all worked alone, one each day for three 
days, and, of course, were not told of each other's results 
until the Q-Sort was finished. While no time limits were 
imposed, it was observed that Judge A took about one and one- 
half hours. Judge C, one hour and three-quarters, and Judge B 
needed a little more than two hours to sort the cards.
There probably is no way to assess the effect of at­
titude on the part of the judges toward their duty. Certainly, 
every effort was made to secure personnel who would approach 
the task in a friendly and cooperative manner. In this respect, 
it can be reported that all three people were indeed most 
gracious and even eager to serve. Once the actual sorting 
began, however. Judges A and C gave the appearance of falling 
into a purely workman-like pattern and exhibited some feelings 
of relief upon completing their work. They simply dug right 
in and got the job done. On the other hand. Judge B seemed
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to thoroughly enjoy the Q-Sort process, and he gave every 
evidence of being reluctant to finish. Perhaps the only 
point to be made here is that all of the judges came into 
the study with a positive attitude which, presumably, would 
be a plus factor.
Earlier, mention was made of the fact that the Q-Sort 
was limited in the size of the universe that could be em­
ployed. Accordingly, a decision was made to set the universe 
at seventy-five statements. This appears to have been a 
proper decision in the sense that none of the judges com­
plained, at all, of the size of the universe. Not one of 
them exhibited any difficulty in keeping "track** of all seven­
ty-five statements.
Some concern was also expressed that the repetitive 
nature of the first few words in some of the statements might 
give away the fact that all of those statements came from the 
same year. Therefore, particular attention was given, at the 
end of each Q-Sort, to the final location of these repetitive- 
type statements to determine what effect they might have had 
on the judges' decisions.
Close inspection of Judge A's Sort revealed that few 
repetitive-type statements had wound up in the same boxes. 
Moreover, when asked. Judge A acknowledged that he had 
recognized the similar cadence in several statements, but
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that he had tended to attribute the phenomenon to typical 
communist jargon usage.
Judge B admitted to being partially Influenced by 
the similar cadence statements, particularly on the low 
side of the Intensity scale. Oddly enough, on the high 
side of the Intensity scale, he thought that the repetitive 
nature of some of the statements was actually a plot to 
throw him off the track, and, therefore, he refused to put 
a few of these statements In the same boxest
Judge C was clearly Influenced the most by the repetl- 
tlve-type statements with perhaps half of them showing up In 
the same boxes. This could reflect the much lower level of 
competency In Chinese and Russian affairs possessed by Judge 
C, which may have provoked a desire to seize upon any clues 
discovered In order to make the "right" decisions. Even so, 
the Influence was not overwhelming, and, on balance. It Is 
reasonably safe to say that none of the three judges was 
unduly led astray by repetltlve-type statements.
All seventy-five statements were apparently structured 
well enough to satisfy the needs of the judges. There were 
no questions or comments concerning the meaning of any state­
ment either during or after the sorting process. The mask­
ing technique had been explained to the judges, so when 
masked statements turned up In the course of running the 
cards, there was no hesitation or confusion. Very likely,
182
the over-all ease in running the three Q-Sorts attests to 
the value of the pre-session instructional period*
Once everything was in readiness, the judges were 
told that they could proceed in any manner they chose. That 
is, they could immediately attempt to assign to the proper 
number of cards a final value, which would be a difficult 
if not impossible way to proceed, or they could lay out all 
of the cards and try to fit them into the proper boxes, much 
like a jigsaw puzzle, and so on. Interestingly, all three 
judges spontaneously decided to pick up the entire deck of 
cards, to read the statement on the top card and then to 
place it, temporarily, into whichever intensity level box 
they though it fit. They continued in this manner until all 
seventy-five cards were gone. While Judge B followed this 
procedure, he did read through all of the cards first.
Judges A and C only read eight or nine cards to "get the 
feel of the statements" before plunging ahead. Experience 
would probably show that the judges had quite wisely and 
naturally settled upon the most efficient method for running 
the Q-Sort. At least, that appeared to be the case in this 
study.
It should appear obvious that at the conclusion of 
this first quick run-through, some of the boxes contained 
far more cards than should finally be placed there, and 
some boxes had far fewer. In Table IV, information was
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provided to show that boxes, that Is intensity levels, one 
and nine should have four cards, that boxes two and eight 
should have six cards, and so forth.
While the results of this first run-through are 
largely unimportant, it might be interesting to see how the 
judges made their initial decisions. Table V gives the in­
tensity values, the desired number of cards that should be 
assigned to each value, and the number of cards each Judge 
assigned to each value. These figures were quickly jotted 
down while the judges took a short break, and they were 
hardly aware of the interruption.
TABLE 5 
RESULTS OP INITIAL RUN
Intensity Value 1 2 3 If 5 6 7 8 9
Desired Number of Cards If 6 9 12 13 12 9 6 h
Card Distribution by 
Judge A 9 8 7 9 7 11 10 8 6
Card Distribution by 
Judge B 9 11 7 10 8 8 7 8 7
Card Distribution by 
Judge C 1 7 11 10 9 15 16 6 0
All three judges displayed a striking reluctance to 
assign the proper number of cards to the number five box.
I8»f
One would think that it would be easier to decide middle- 
level intensity statements, but it appears to have been the 
most difficult part of the Q-Sort. At the same time, Judges 
A and B had a tendency to distribute the cards rather evenly 
throughout all of the boxes. Moreover, their distributions 
are remarkably alike. Both Judges A and C put most of their 
cards on the high-intensity side of the scale, whereas Judge 
B put most of his on the low-intensity side, although the 
total variation is not great. Judge C preferred to bunch 
the cards closely toward the center with a marked unwilling­
ness to place cards at the two extreme ends.
A hasty conclusion might be made at this point that 
Judges A and B, because of the similarity of their initial 
runs, Were thinking pretty much along the same lines, while 
Judge C was operating at a different level. This would tend 
to re-enforce the earlier supposition that A and B were "bet­
ter" qualified than C. However, such a conclusion would be 
extremely vulnerable, for a variety of reasons. For instance, 
C may simply have felt a stronger obligation to try to fill 
the boxes in the prescribed manner, than either A or B did.
If this were indeed the case, then one could argue that 
Judge C had actually run the best initial sorti Of course, 
no conclusions are really in order, based on such a limited 
part of the Q-Sort.
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The next thing the Judges had to do, after finishing 
the initial run-through, was to re-sort the cards with 
greater discrimination, until the final forced array had 
been achieved. For example. Judge A had initially placed 
nine cards in the number one box, but the forced array only 
permits four. Consequently, A then had to decide which five 
statements did not belong there and put them in some other 
box. Obviously, this was the hardest part of the Judges' 
work. Judge A filled up the middle box first and then 
worked outward to the extremes. Judges B and C chose to 
start at the extreme ends and work inward.
Once the Judges had finished their work, a tabula­
tion was made of their Q-Sorts. This was done by taking 
cards out of the boxes, and determining, by use of the code 
on the reverse side, where all of the cards for 1959 had 
been placed, where all of the cards for I960 had been placed, 
and so on. Thus, Judge A had placed one 1959 card in box 
number one, one 1959 card in box number two, five 1959 cards 
in box number three, and three 1959 cards in box number four. 
Table VI contains the complete tabulation of the cards ac­
cording to their location as determined by Judge A.
By using the information found in Table 6, it is 
possible to calculate the average hostility of the statements 
for each year according to Judge A. This can be done by mul­
tiplying the years' statements by their number, adding them
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TABLE 6
LOCATION OF CARDS BY JUDGE A
Box Number 1 2 3 h 5 6 7 8 9
Year
1959 1 1 5 3 0 0 0 0 0
1960 1 0 0 6 2 1 1 0 0
1961 2 0 3 3 0 3 0 0 0
1962 0 3 1 0 2 2 1 2 0
1963 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 2 h
196M- 0 2 0 0 3 3 3 0 0
1965 0 0 0 0 3 2 3 2 0
all together, and then dividing that snm hy the total numher 
of statements for the year. In this fashion, 1959 can be 
read as (1x1) + CL x 2) + (5x3) + (3 x ^) = 30; or, more 
simply, 1959 could be read as 1 + 2 + 12 + 12 = 30. The 
total values for each year are expressed in Table 7.
Now all that remains to find the average hostility 
value for each year is to divide the below total values by 
the total number of statements used for each year. It should 
be remembered that 1959 and 1965 have ten statements, while 
all other years have eleven. Judge A*s average hostility 
values are found in Table 8, on page I8 7.
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table 7
TOTAL YEARLY VALUES AS DETERMINED BY JUDGE A
Year Total Value
1959 1 + 2 + 15 + 12 = 30
I960 1 + 2 4 + 1 0 + 6 + 7 = 48
1961 2 + 9 + 1 2 + 1 8 = 41
1962 6 + 3 + 10 + 12 + 7 + 16 = 54
1963 15 + 6 + 7 + 16 + 36 = 80
196^ 4 + 15 + 18 + 21 = 58
1965 15 + 12 + 21 + 16 = 64
TABLE 8
AVERAGE HOSTILITY FOR EACH YEAR AS DETERMINED BY JUDGE A
Year Total Value Divided By Average
Hostility
1959 30 10 3 .0 0
I960 ■^8 11 4.36
1961 41 11 3 .7 2
1962 54 11 4 .9 0
1963 80 11 7 .2 7
196»+ 58 11 5 .2 7
1965 64 10 6.40
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A cautious conclusion that might be developed from 
Table 8 Is that Judge A arrived at very satisfactory hos­
tility averages. Since 1959 Is being assumed as the rough 
beginning of the Slno-Sovlet break, then, of course. It 
should have the lowest average. The year the Russians with­
drew their experts from China, I960, could not help but show 
an Increase In hostility, even markedly so. In 1961, the 
Chinese had to retreat and retrench because of economic 
pressures, and the downward trend In hostility reflects 
that fact. Near the end of 1961, the Russians ran little 
Albania out of the Socialist camp. This caused a new wave 
of antagonism, which carried over Into 1962. Then there was 
the Indian and Cuban Crises of 1962 that added fuel to the 
fire, so that the hostility factor rises once again. As 
a matter of fact, one could probably suggest that Judge A's 
hostility average for the year 1962 ought to be somewhat 
higher than It Is. All of the available evidence presented 
In the historical narrative would lead to the belief that 
1963 was the year of greatest conflict, and Judge A has 
correctly come to the same conclusion. The next year, the 
Chinese held off a bit until they could determine the course 
of Khrushchev's successors. But In 1965 they renewed their 
attack since they became convinced that things were not go­
ing to change very much.
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In summary then, it certainly appears as if Judge A 
has performed veil in agreeing with the picture seen in the 
historical narrative# One might argue with some of his 
specific figures, but, on the whole, he has matched the ups 
and downs of the Sino-Soviet split rather nicely. These 
ups and downs can be better visualized by viewing Graph 1 
which follows on page 192.
The next three tables reveal the information gained 
from an inspection of Judge B's Q-Sort. Table 9 carries 
the location of the cards; Table 10, the total values as­
signed; and Table 11, the hostility averages. These tables 
follow on pages 190 and 191.
It should be clear that Judge B also did well with 
his Q-Sort in that he too agrees rather closely with the 
historical evidence. What is more, his values for 1961,
1962, and 1963 could easily be considered a better represen­
tation than Judge A's. Of course, that is debatable since 
there are no absolute values involved. On the other hand. 
Judge B rated 196^ more hostile than 1965 which does not 
mesh with the apparent situation or with Judge A's Q-Sort.
According to the historical narrative, the Russians 
tended to lose interest in the Sino-Soviet split fairly 
steadily from the year 1963 on. By a strange coincidence. 
Judge B, with a strong background in Russian affairs, 
reflects the same loss of interest in his hostility averages.
190
TABLE 9 
LOCATION OP CARDS BY JUDGE B
Box Number 1 2 3 4 ? 6 7 8 9
Year
1959 0 5 2 2 1 0 0 0 0
I960 1 0 1 4 3 1 1 0 0
1961 1 1 3 4 2 0 0 0 0
1962 1 0 2 1 0 2 4 1 0
1963 0 0 0 1 2 4 0 2 2
196^ 1 0 1 0 1 2 1 3 2
1965 0 0 0 1 3 3 3 0 0
TABLE 10
TOTAL YEARLY VALUES AS DETERMINED BY JUDGE B
Year Total Value
1959 10 + 6 + 8 *^ 5 = 29
I960 1 + 3 + 16 + 1? + 6 •4- 7 = 48
1961 1 + 2 + 9 + 16 + 10 = 38
1962 1 + 6 + 4 + 12 + 28 f 8 = 59
1963 4 + 10 + 24 + 16 + 18 = 72
196^ 1 + 3 + 5 + 1 2 + 7 + 2 4 + 18 = 70
196? 4 + 1? + 18 + 21 = 58
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TABLE 11
AVERAGE HOSTILITY FOR EACH YEAR AS DETERMINED BY JUDGE B
Year Total Value Divided By Average
Hostility
1959 29 10 2 .9 0
I960 kQ 11 ^.36
1961 38 11 3.^5
1962 59 11 5.36
1963 72 11 6.5V
196M- 70 11 6.36
1965 58 10 5 .8 0
This mast be purely coincidental, however, since Judge B 
did not know which statements were made in which years, but 
it is an interesting phenomenon.
Judge B’s hostility averages exhibit a somewhat 
smoother rise and fall pattern than Judge A’s. Graph 2, 
which can be found on page 193, illustrates the pattern.
Figures compiled from Judge C ’a Q-Sort appear in the 
following Tables 12, 13, and 1^. Table 12 presents the 
location of cards; Table 13, the total values assigned; and 
Table IM-, the hostility averages.
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TABLE 12 
LOCATION OF CARDS BY JUDGE C
Box Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year
1959 1 2 2 5 0 0 0 0 0
I960 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 0 0
1961 2 0 4 2 3 0 0 0 0
1962 0 3 1 0 0 2 0 2 3
1963 0 0 0 2 4 2 2 1 0
1964 1 1 0 0 2 2 1 3 1
1965 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 0 0
A careful analysis of the hostility averages dis­
played in Table lU-, found on page 195, suggests something 
of a paradox. Both Judges A and B determined that 1963 vas 
the year of greatest hostility, which seems to square with 
the historical data; yet Judge C awarded that honor to 1965, 
One would be immediately tempted to conclude, therefore, 
that Judge C's Q-Sort is of less value than Judge A's or 
Judge B*s, and that Judge C is indeed the "least" well- 
qualified of the three. However, Judge C's averages are 
in close agreement with those of one or both of the other 
two judges, in four out of the seven years, and even a
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TABLE 13
TOTAL YEARLY AVERAGES AS DETERMINED BY JUDGE C
Year Total Value
1959 1 + 4 + 6 + 20 = 31
I960 2 + 6 + 1 2 + 2 0 + 7 = 47
1961 2 + 1 2 + 8 + 1 ? = 37
1962 6 + 3 + 1 3 + 1 6 + 2 7 = 64
1963 8 + 2 0 + 1 2 + 1 4 + 8 = 62
196^ - 1 + 2 + 1 0 + 1 2 + 7 + 2 4 + 9 = 6?
196? 36 + 28 = 64
TABLE 14
AVERAGE HOSTILITY FOR EACH YEAR AS DETERMINED BY JUDGE 0
Year Total Value Divided by Average
Hostility
1959 31 10 3.10
I960 47 11 4.27
1961 37 11 3.36
1962 64 11 ?.8l
1963 62 11 ?.63
1964 6? 11 ?.90
196? 64 10 6.40
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fifth year is not too far off the mark. The key, of course, 
is the average for 1963. If it vere one full point higher, 
then Judge C’s distribution would look just as "good" as 
Judge A's, and "better" than Judge B's.
Judge C's averages have been plotted on Graph 3, 
which can be found on page 197. It is followed by Graph 4, 
found on page 198, which contains the averages of all three 
judges in order that a visual comparison of their Q-8orts 
can be made. Significantly, the three are in close agree­
ment for the years 1959 through 1962. A survey of Tables 
9, and 12 reveals that these are the years to which more 
low-intensity statements were assigned than high ones. Per­
haps it would be fair to conclude that the judges found it 
easier to decide on what constituted a low-intensity state­
ment than what constituted a high-intensity statement.
Earlier, mention was made that the judges worked 
alone. Had they worked together, it is possible that they 
might have collectively produced a "better" Q-Sort than was 
produced by any one of them. However, collectivity would 
have introduced the element of personality into the Q-Sort, 
so that Judge A might have persuaded B and C to see things 
his way, or Judge B might have unduly influenced C, and so 
on. Nevertheless, some degree of collectivity can be com­
puted by putting together the results of the three Q-Sorts 
and finding the average. This information is given in Table 
15, which is found on page 199 of this study.
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GRAPH 3
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TABLE 15 
COLLECTIVE Q-SORT
Year Judge A's 
Results
Judge B's 
Results
Judge'C's 
Results
Total Divided By Average
1959 3.0 2.9 3 .1 9 3 3 .0
I960 k-,36 4.36 4 .2 7 12.99 3 4.33
1961 3.72 3.45 3 .3 6 10.53 3 3 .5 1
1962 M-.90 5.36 5 .8 1 1 6 .0 7 3 5.36
1963 7.27 6.54 5.63 1 9 .4 4 3 6.48
196^ 5.27 6 .3 6 5 .9 0 1 7 .5 3 3 5.84
1965 6.40 5 .8 0 6.40 18.60 3 6.20
v û
vO
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The average of the three jndges* results again re­
veals the same up and down pattern of hostility that was 
discovered by Judge A alone. See Graph 5j which is on 
page 201, for a visual presentation of this information. 
However, Judge A's numerical values vary considerably from 
the average, in some cases. While Judge 6 and Judge C are 
still out of step with Judge A and the average, their 
numerical values match the average much more closely than 
do A's. The important factor, of course, is that the col­
lective results of the thinking of these judges, with 
diverse backgrounds, produced an average that fits remark­
ably well the historical evidence produced in the first 
part of the study. When it is remembered that none of the 
Judges ever saw any part of the historical evidence and 
were not even told what they were going to do until they 
arrived for the Q-Sorting, it would seem in order to sug­
gest that Content Analysis can be a useful tool in this type 
of research.
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CHAPTER VII
There are at least two ways in which one can compute 
mathematically the reliability of the judges' Q-Sort runs. 
One of these, a pair comparison, is rather simple to develop 
but perhaps not too significant. The other method is to em­
ploy Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation, a fairly 
standard statistical device.
After each judge had completed his Q-Sort, a coded 
notation was made on the back of each card indicating the 
value assigned to it. Then it was possible to determine to 
what extent the judges had agreed on a card by card basis.
To illustrate: the card containing the statement, "no one
and no force can destroy this friendship between us," was 
awarded to the number 1 box by both Judges B and C, but to 
the number 2 box by Judge A. Thus B formed one pair with C, 
while A paired with neither of them. The point then is to 
discover how many pairs A formed with B, how many pairs A 
formed with C, and how many pairs B formed with C. This in­
formation can be applied to the formula R = A / N. In this 
formula, R = reliability index (zero to 1.00); A = agree­
ments (pairs); and N = total number of responses (75)•
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Inspection of the cards revealed that Judge A agreed 
with Judge B on 49 cards; Judge A agreed with Judge C on 4l 
cards, and Judge B agreed with Judge C on 48 cards. Table 
16 displays the reliability indexes.
TABLE 16
RELIABILITY OF JUDGING AS DETERMINED 
BY PAIR COMPARISON
Judges Agreements Divided By Reliability Index
A with B 49 75 .653
A with C 41 75 .547
B with C 48 75 .640
Average .613
Obviously the indexes obtained from the pair compari­
son technique are only moderately high, which would suggest 
that the reliability of the judging itself was good but not 
outstanding. However, given the fact that there were nine 
shadings of judgment within the Q-Sort for each statement 
and that the judges were forced to discriminate between many 
similar appearing statements, then the indexes take on a bet­
ter light. As a matter of fact, a strong case could be made 
for scoring as "agreement" any judgings that came within one 
step of each other. Then, in the illustration given above.
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all three judges would be paired, since B and C put the card 
in the 1 box and A put the card just one step away in the 2 
box. Under this arrangement, A agreed with B on 62 cards;
A agreed with C on 59 cards, and B agreed with C on 63 cards, 
The resulting indexes are in Table 17, below.
TABLE 17
RELIABILITY INDEXES INCLUDING AGREEMENTS 
ONE STEP APART
Judges Agreements Divided By Reliability Index
A with B 62 75 .8 2 7
A with C 59 75 .7 8 7
B with C 63 75 .840
Average .818
By adding the "one step apart" agreements to the for­
mula, the indexes are brought up to very acceptable levels. 
Interestingly, Judge C came out better in the pair comparison 
test than in the earlier analyses.
There is another body of information that can be de­
rived from a pair comparison, and it may be even more signifi­
cant than the reliability indexes. By reviewing the paired 
statements, one can prepare a listing of typical statements
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for each of the nine intensity categories which will help 
to establish the intuitive validity of the judging.
In categories 2 and 9, there were no statements on 
which all three judges agreed. These were, of course, the 
extreme ends of the scale where agreement would be most 
difficult. On the other hand, even in those two categories, 
there were several statements on which two judges agreed, 
with the other judge being only one step away. The follow­
ing is a list of two statements from each category in which 
there was complete or nearly complete intuitive agreement.
1. The great unity and friendship of the people of China 
and the Soviet Union will flow on eternally, like 
the Yangtse and the Volga.
2. Any aggression and provocation against the USSR is 
an attack against us.
1. The great Soviet Union is the most faithful friend 
of the Chinese people.
2. We have established a friendship and unity with the 
Soviet Union which is indestructable and is growing 
daily.
1. Profound friendship has long existed between the 
peoples of PRC and USSR.
2. We have united as one.
4
1. The Sino-Soviet Alliance is a strong bulwark for 
safeguarding world peace.
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2. We have worked in close cooperation.
5
1. We are convinced that the difficulties that have 
temporarily appeared between China and the Soviet 
Union, are a historical episode and can be resolved.
2. We welcome the normal attitude of equality towards 
fraternal parties shown in your letter.
1. The Marxists-Leninists draw different conclusions 
than the modern revisionists on revolution.
2. They are still stubbornly clinging to the divisive 
line.
1. Grave differences exist between us and the leadership 
of the CPSU.
2. All their actions have turned out contrary to our 
hopes.
8
1. Khrushchev has betrayed the path of the October 
Revolution.
2. The modern revisionists have continually launched 
anti-Chinese campaigns to compel China to change 
the just stand it takes in international affairs.
1. Apparently the Soviet leaders have already become 
so degenerate that they now depend on telling lies 
for a living.
2. They resort to various dirty tricks to isolate the 
Chinese People's Republic.
In many of the middle categories there was complete 
agreement by all of the judges on several statements.
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However, by presenting only two from each category, one gains 
a representational picture of the type of statement assigned 
to each intensity level as well as a capsule view of the 
shifting attitude of the Chinese toward the Russians.
A second way of measuring the reliability of the judg­
ing is to use Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation.
The average intensity value that each judge found for each 
year gave, in effect, a rank to that year of from 1 to 7»
Thus, Judge A found that 1959 had the lowest average intensity 
value and would then rank number one. He also found that 1963 
had the highest average intensity level, so it would be num­
ber seven. In similar fashion, the other years were also 
ranked by Judge A as well as the other two judges. Finally, 
the judging can be compared according to the way in which 
the three ranked the years. The Spearman formula is: R =
1.00 - 6 Sum d^ / n3 - n; R = reliability index, Sum d^ = 
summation of number of differences between judgings squared, 
and n3 - n = number of years covered or (7^ - 7) or 336.
From Table 18 it can be seen that the summation 
squared of differences between the rankings of Judges A and 
B is 2. This figure can now be applied to the formula; R =
1.00 - 6 X 2 / 336 = .964.
Table 19 reveals that the summation squared of differ­
ences between Judge A and Judge C is 12. Application of this
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TABLE 18
RANK CORRELATION OF JUDGE A WITH JUDGE B
Year Rank by Judge A Rank by Judge B Difference Sum d^
1959 1 1 0 0
I960 3 3 0 0
1961 2 2 0 0
1962 4 4 0 0
1963 7 7 0 0
1964 5 6 -1 1
1965 6 5 1 1
Total 0 2
TABLE 19
RANK CORRELATION OF JUDGE A WITH JUDGE C
Year Rank by Judge A Rank by Judge B Difference Sum d^
1959 1 1 0 0
I960 3 3 0 0
1961 2 2 0 0
1962 4 5 -1 1
1963 7 4 3 9
1964 5 6 -1 1
1965 6 7 -1 1
Total 0 12
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figure to the formula yields: R = 1.00 - 6 x 12 / 336 =
.786. Obviously, this coefficient is significantly lower 
than the one relating to Judge A and B and would again tend 
to re-enforce the idea that Judge 0 had a somewhat "poorer" 
preparational background than the other two.
TABLE 20
RANK CORRELATION OP JUDGE B WITH JUDGE 0
Year Rank by Judge B Rank by Judge C Difference Sum d^
1959 1 1 0 0
I960 3 3 0 0
1961 2 2 0 0
1962 4 5 -1 1
1963 7 4 3 9
1964 6 6 0 0
1965 5 7 -2 4
Total 0 14
When Judge B is compared with Judge C, the summation 
squared of difference is 14. Using this information, from 
Table 20, in the Spearman formula, the coefficient of Rank 
Correlation between the two judges becomes : R = 1.00 - 6 x
14 / 336 = .750.
These three coefficients of Rank Correlation as deter* 
mined by the Spearman formula would seem to fall within
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significant boundaries. Judges A and B particularly come 
out very well indeed.
Using this same process, it is possible to calculate 
the coefficients of Rank Correlations for all three judges, 
when compared with the composite ranking for the same years. 
It will be recalled that Judge A's average intensity values 
matched, reasonably well, the composite average intensity 
values. That is, both Judge A and the Composite ranked 1959 
as number 1, then I960 as number 3j and so on. When com­
pared with the composite, the three judges display the fol­
lowing coefficients:
Judge A with Composite: 1.000
Judge B with Composite: .96^
Judge C with Composite: .786
In summarizing the computations on the reliability of 
the judging, there appears to be sufficient reason for stat­
ing that all of the figures are adequately impressive. This 
is especially true of the results obtained with the Spearman 
formula which should be regarded as somewhat more valid than 
the pair-comparison test.
CHAPTER VIII
Chinese Communist attitudes toward the Soviet Union 
from 1949 to 1965 ran the gamut from being very friendly to 
being very hostile with periods of readjustment along the 
way. The initial alliance of these two great powers with 
their immense territories and populations presented the 
Western world with a rather bleak outlook indeed. It was 
fairly common practice to bemoan the fact that approximately 
one-half the peoples of the world were now living under the 
red banner of communism. In certain parts of the West, 
notably the United States, a sort of anti-communist hysteria 
gripped the people, a hysteria which was further heightened 
by the Korean War. In such a milieu, it would have taken a 
most courageious commentator to suggest that the Sino-Soviet 
alliance was narrowly based and that a split was a definite 
future possibility. Yet, a split did occur, perhaps sooner 
than anyone suspected. From the evidence presented, some 
conclusions about Chinese attitudes toward their Russian 
ally are in order.
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One of the most important conclusions to be reached 
is that the original basis of alliance between the two powers 
was the commonality of ideology rather than the commonality 
of national interests. This factor manifested itself in the 
early Russian response to the Chinese Communist takeover, as 
opposed to Moscow's later actions, and in the Chinese atti­
tude toward their northern neighbor during the early period 
versus the later period.
The initial Soviet response to the Chinese Communist 
takeover was certainly lukewarm, to say the least. Technically, 
the Russians maintained diplomatic relations with Chiang Kai- 
shek's Nationalists until almost the last minute. Even after 
recognizing the new government, it was years before Moscow 
picked a top-level party member to be ambassador to Peking.
In the areas of trade and economic assistance, the Rus­
sians displayed an equal lack of interest. The Chinese des­
perately needed and probably expected massive amounts of aid 
from a seemingly rich Soviet Union. What they received was 
niggardly in size, and the terms of repayment were suitably 
strict. On the other hand, trade figures did show a nice in­
crease for several years, although they never reached what 
might be called staggering proportions, considering the size 
of the two countries. Moreover, the Chinese people paid a 
dear price for the trade, in some instances, since they had
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to export short supply foodstuffs to balance their trade 
deficits and to pay off their loans.
There were other ways In which the Russians Indicated 
their low-level enthusiasm for the new People's Republic of 
China during the first four years. The number of Soviet 
experts sent to help China Industrialize was significant, 
but not as large as the number sent later on. Not too much 
military equipment was given to the Chinese, and It tended 
to be obsolete. Some modern MIG fighter planes were sent to 
China during the Korean War, but few planes were sent later, 
and they were mostly of the older variety. Russia promised 
to give back Port Arthur and make other concessions, but 
found excuses for hanging on to them for several years more. 
Finally, Moscow was particularly hazy about promises to help 
the Chinese Communists oust the Nationalists from Taiwan.
In short then. It Is extremely difficult to sense In 
the Russians' behavior, any compelling national Interest In 
Joining hands with Communist China. Stalin especially, seems 
to have viewed the new China as a sort of Impecunious brother- 
in-law, who has to be tolerated simply because he Is a member 
of the family.
Part of the answer to the Soviet attitude at this time 
might be that they felt their Far Eastern flank was temporar­
ily secure. After all, powerful Japan had been defeated, the 
British and the French were not likely to maintain a presence
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East of Suez, and India was not much of a threat whether 
colonial or free. True, the United States was in Korea 
and Japan, hut perhaps a Korean War would send the Americans 
scurrying back to Japan or even further. Hopefully, they 
would at least be driven off the mainland. This left only 
China, and China was poor, war-torn, and communist. There­
fore, China could be welcomed into the Socialist Camp, but 
there was no need to turn her into a major power. In fact, 
it would probably be better not to.
As far as the Chinese communists were concerned, there 
probably was never any real doubt that they would turn to the 
Soviet Union, just as soon as possible, after seizing control 
of mainland China. One might argue that the Sino-Soviet al­
liance was simply a matter of expediency, that the Chinese 
actually had no where else to go, but that would not neces­
sarily be true. Of course, the United States was heavily 
committed to Chiang Kai-shek, but the corruption within his 
administration and its rapid disentegration had left many 
Americans thoroughly disenchanted with Chiang. It is at 
least conceivable that had the communists decided to launch 
a powerful peace offensive aimed at the United States, they 
might have brought American public opinion around to a 
tacitly neutral or even friendly position. In fact, the 
official recognition of the PRC by Great Britain could very 
well have been used as Peking's opening shot in such an 
offensive.
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It is difficult to say, with exactitude, just where 
China's greatest national interests lay in 1949. Certainly, 
with the Russians sitting on the back doorstep, it would be 
necessary to maintain friendly relations with them. However, 
the PRC's overwhelming need in late 1949 and for years there­
after, was capital for industrial expansion. Without ques­
tion, the United States had the greatest amount of distribu­
tive capital of any nation in the world. On the basis of 
this one issue alone, it would appear that China had more 
reason for being friendly with the United States than the 
Soviet Union. Yet they chose the Soviet Union, a fact which 
suggests that commonality of ideology was more important to 
the Chinese than national interest.
More evidence of the Chinese Communists preoccupation 
with ideology can be found in their relations with the Rus­
sians and the Western powers during the first few years.
The Chinese went out of their way to emulate and praise 
everything Russian, to the point of being almost maudlin.
All of their slogans carried pro-Russian statements; students 
by the thousands were sent to Russia; Russian language in­
struction was introduced into Chinese schools; Russian movies, 
plays, ballets, and so on, were all the vogue. In addition, 
the PRC was the strongest supporter of any foreign policy 
statement issued by Moscow.
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Chinese relations with Western powers were almost 
universally bad. Even the British and the Portuguese were 
not treated especially well, despite their recognition of 
the new regime. But it was the United States which received 
the brunt of Peking's most slashing vocal attacks, much to 
the astonishment of many Americans who had been led to believe 
that Mao was a simple agrarian reformer. In fact, the Chi­
nese were almost eager to outdo everyone else in vilifying 
the United States, although part of the justification was, 
no doubt, the Korean conflict.
In summary, the first three or four years of the Sino- 
Soviet partnership rested more on a sharing of ideology than 
a sharing of national interest. This is not to say that 
national interest was not important, only less important.
From a purely practical standpoint, the Soviet Union was 
stuck with a partner with an insatiable need for economic 
aid, while the PRC was stuck with a partner that was more 
interested in Europe than with the Far East. Neither one 
gained any tremendous benefit from the partnership; indeed, 
they may both have lost I The Russians tolerated the situa­
tion since, as leaders of the Socialist Camp, it was the 
only decent thing to do. The Chinese viewed the partnership 
as a natural right, and their attitude toward the Soviet 
Union during this period was the friendliest it ever became.
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Â second conclusion developed In the study Is that 
Stalin's death, and the subsequent struggle over a successor, 
unintentionally presented the Chinese with an opportunity to 
do some independent thinking. There is no doubt that the 
Chinese benefited enormously from the three or four years 
that it took Nikita Khrushchev to gain control of the Kremlin. 
They benefited both internally and externally, while at the 
same time, they were free to re-evaluate their position in 
the Sino-Soviet alliance.
The Chinese benefited internally because of the general 
relaxation of control that accompanied the period of struggle. 
The new Russians leaders were anxious to please their satel­
lite neighbors in every way possible in order to prevent any 
defections. The amount of trade and economic assistance that 
flowed into China was greater than ever before. Moreover, in 
Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese had an "old revolutionary" who 
could command a certain degree of respect within the Social­
ist Camp, now that Stalin was gone. They began to suggest 
that China had found a new path to socialism that other back­
ward countries might want to emulate. It is doubtful that 
Stalin would have permitted such boasting.
Externally, the Russian power struggle gave the Chi­
nese room to maneuver in foreign affairs. They were able to 
mount a diplomatic offensive in both Southeast Asia and 
Africa with fairly good results. The evidence indicates
218
that Peking may even have played a vital role in quieting 
the uprisings in Eastern Europe. All of this activity added 
greatly to the stature of the PRC at a time when the rather 
rambunctious exploits of Buganin and Khrushchev were probably 
costing the Soviet Union some loss of prestige.
Clearly, the most important result of these three or 
four years, is the change in relationship that existed be­
tween the PRC and the USSR. While Stalin was alive, the 
Chinese made virtually no effort to acquire equal status 
with the Soviet Union, within the Socialist Camp. Indeed, 
their fawning adulation of their great Northern ally came 
close to saying that China never thought of equalling the 
position of the Soviet Union. With Stalin out of the way, 
however, it slowly began to dawn on the Chinese that they 
could make an impressive case for ideological parity. In a 
sense, the Chinese had matured. Their aid and advice was 
being sought in many of the capitols of the world, including 
Moscow, which must have been a most satisfying sensation.
Of course, the PRC was by no means equal to Russia in most 
respects, but by 1957» the Chinese began to think that they 
could move ahead of Moscow ideologically. In retrospect, 
it might not be far-fetched to say that the Sino-Soviet 
alliance began to crumple with the death of Stalin.
By all odds, the six years running from 1958 through 
1963, are the most exciting and dramatic covered in the
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study. They are also paradoxical in that national interest 
became much more important for both countries in different 
ways, but not too much was directly said about it. On the 
other hand, ideology became less important in holding the 
alliance together, but it was an almost constant topic of 
conversation. In reality, these two factors, ideology and 
national Interest, would practically merge into one and the 
same thing for a time, while at other times, they would 
separate into distinct categories. On still other occasions, 
the one factor would tend to blur the other and vice versa.
On balance, however, it is reasonably safe to conclude that 
these are years in which both the PRC and the LSSR pushed 
their own national interests behind a smoke screen of ideol­
ogy, particularly the Chinese.
There can be little doubt that the Russians turned to 
the Right during these years. Equally apparent is the fact 
that the turn was made to satisfy national interests at the 
expense of communist ideology. The repeated attempts at some 
sort of rapprachment with Tito, Khrushchev’s visit to the 
United States, the drive toward the Summit meeting, Khrush­
chev's handling of the Cuban Crisis, as well as the Taiwan 
Straits Affair, and many, many more instances, all testify 
to a new Russian mood. Whether it was motivated by a matur­
ing industrial society or by recognition of the realities of
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the nuclear balance of terror, or some other reason, is 
outside the scope of this study. However, the enunciation 
of the new doctrine of peaceful coexistence meant that the 
Kremlin was now ready to place the interests of the Soviet 
Union ahead of the interests of the rest of the Socialist 
Camp if, indeed, that had not always been the case.
While the Russians were seeking a relaxation of in­
ternational tensions, the Chinese repeatedly advocated a 
"get-tough” policy toward the West. Peking gave every indica­
tion of a real belief in the East wind prevailing over the 
West wind, based in large measure on the Russian ICBM superi­
ority. The Chinese maintained that the capitalist, imperial­
ist powers could not be trusted, that wars of national libera­
tion ought to be aided and encouraged, and that world revolu­
tion was inevitable. They castigated the Yugoslavs unmerci­
fully, attacked India twice, constantly threatened Taiwan, 
and sought atomic weapons from Russia. In short, the Chinese 
assumed an uncompromising posture of belligerency which they 
tried to force on the Soviet Union as well, but without much 
success. The two countries were simply pursuing their own 
differing national interests, and it drove them apart.
The motivation behind China's belligerent attitude ap­
pears to revolve around two closely related ideas. First, 
Peking probably felt that if the Soviet Union, with its big 
rockets, and the rest of the Socialist Camp were to keep a
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constant pressure on the West, then the West might be made 
to grant concessions especially favorable to China. A jit­
tery world might demand that the PRO be admitted to the 
United Nations. Hopefully, this would weaken the Taiwan 
government and suggest to the United States that it ought to 
remove its fleet from the Formosan Straits. All of Southeast 
Asia would then presumably be open to Chinese penetration, as 
well as the Indian subcontinent. The possibilities were end­
less, once the American policy of containment was shaken.
Second, if the Russians could be induced to follow such 
a path, they would no doubt have to draw closer to the PRC. 
Then Moscow would need Peking's support and would be compelled 
to build up her ally with massive infusions of aid, including 
the sought-after nuclear capability. More importantly, this 
close tie between the two communist giants would certainly 
preclude any Russo-American detente, which seems to have been 
a growing fear of the Chinese. Thus, China clearly needed 
international tension to enhance its own position and to 
perserve its own special relationship with the USSR.
Again, the paradox in all of this is that both sides 
sought to mask their real intentions behind a blizzard of 
ideological polemics. In such a contest, one would expect 
the Russians to be easy winners. Yet, the motherland of 
Lenin found itself on the defensive, charged, and quite 
properly, convicted of revisionism. However, the Chinese
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victory was a hollow one. By 1963» Peking's power and in­
fluence within and without the Socialist camp was fantastical­
ly lower than it had been only a few years earlier. It is 
easy to conclude, therefore, that Chinese hostility toward 
the Soviet Union reached its peak during this period, not 
because of ideological differences, but because of diverging 
national interests.
An interesting sidelight to the entire polemical ex­
change of this period carries enough importance to be noted 
by itself. That is the question of peaceful coexistence 
versus world revolution. In spite of the endless Chinese 
arguments in favor of world revolution, there is no solid 
evidence that Peking really wanted an all but nuclear holo­
caust that would destroy the better part of the world. In 
fact, the Chinese made several attempts to clarify their 
position by explaining what they meant by world revolution. 
They believed that unrelenting pressure on the West, support 
for national liberation movements, and encouragement to dis­
advantaged peoples everywhere to revolt could produce enough 
turmoil to approximate world revolution. Unfortunately,
Mao's paper tiger theme and his alleged statement about losing 
half the people of China but still surviving in better shape 
than imperialism, left the Chinese open to the charge that 
they took a callous attitude toward life. Also, the Chinese 
unwisely boasted that they were not afraid of nuclear war,
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whereas they thought the Russians were. In summary, Peking 
was perfectly willing to see the world limp from crisis to 
crisis in a sort of rolling world revolution, but they did 
not want a full scale war. After 1963, of course, the whole 
issue became purely academic.
Only a few comments need to made about the years of 
196U- and 1965 that relate to Chinese communist attitudes to­
ward the Soviet Union. For one thing, the split showed 
definite signs of solidifying in 1965 after a brief relaxa­
tion in 196^. The Chinese hesitated just a bit, to see what 
Khrushchev’s successors would do, before pushing ahead with 
their anti-Russian stance. However, the nature of the attack 
changed. Before, the Chinese had shouted with outraged in­
dignation that they were right, and Moscow was wrong. However, 
they had tried by fair means or foul to make the Russians and 
the rest of the Socialist Camp admit it. During these last 
two years, on the other hand, Peking seems to have recognized 
that the game was lost, and a pervading note of bitterness 
crept into the argument. The Chinese had painted themselves 
into a corner where name-calling was about the only pleasure 
left to them. Ironically, the man they were personally be­
rating the most, Khrushchev, was removed from the scene in 
late 196^ -. Alas, for the Chinese, even the target would not 
hold S t illI
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There is a rather intriguing speculation that pre­
sents itself at this point. By the end of 1965, the Chinese 
communists had succeeded in driving virtually all "foreign 
devils" from her land. This is something that Chinese rulers 
had been trying to do for more than one hundred and fifty 
years. Of course, it is doubtful that the PRC had such a 
goal in mind when they began tilting with the Russians, but 
such a result did come to pass. To a large extent, China is 
once again the China of old, isolated, withdrawn, the center 
of her own universe. It is not likely, however, that Peking’s 
current rulers want it that way or will leave it that way.
The behavioral part of the study produced several con­
clusions of its own. Some of them relate to the general sub­
ject matter under discussion, while others bear on the utility 
of content analysis as a research device in political science.
One of the more significant conclusions developed by 
the behavioral treatment is that, officially, the Chinese 
Communists behaved themselves quite well during the period 
of greatest stress, from 1959 to 1963. One could even argue 
that the Chinese were much more loyal to the Russians than 
the Russians were to the PRC. It should be remembered that 
the Chinese were under enormous pressure at home, because of 
the dismal failure of the commune system, natural calamities, 
and a desire to show other underdeveloped countries what it 
could do. At the same time, they had to look on as the
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Kremlin wooed America and gave more economic aid to neutralist 
countries than to China. Furthermore, in 1959* Khrushchev 
reneged on his promise to give the Chinese an atomic bomb; 
in I960, he withdrew his industrial experts, along with many 
of their blueprints for running the new factories; and in 
1961 and 19 6 2, he virtually stopped all trade with the PRC.
In spite of his incredibly shoddy treatment, the Chinese 
backed Khrushchev's drive to the Summit In the year 1959; 
they backed him in I960 when the Summit meeting collapsed; 
and they initially backed him in 1962 over the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. This is not to say that the Chinese were happy at 
the propsect of always having to turn the other cheek, but 
it does illustrate that they displayed an amazing degree of 
restraint under trying circumstances. This restraint was 
discovered by a careful analysis of the content of official 
documents and statements issued from Peking. Of course, it 
might also have been discovered by a discerning review of 
the historical evidence, but it would not have been as 
dramatic or apparent.
An important contribution of the Q-Sort technique is 
that it was possible to determine, mathematically, the degree 
of hostility as expressed by the Chinese Communists toward 
the Soviet Union for the years 1959-1965. Even though the 
values derived are not absolute, they are, nonetheless, 
relative and as such, offer a better conception of the change
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lii attitudes than might otherwise be the case. For instance, 
it may be perfectly valid to surmise from the mass of his­
torical data that 1963 was a year of greater hostility than 
1962, and 1962 was more hostile than 1961, and so on. But 
would not it be stronger, and perhaps more valid, to say 
that a mathematical process has determined that the hostility 
value for 1961 is 3, for 1962 it is 4, for 1965 it is 5, and 
so on. Certainly in this situation, where the date of the 
Sino-Soviet split is still in some dispute and where the evi­
dence is somewhat fragmentary, it can be concluded that the 
use of a behavioral device was extremely helpful in lending 
substance to the study.
A couple of relatively minor comments need to be made 
about the Q-Sort itself. In essence, they have been stated 
before, so it will not be necessary to deal with them in any 
length.
Earlier, it was suggested that all aspects of the Q- 
Sort must be performed well if good results are to be expected. 
That is, the source material has to be properly selected, the 
unit statements written in the correct manner, and so forth. 
Based on the very limited experience of this one exercise, it 
would appear that the Judges' individual competencies had 
more bearing on the results than had been expected. Presum­
ably, if the three Judges had possessed a more uniform back­
ground, they might have produced more uniform results, but 
that is à very tentative conclusion.
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Another rather minor conclusion that may be related 
to the comment above, is that the judges agreed much more at 
the low-hostility end of the scale than at the high-hostility 
end. That is, they seemed to agree quite easily on what 
constituted a friendly statement, but they differed consider­
ably on the hostile ones. Oddly enough, the friendly state­
ments should have required greater discrimination than the 
hostile statements, but the judges apparently did not see it 
that way. In any event, both this comment and the one im­
mediately above, are meant to be informative rather than 
critical.
The final and most important conclusion to b\, reached 
has to do with the efficacy of content analysis as a research 
device in political science. A review of the exercise pre­
sented in this study should leave little doubt that content 
analysis can be a tremendous research technique in that 
discipline. It was possible, through extensive examination 
of a large body of available literature, to build up a his­
torical narrative suggesting the changes in Chinese attitudes 
toward the Soviet Union from the year 1959 through 1965. 
Virtually the same suggestions were reached by examining a 
much smaller body of literature, namely official documents. 
Moreover, the conclusions drawn from the historical narrative 
were based on the observations of twenty or more "China ex­
perts," whereas the conclusions based on the Q-Sort were
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based on the judgment of three people, only one of whom 
could be considered as something of a "China expert." In 
short then, when properly performed, content analysis pro­
duced, both more quickly and easily, the same results as 
the historical approach in this case. It should be made 
absolutely clear, however, that no claim is being made that 
behavioral research is "better" than historical research.
In fact, it may well be that they are both "best" when they 
are used to re-enforce each other. The only point being 
made is that the political scientist can submit a body of 
evidence to content analysis and expect good results. He 
does not need to rely exclusively on traditional methods of 
research.
In summary, Chinese Communist attitudes toward the 
Soviet Union underwent a remarkably swift change from 19^9 
through 1965* In just a little over fifteen years, these 
attitudes went from friendly subservience, to feelings of 
equality, to a position of hostility, and, eventually, to a 
sort of resigned estrangement. The behavioral exercise in­
dicates that during the final seven years under study, 1963 
was the year of greatest hostility. Finally, the close 
corroboration of conclusions gained from the historical 
narrative and the behavioral exercise covering these seven 
years, suggests that either research method is a viable tool 
for use by political scientists.
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